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lity of the fentence pronounced against him, and craving such relief from its confequences as parliament could afford, fome converfation enfued, the refult of which was, that the subject should stand for confideration on the Thurfday following.

Mr. Whitbread, jun. then moved, that an addrefs be prefented to his majefty, praying that the execution of the fentence against Mr. Paimer be postponed till after Thursday next. This produced a converfation and a divifion, when the num. bers were, for the motion 34; against it 104; majority 70.

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On Thuriday, March 6, Mr. Mainwaring, after ftating feveral improprieties which had obtained refpecting a due obfervation of the fabbath, owing to the lelaxation or inad quacy of the laws relating thereto, particularly in the inftance of the practice of journeymen bakers, which part of his propofed meature would go to refrain from baking on a Sunday, except from the hours of ten till one inciulive, moved for leave to bring in a bill to explain and amend an act paffed in the twenty-ninth year of the reign of king Charles II. The motion was agreed to.

Mr. Pitt then moved for leave to bring in a bill for augmenting the militia. After a few words from lome gentlemen, who refpectively deferred the full delivery of their Sentiments to a future ftage of the bill, the motion was agreed to.

After this, Mr. Whitbread rofe and faid, it was not his intention to call into question the right of his majesty in the making of treaties with foreign powers (a right which was incontettibly vetted in the crown) but to call the confideration of the houfe to the grounds on which thofe treaties had been made, and the ultimate objects they had in view. The topics on which they had been defended were at all times the fame; and the fame difgraceful epithets with which the enemy had been loaded, were fuch as on former occafions had been applied to great nations and to great men. They were fimilar to thofe which were applied by Philip II, the tyrant, to the prince of Orange, when he was afferting the liberties of his country, The manifettoes which have been published contained the fame tone of calumny and reproach, and the French nation were unjulty libeiled. Instead of a conduct fo unbecoming, fo incompatible with the feelings and honour of a great nation, had minitters availed themiclves of the high fituation which they then held, they might

have averted the horrors of war, and the king and queen of France might now have been fafe upon their throne. He then adverted to the treaty of Pilnitz, from which he would prove the object of the confederacy, which was, on the part of the European powers, to crush the liberties of France. The treaty of lord Hood had pledged this country to fupport the conftitution of 1789, and general O'Hara's speech had confirmed this treaty, with the molt facred affurance of faith and proteetion. Yet it was obvious, that the allies never meant to accept this conftitution, which general Wurmier diftinguifhed by the name of infamous. It was alfo manifett that Pruilia was averfe to it, and no ftronger proof of this averfion could be given, thin the malevolent conduct with which La Fayette had been pursued (the defender of the conftitution of 1789) a conduct which was not turpalled by any of the tyrants of Rome. Neither Ruffia nor Pruflia, he was fure, would accept it, from their common league again't the liberties of an equitable and mild government, which they fubverted and trampled under foot. Necefiity may impose even on a good man, as the inftrument of prefervation, a murderer; yet forely he would he extremely happy to get rid of him as foon as he could. He compared the combination of powers to the expedition of the crufade, where a full remiflion of guilt was to reward the pious adventurers.

The affumption by minitters, that it was a war for a general defence of fociety, was contradicted by the ftates of Europe and of America, which ftill preferved their neutrality; and if victory were to crown our hopes of conqueft, a war with the other powers of Europe would be unavoidable. There would be a quarrel for the fpoils, and habits of plunder and rapacity would urge them on to war and violence. He confidered it then to be the intereft of the country to make peace with the republic of France; which even under its prefent odious tyranny, would still be preferable to war. For, though he would no more confide for a table adherence to treaties in the faith of kings, than in those who were in the executive government of France, yet the change of men may no more affect fuch a treaty in one cafe than in the other. He therefore, on those con- ̈ fiderations, would move,

That an humble addrefs be presented to his majelty, to reprefent to his majefty, that his faithful commons having taken into their ferious confideration the various

engage

engagements which have, by his majesty's command, been laid before the houfe, cannot forbear to express their deep concern that his majefty fhould have been advifed to enter into engagements, the terms of which appear to this houfe to be wholly incompatible with the deciarations repeatedly made to this houfe from the throne, relacive to the prof ffed objects of the prefent unfortunate war.

To reprefent to his majesty the affliction and alarm of his faithful commons, that his majesty should have been advifed to make a common caufe, with powers whole objects are unavowed and undefined, but from whofe conduct his faithful commons have too much ground to dread to carry on war for the purpose of dictating in the internal affairs of other Countries; views which have been repeatedly and folemnly dilavowed by his majetty and his minitters, and which are utterly abhorrent to thofe principles upon which alone a free people can with honour engage in war.

To reprefent to his majefty, that if the prefent war, had been what his majesty's meffage in the lalt feffion of parliament stated it to be; a war of aggreffion on the part of France, and of defence on the part of Great Britain; that by a treaty previously in exiftence between his majefty and the king of Pruffia, the co-operation and affiftance of that power were enfured to this country.

That it does not appear to this houfe that the fuccours ftipulated by the defenfive treaty of 1788, have been required by his majetty, but that a convention has been entered into, the ftipulations of which have no other tendency than the involving us in fchemes as foreign to the true intereit, as they are repugnant to the natural feelings of Englishmen; and of impofing a refraint upon his majefty's known difpofition to avail himself of any circumitances which might otherwile enable him, confiftently with the honour of his crown, and the welfare and fecurity of the country, to relieve his people from the prefent burtheniome and calamitous war.

To reprefent to his majesty, that the irruption of the French into Savoy, and their poffeffion of that part of the dominions of the king of Sardinia, did not ap. pear to his majefty fo far to endanger the balance of power in Europe, as to induce his majesty on that account to commence holtilities against France. That his faithful commons do therefore exprefs their difapprobation of that part of the treaty

recently concluded between his majesty and the king of Sardinia, by which his majefty is bound not to lay down his arms until the reftitution of Savoy fhall have been accomplished; a fpecies of engagement which it can at no time (excepting in cafes of the greatest emergency) be either prudent or proper to contract; and much less for an object which was not deemed in his majefty's wifdom to be connected with the interefts of this country, fo as to occafion a declaration of war, and which cannot now be confidered by his faithful commons as of fufficient importance to be made the indifpenfable condition of peace.

To reprefent to his maiefty, that it appears to his faithful commons to be the general tendency of thefe engagements to involve us in connexions of undefined extent, for objects which we difapprove and have difavowed, and this with powers on whofe principles of equity and moderation we are inftructed by experience to have no reliance, and whofe complete fuccefs may, in our opinion, prove fatal to the liberties of Europe.

To reprefent to his majesty, that having thus expreffed our fentiments on the engagements which his majesty has been adviled to contract, we feel it our bounden duty most humbly and earnestly to implore his majefty to confider of fuch measures as to his royal wisdom shall seem adapted (confiftently with that national faith which in common with his majefty we defire to preferve religiously inviolate) to extricate himfelf from engagements which oppose fuch difficulties to his majefty's concluding a feparate peace, whenever the interests of his people may render fuch a measure advifable, and which certainly countenance the opinion that his majefty is acting in concert with other powers for the unjuftifiable purpose of compelling the people of France to fubmit to a form of government not approved by that nation."

Mr. Jenkinson faid, the hon. gentleman who had juft spoken, so far from entering into the particular merits of the treaties which would have made the fubjet of his motion, had ranged through a wide field of matter unconnected with the motion. The difcuffion that should arife was, whether the conduct of this country to other nations was just and true? Should a motion be regularly made for peace, he would expect an adequate fecurity would be pointed out for its ftability. He juftified the propriety and neceffity of both Auftria and Pruffia entering into a war

against

against France, and infifted, that on the part of France, it was a war of aggreffion. The convention of Pilnitz, he faid, could not be confidered as an act of provocation. It is true, it declared to fet the king of France free, and to enable him to form a juft and rational government.

He here entered into a defence of the treaties, to prove it to be the intereft of Great Britain to form as many good alliances as the could; maintaining that the was not under a neceffity of continuing the war to the extent that was defined by the honourable gentleman. Situated as Pruffia was, there was no likelihood that the would lole any of her towns; and with respect to thofe in the Netherlands, the lofs of them, as forming the barrier of Europe, was a matter of no lefs importance to Great Britain than to the emperor. With respect to the treaty of Sardinia, if it produced no other effect than preventing her alliance with France, and compelling the French to keep up a strong force in that quarter, where the was attacked, it was beneficial.

Mr. Fox faid, that there was no common object to which the confederate powers directed their attention. He combated the affertion, that the French were the aggreffors against Auftria and Pruffia; and maintained, that although the emperor held out pacific meafures, no one believed fuch were his intentions, and that in point of fact he was continually interfering with the internal government of France. In reviewing the conduct of the allies toward France, he infifted, no inftances of perfidy could be fo glaring and deficient in good faith, as thofe which they had fent into the world. Witnefs the proclamations of the prince of Saxe Cobourg. When M. Dumourier first deferted the caufe of the French, the proclamation called him a wife and virtuous man; but no fooner was it discovered that his defection was merely perfonal, and not attended with all thole advantages to the combined arms which were expected, than immediately all his wifdom and virtue fled with his, power; and he remained to wander a folitary, unnoticed exile-no longer refpectable when he no more continued formidable. What next followed? In tour days after iffuing the first proclamation, a fecond made its appearance, retracting every point offered by the former, and itating as reafons for fuch conduct, that the people of France had neglected to exprefs their willingness to receive the propofitions held out by the prior one, and all this in the space of four days, when

it was impoffible that the greatest part of the kingdom could have any knowledge of the event. To fhew that we entertained a different object from our confederates, he adduced the declarations made to the Toulonefe. We promised them to protect the conftitution of 1789, and took poffeffion of the place in the name of Louis XVII, King of the French, and not using the ftyle of the old monarchy, King of France and Navarre. Let us turn our eyes and obferve what was the conduct of our ally the king of Prutia, to the man who had been the founder of that conftirution-M. La Fayette. What was his fituation? He who had become the voluntary martyr of the conftitution of 1789, was fecluded from life, dragging a milera. ble existence in the horrors of a dungeon, loaded with irons, and fuffering all the pangs that could be inflicted by the iron hand of defpotifm. He was the victim which our allies facrificed for his conduc in that point that we esteemed meritorious. The court of Pruffia had afferted, that La Fayette was not their prifoner, but the prifoner of the combined powers, and that they of themfelves had no power to liberate him. He mentioned this, not that he believed this country was an accomplice in fo black an act, but because they might have the opportunity of publicly disavowing it. At the moment alfo that we were ftating our intentions to the people of France, by means of our connexion with the port of Toulon, to go only to the reftitution of the conftitution above mentioned; at the fame time our other allies, the Auftrians, were in poffeffion of Alface, where, with a conduct diametrically oppolite to ours, they were destroying all the authorities conftituted fince the revolution, and introducing the old defpotism to its full extent. From thefe points he adduced the inference, that the objects which our allies propofed to themselves, were different from thofe which we had stated to be our's. Our object might be to restore order and peace to the kingdom of France; but he infifted the fair inference from the conduct of our allies was, that they meant to difmember the country, and indemnify themselves by plunder; unjustly appropriating the ruins of that unfortunate kingdom to their own advantage. He deprecated fuch an event, which he was fure, far from giving us even delufive repole, would be a bone of contention to the now combined powers, and prove the feeds of many future deItructive wars.

The chancellor of the exchequer faid, there

there was one leading principle which characterised the whole of the arguments of the gentlemen on the oppofite fide of the house. The principle he meant was, that we had voluntarily entered into this war, and could conclude it whenever we thought proper. But the fact notoriously was, that it was a war of aggreffion, and unremitted provocation, on the part of our enemies. This he thought unnecessary to enter into long details to prove, because he had the honour of feeling that a great majority of the honfe thought with him upon that fubject. The real queftion was, whether they had fufficiently attained thofe points which they had deemed neceffary to peace, even at the hazard and expence of a war. Confidering the circumstances, he thought we had made as much progrefs as could be expected; but even if that had not been the case, the present contest was of that magnitude, and involved fo many of our dearest rights, that our best exertions as men were due to fecure our propofed object. If we did not fucceed, our lives, liberties, and property were all infecure. Here was the fundamental difference between them and the gentlemen on the oppofite fide: if they thought the war was not a war of neceffity, they might propofe measures of peace, confiftent enough with their fentiments; but until he was convinced there exifted fome better fecurity for its obfervance than at prefent, he would continue to oppose them. They might argue, that the French were willing to treat, and would religiously obferve their contracts; and that, confequently, we might fafely throw down the barrier erected by our treaties. Yet the houfe would not readily trust thofe enemies, whom they had already feen endeavouring to detroy the focial order of all Europe. He did not think it was just to draw inferences, of its being the intentions of our allies to proceed to fuch lengths as had been stated, or that they had any unjuft motives for waging war against France, from a few particular acts.

The right hon. gentleman had asked, if laft year was included in this ftatement of the great profperity of the country? He would fay that no one felt more for the diftreffes which war occafioned than he did, but confidering minutely the circumftances that had occurred last year, he thought they gave the ftrongest and most unexampled proofs of the great refources of this country: no one that knew that to be the cafe, could argue that we were unequal to carry on the war; beiides, it

had been allowed even by the right hon-
gentleman himself, that the preffure which
affected manufacturers and the lower order
of the people had not proceeded from this
country engaging in the war, but from
the existence of the continental war, and
would have happened whether we had
And it
taken any share in it or not.
ought to be recollected, that in proportion
as the power of France on their prefent
fyftem was extended, the liberty and the
commerce of all European nations mult
be endangered, two bleffings of which
Great Britain of all others poffeffed by far
the largest thare. He next alluded to the
fhock which commercial credit had fultaine
ed last year, and its being in a degree fo
temporary gave one of the greatest proofs
of the refources of the country. We had
feen that it cea ed in a few months; and
he thought on the whole, that in the cir
cumstances of the laft year, though they
were not equal to the fplendid profperity
of the preceding years, nothing had hap
pened that ought to induce us to yield,
while we confider ourselves engaged in a
worthy caufe; on the contrary, every ap-
pearance afforded the greatest encourage-
ment to proceed. It feemed to be the
with of thofe who were enemies to the war
from the first, to bring over to their way
of thinking the friends to it; and they
left nothing untried. They had argued
the probability of our not fucceeding
finally against France, and the destruction,
even if we did fucceed, from the certainty
of future wars, fo hurtful to us and to
all Europe; an argument which he thought
was not tenable upon any rational grounds.
He replied to Mr. Fox's allufion to the
last campaign, and the comparative fitua-
tions of this country and France in the
month of Auguft laft, and at the moment
they were fpeaking. He denied that this
country, though the do not interfere with
framing an internal government for France,
was bound to accept as a government the
pretent anarchy of France, merely because
the French people willed it. The current
of no war had ever been uniform; but
comparing our fituation at the beginning
of it, with the prefent moment, he affoted
it to be very encouraging, and agreed
with the fentiments exprefled in the
king's fpeech on this point, from a con-
fideration of the pofitive circumstances
the fortreffes gained, and the barriers passed
by the combined powers, with our affik
ance. We certainly had feen, and were
now feeing, very great preparations in
France, but we likewife faw that they are

not

not made with eafe, nor were even the refult of natural caufes, profperity, or internal wealth: in proof of this, he referred to their mode of railing, recruiting, and conveying their military force, their revenue, their finance, and their expenditure; all of which exhibited no refource, but extortion keeping pace with prodigality. Compare their coits in the prefent war with thofe of our allies and ourselves, and any one must be led to think that there was much more probability that France would fink under the preffure of the war, than the combined powers. He lamented as much as any man the fufferings of La Fayette, but never could allow that his fate was at the difpofal of this country. With regard to Poland, he completely difapproved of the fyitem purfued by Ruffia and Praffia; but while they admitted injuftice in particular inftances, would they not advert to that univerfal injuftice with

which the French system threatened all th2 world? He next argued, that it was unneceffary to ask questions about the particular views of confederate powers, but difclaimed every intention to impose the ancient fyftem of detpotifin as a government for France. He concluded, that by taking a general view of the fituation of Europe now, and comparing it to what it was in the beginning of the war, we might fairly augur fuccels to our endeavours. He defended the alliances, by obferving, that as we were driven into the war, we had a juft right to avail ourselves of the affiftance of those powers whom we found already engaged as opponents to our enemies.

After a few words, in reply, from Mr. Whitbread, the houfe divided, for the addreis 26; against it 138; majority 112. [ To be continued, ]

LONDON GAZETTES.

From the London Gazette, April 3.

Whitehall, March 4. Letter, of which the following is an A extract, was yesterday received by the right hon. Henry Dundas, his majefty's principal fecretary of itate for the home department, from his royal highness the duke of York, dated St. Amand, the rit of April 1794:

from count Walmoden, that the enemy, having fucceeded in furprifing the Heffian polts at Tenbreuil, between Werwick and Ypres, got behind the Hanoverian pickets, and cut them off. Succour, however, having arrived from Menin, the enemy

were driven back, and forced to re-crofs the Lys, and to deftroy the bridge which they had made. Our lofs was one man killed, one officer and feven men wound.

From the London Gazette Extraordinary,
April 17.

On Saturday morning, the enemy attacked the advanced poits of the prince ofed, and three officers and 143 men taken priíoners.' Cobourg's army, near Cateat, in confiderable force. At first they obliged the Auftrians to retire, and to abandon three villages in their front; but upon the battalions appointed for the fupport of the out-polts moving forward, the enemy were beat back, with the lofs of upward of 500 men killed, and fixty pritoners, with five pieces of cannon. The lofs of the Auftrians, in killed and wounded, amounted to about 120 men. Since this every thing has been quiet.'

From the London Gazette, April 12.

Whitehall, April 12. A letter, of which the following is an extract, was yesterday received from his royal highnefs the duke of York, by the right hon. Henry Dundas, his majefty's principal fecretary of state for the home department. dated St. Amand, the 8th of April 1794:

"I have received this morning, a report

Whitehall, April 16. A letter, of which the following is a copy, was this day received by the right hon. Henry Dundas, his majefty's principal fecretary of ftate for the home department, from general fir Charles Grey, K. B. dated from Martinico, the 16th of March 1794.

Camp before Fort Bourbon, Island of
Martinico, March 16, 1794.

Sir,
In my dispatch of the ad ultimo, I
had the honour to acquaint you, that the
force, deftined for the expedition, was
then embarked, in Carlisle Bay, at Bar.
badoes; and, having failed very early in
the morning of the 3d, I have now the
fatisfaction to add, that we are in poffef-
fion of the whole ifland of Martinico, ex-

cepting

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