ftates of Europe had heretofore fo conftantly and carefully prevented, was now in part effected; Bavaria was completely fubjected to the Auftrian yoke, although deluded by a fair but falfe appearance of her ancient liberty: this artifice was accomplished under the fpecious pretext of reducing France to monarchy and order. He difcourfed at large upon this head, and concluded with his reprobation of the treaty with the emperor, because it neither guaranteed us, nor feemed to lead to any favourable iffue. Ruffia, that Coloffus of Europe, next attracted his attention; he juttified himself in calling that vaft and unbounded empire the Coloffus of Europe, by furveying her conqueft of Poland, and her extended territories into Turkey. Ruffia was a power fo enormously gigantic, and of fuch terrific afpect, as to be viewed with awe, and guarded against with the utmost dread. The ceffion of Oczakow be confidered as extremely wrong, and inimical to the intereft and fafety of Europe. Ruffia now poffeffed the unlimited navigation of all the rivers that flow into the Black Sea fouth of the Danube. Her increafing power was fatal to the industry, to the confumption, to the profperity and importance of every other power. Already our manufactures and confumption had been leffened by her thrift and circumfpection, and our industry been greatly checked; not did he doubt but that in a fhort period they would fuffer by her means a general flagnation. He defcanted on the imprudence and danger of permitting this alarming aggregation to proceed fo rapidly; and by way of illuftrating how rich our merchants were, and how much they derived from the industry and commerce of this country, . he related, that one of them had affured him, while in the treasury, that if he were willing to allow a large and apparently exorbitant falary for all his contracts, he never would or could allow him a proportionable falary to the income he received therefrom. If therefore the wealth and trade of one merchant was fo immenfe and boundless, how much caution should be used, left the trade and wealth of a great body of merchants of adequate ettimation become fubverted and ruined by our narrow prejudices. Referring to Spain, he conceived the treaty oppofite to every arrangement of any former period. He reviewed the treaty of 1686, and the treaty of Worms, which all tateimen had concurred in calling the fundamental establishment of Europe. When he compared the conduct of adminiftration with that of thote illuftrious perfons who figned the treaty of Worms, he lamented that they were neither directed by the fame motives, nor guided to the fame effect. What were the defires of Spain he did not imagine dif ficult to difcover; and then, in a strain of admirable irony, expatiated on their difcontent at Toulon, their defeated hopes of gaining the French navy, their mortification at the preference which the Toulonele gave to the English, and finally the rooted jealousy and animofity that mut enfue. He commended the noble, grand, and individual character of the Spaniard, but expreffed his difapprobation of the Spanith government, as founded upon the principles of a dark and myfterious policy, and a jealous and ambitious enterprize. His lordship next commented on the treaty with Sardinia, and animadverted on the commanding tone we had affumed toward the grand duke of Tuscany and the Genoele republic, to compel them to renounce the neutrality. He maintained, that this imperious manner, however confiftent with the common behaviour of adminiftration, was improper, and might hereafter be injurious to our intereft. What must the feelings of the grand duke be, to find himself treated like a slave, and threatened into obedience? His lordfhip read the various ftate papers that paffed between lord Hervey, his majesty's Charges des Affaires at Florence, and M, de la Fiotte, the fecretary of state to the grand duke. From thefe he inferred a variety of conclufions, all derogatory to the dignity and pride of Tulcany, and degrading to the ufual magnanimity of Great Britain. When I first perused these papers, said his lordship, I was induced to believe that the noble lord at the court of Florence, defcended from a family of high rank and fituation, might have been induced by the confcioufne.s of his own fuperiority, and the animated zeal for his country, to affume this lofty language ex voluntate; but from a fubfequent paper, it is evident, that the high infulting menaces denounced againit the grand duke, in cafe of his neutral perfeverance, were dictated by the British cabinet; and confequently the noble lord is exonerated from any imputation erroneously thrown out against him. Let us, however, confider whether fuch language was juftifiable. Let us rememher who the grand duke is, how anguft his perfon, how nobly related, and what hereafter may be his fituation! Brother to the emperor, and by the fudden revolutions that have lately happened in that family, and which may happen again, perhaps, heir to the Imperial throne: the time may foon arrive when he may feek the opportunity of revenge, and have the means of it. The late king of Spain never forgave the bombardment of Naples when he was in it; and it may be equally probable, that the grand duke of Tuscany may never forget the difhonourable station to which we rafhly endeavoured to reduce him. Do minifters believe that there is no virtue, no fenfibility in royalty? Do they fuppofe, that among other fenfations of which mankind are deprived when they frequent a court, that they alfo lofe their memory? Whatever may be their fentiments on the prefent occafion, there may be a moment in which they or their fucceffors may unavailably repent of their pride and temerity. Belide a multitude of other reasons for reprehending the treaty with Sardinia, one particularly occurred, which was, our rathness in entering the Mediterranean in an hoftile manner. It had been frequently ftated, that as we could have no neceflity ever to pass the bar, it would be madnels and impolicy to do it. This argument was ftrengthened by others; fuch as the natural alliance that might again take place between France and Spain, to the prejudice of this kingdom, &c. His lordship then made fome brief obfervations upon the fame dictatorial language we had ufed toward Swifferland, Denmark, and Sweden. The manifeftoes which paffed between lord Fitzgerald and the Canton of Bern he recited, and declared that fuch treatment toward a gonernment so wife, virtuous, and well regulated as that of Bern, was deferving of the harpeft rebuke. He pronounced a panegyric on that government, and declared, that if all the world were inundated with folly, wisdom would feek refuge in Bern, would there raife her temple, and full have adorations offered at her fhine from the pure and fimple but enlightened Swifs. From Bern his lordship turned to Denmark, where the conduct of adminiftration was equally noble, laudable, and juft. The reply of count Berhnitoffe to our remonftrance, he averred, was one of the boldeft, wifeft, and most honourable replies he had ever read. It was a state paper that thould be kept as a model for every cabinet in Europe-a paper which was confiftent in all its parts, and which, the more it was ftudied, would be the more admired. The next queftion was, what was the propofed object of the war? and the reply was, the reftitution of the ald government in France. Could any thing be more abfurd? yet even in this reply, as in every thing elfe, there was no confiftency; for all the allies appeared to act upon different grounds, and have separate views. Some demanded the reftitution of the wretched, worn-out, deftructive system, while others afsked for the conftitution' of 1789. The allies had proceeded alfo upon different grounds, and all with the fame folly and inconfiftency. First, he briefly recapitulated the duke of Brunfwick's manifefto, that fupreme mass of abfurdity, and exculpated the duke by a reference to his former character as a fovereign, a politician, and a general, as a man of an enlarged mind and excellent heart. His' character had however been latterly rendered odious throughout Europe by the publication of this very manifefto, and his fubfequent retreat; though this invasion of France was nothing more than a mad and vain attempt, and the whole he believed planned and commanded by the cabinet at Berlin. The retreat, though sọ difhonourable to the duke in the public eftimation, was applauded by every military man, for the time, who had the management and execution of it. If blame attached any where, it was to the invafion; for when the retreat was found neceflary, it was conducted in the wifest and best manner. After him, other generals had introduced themselves in the wide field of politics and armed exertions. He meant the prince of Saxe Cobourg and general Clairfayt, the one of exalted birth, and the other of affiduity and experienced va lour: yet neither of thete had fucceeded much better than the Prufiian prince, though studied in the most active school of war and policy. The fame inconfiftency was ftill manifeft, for upon the defection of Dumourier, prince Cobourg firit published a manifefto, wher in the virtue, rectitude, and meatures of general Dumourier were highly extolled; and in about four days after, the fame general published another manifeito which contradicted all that he had formerly asserted. Adverting to the declarations that had unceafingly been made by the allies, relpecting their determination not to intermeddle with the internal government of France, Ee nor nor to proceed with any intent of conquest, he fhould prove how firmly they adhered to these determinations by the manifefto of general Wurmfer when he entered Alface, by the capture of Valenciennes in the name of the emperor, and the fummons of Dunkirk in the name of Great Britain. On thefe topics he enlarged with much force, though not much novelty of argument. He maintained, that the evacuation of Toulon, with all its confecutive evils, was a juít reward for our breach of faith, and our proceeding in an offensive war. While the French confined themfelves within their own frontiers they were fuccefsful; but the men who at that time fought like heroes, loft all their energy and refolution when defcending into Germany. So it was with the Germans, on the other hand, in the fame manner, and fich would aloft always be the difference between an offenfive and defenfive war. The reafon in one degre, too, was obvious, why a defenfive war fhould be attended with better fuccefs. The men were infpirited by familiar objects, and by objects molt dear to them. Whatever was wanted for the ufe of the armies could be more easily obtained, and could be paid for by allignats, or other paper or mode of circulation among themselves, without any material difadvantage. When militating in a foreign country, they were draining their own refources to enrich trangers, and obliged to expend their, Specie. He was well affured, from the moft credible authority, that the fiege of Mentz created more diffatisfaction among the populace of Paris, than any other circumitance during the whole campaign; and that perpetual were the complaints at the expence of tranfporting provifions and arullery beyond the Rhine.After this he compared the declarations of lord Hood at the furrender of Toulon, with what had recently happened, and inveighed vehemently against the violations of faith, and the propofed reftitution of a government fo weakened, difabled, and worn-out, that it could no longer stand. He remembered that he had been at Paris about fixteen years ago, and upon his return to England, in a private converfation with that late worthy and able politician lord Chatham, he was afked his opinion of the French nation and French monarchy. He replied, that he fuppofed the French monarchy in the zenith of its glory. Ah, you are a young man, replied lord Chat ham, but I could teach you to think otherwife, for fo far is the French monarchy from the zenith of its glory, that I fufpect it has declined fo much as foon to let in night.' By way of enforcing this opinion, lord Chatham related, that when at Dijon he had read a proclamation of the king which was posted up on one fide of the street, and on turning about he read a proclamation of the parliament contradictory in every article posted on the other. Hence he reflected on the declension and fall of monarchy in France. After a variety of obfervations of the fame tendency, the noble marquis remarked, that we were perpetually blaming the violent language which was used against Great Britain in the French convention, while in our own affemblies we were no lefs guilty. If we branded their proceedings with the opprobrious title of anarchy, we muft expect to have our government marked with the fcornful name of tyranny. It was now high time that we thould adopt a nobler behaviour, and become ourselves a great example. Let England hold her hand out in amity to France, and he would pledge himself that France would come forward more than half way to meet it. It was useless to think of reducing France, as had been afferted in a very excellent pamphlet, and written too by an avowed aristocrat, and a man well approved of by most of the allied powers; he meant the pamphlet of M. Mallet Du Pan, from which he fe lected a few extracts; and concluded his fpeech with the following motion: That an humble addrefs be prefented to his majefty, To reprefent to his majesty, that the events of the last campaign have demonftrated the extreme improbability of conquering France, even under the fingular circumitance of a general confederacy formed against her : · That the duration of an extensive confederacy, neceffarily flow and ill-combined in its operations, is not to be depended on from day to day, and formed, as the prefent is, with powers, who, it is to be apprehended, from the exhausted state of their finances, wafted by profufion and war, can only fulfil their engagements to us by being fubfidized, the great burden of expence and odium muft ultimately fall upon Great Britain and Ireland : That were the war to be in future as fuccessful, as it has hitherto proved adverfe, it ought not in found policy to be continued, because no acquifitions of ter ritory can be of real, and much lefs of adequate benefit, at the rifque of prolonging the prefent, and laying the foundation of future wars : That a lofs to the nation incalculable, and almoft beyond imagination, muft follow from the diminution of product and confumption; the stagnation and deftruction of capital, and the general decay of trade, which have arisen in the place of that reduction of debt and taxes, which we were taught to expect, and which is fo effential to our external independence, and to our internal tranquillity and happiness. That the difmemberment of France, if attainable, fo far from fecuring the balance of power in Europe, must endanger, if not overturn it; as it cannot fail to augment the ftrength of the greater European powers, who, from their ambition, and the policy which they have lately adopted of acting in concert, already threaten the extinction of the independent ftates of the fecond and third order, upon whofe prefervation the liberties of Europe effentially depend. That opinions and fentiments once widely diffeminated cannot be controlled by arms, and therefore it behoves every government, which would guard against the progrefs of democratic principles, to avoid the evils which gave birth to them in France. That the obedience paid by the French Ration to its provifionary government, when in the act of oppofing a confederacy attempting to control its interior, though a ftrong proof that the prefent war is more likely to confirm than to deftroy fuch a government, yet is no proof that the French nation will continue that obedience to it, provided we fuffer them to return to a ftate of external peace, while it may be yet time for the national good fenfe to operate; That experience has demonstrated the futility of every attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of France, even if the injustice of it were problematical, and that we must deserve the deepest reproach which a nation can incur, if, to ferve the mere occafional purposes of the confederacy, we encourage further revolts in that country, where we find that we are unable to fulfil our promiles of prefent fupport, or to fave thofe who have put a confidence in us from ruin and extermination. Therefore, to implore his majesty to declare without delay, his difpofition to make peace upon fuch difinterested and liberal terms as are beft calculated to render the peace between any two nations lasting; and to communicate fuch declaration to his allies, that an immediate end may be put to that daily effufion of human blood, which, if fuffered to proceed, must change the character of the nations of Europe, and in the place of that improving spirit of humanity which has till lately distinguished modern times, fubftitute a degree of favage ferocity unexampled in the annals of mankind.' Earl Fitzwilliam faid, that the people of the country confidered this war on our part as a defenfive war. It was evident the French meant to give law to all Eu rope, and to carry their principles into the heart of every other country; princi. ples which, if propagated without oppofition, must be tremendous to every other part of the known world; and of the intention of the French to propagate them there could be no doubt, for that was confirmed by their acts. This was illuftrated beyond a doubt by many facts, and manifefted from the authority of Briffot, who was the first adviser of the declaration of war by the late king of France against the emperor. Briffot had fince declared that this war, on the part of the French, was not a war for conquest, in order to gain territory merely, or ambition only, but a war of deftruction to every lawful government. His lordship obferved, that although he regarded this war on our part as a defenfive war, yet it did not thence follow that we should not be very active in our measures. The object of the motion now before their lordihips appeared to be highly objectionable, to call on his majetty to make a diftinct fpecification of the mode in which the war was to be carried on, and in direct violation of all the treaties by which he is engaged, to call on him to abandon the common cause, without confultation with any of the other powers. This appeared to him to be highly improper; for we should at all times pay a high regard to the spirit of our treaties, and we were bound in honour by the prefent treaties. With regard to peace with France, we had no hopes of it under the prefent fyitem, unless we were prepared to facrifice every thing that was dear to us; for we had lately been told by one man in the national convention, that we may have peace if we please, but before we have it we must give up our conftitution. What after this was to be faid of the hopes we had of obtaining peace under the prefent fyftem of government in France? What were we to expect, if we were to withdraw from the present league, or to become paffive? The beft way to answer that, would be found by looking at the conduct of the French when they invaded Savoy. They openly declared they attacked Sardinia, because he was too weak to defend himfelf. It was now an avowed principle in France, that the weakness of a power was a reafon for attacking it. Would we propofe terms of peace with France, we must disband our army, or quit the territories of the republic, and then what fecurity had we that any honourable terms would be affented to on their part? The duke of Grafton faid, that there might be fome who thought that it would avail nothing to fupport a fide of a queftion against a great fuperiority: he confeffed he was not difmayed by that confideration; for he was old enough to remember, and to fee a small minority-a minority flan dered by addreffes to his majesty from different parts of the kingdom, and by other productions, and all this for advising peace with America; and yet fome of the very perfons who were fo angry at firft with this advice, adopted it, and the fmall minority grew up into a large majority in the kingdom. What then was to be dreaded in this, any more than had been encountered and fubdued in that? Nothing. The motion was calculated to promote the real welfare and profperity of the people of this country; and he believed that if right meafures had been taken fome time ago with regard to continental affairs, hundreds of thousands of the lives of our fellow-beings would have been faved; and he faw no reason why fuch teps fhould be proceeded in. He had fome time ago heard indeed, that we ought to repole a confidence in minifters: but when fo much blood and treafure were to be wasted by their schemes, and that too unneceffarily, confidence in minifters was a new doctrine to him; and he was fure it was entirely unconftitutional. There were men who were interested in continuing the fyftem, the effects of which were fo heavily felt. But he believed not many of their lordships would deny, that very alarming confequences might arife out of that continuance. We know very well, that we were two years ago in a state of great enviable profperity; perhaps as few would doubt we were tremendously fallen fince that period. For this there must be fome caufe, and he was inclined to think there might be two, each would operate in its way. The caufes he alluded to were Either the building itself, although not rotten at the heart, is in a state of dangerous decay; or minifters were corrupt in the discharge of their duty, and by inefficient, ill-judged, or unwife meatures, had brought us to our prefent condition, from which, unless timely prevented, fome ferious calamity would befall us. Either of thefe caufes was enough to bring us into a fituation, which, unless some remedy was immediately adopted, might end in our total ruin, and he was fure that a combination of thefe caufes was enough to do fo, and perhaps that combination was now working to that end moft rapidly. They would remember that about two years ago, the right honourable gentleman who was at the head of his majefty's cabinet, had, in a fpeech delivered with that matchlefs eloquence which diftinguishes him, told the public the very thriving condition of the finances of this country, the growing produce of our revenue, and above all, the probable profpect we had of continuing to ourselves the bleffings of uninterrupted peace for the space of fifteen years. That was in February 1792: the minifter had actually calculated our finances upon that prospect, and on it he had built a plan for the liquidation of our enormous debt. At that time he could not be deceived as to the affairs of France, for there was not a fingle emigrant from that country that was not a friend to the old government, and from whom he could not have received any flattering details of the good difpofition of the then ruling party in France; and yet with all this advantage from information that could not flatter him, he was pleafed to hold out to the public a profpect of the bleffings of peace for fifteen years together. What did this teach every man of a reflecting mind to infer? Either that the minitter was infincere at the time he heid out this language, or that the system on our part with reference to the politics of the continent was changed: the firit was an uncharitable, the fecond a fair inference. He would take it then that we had changed our fyftem, and that we were now to infift on a particular form of government. On this he muft own he had no idea of our fuccefs; nor did he fee juftice in our interfering at any time in the internal government of France, or of any other country. He had heard indeed that the French infifted on altering our conftitution, before they would confent to be at peace with us; but he believed that if there were wildom in our councils, and proper terms were offered for peace with the French, our conftitu |