delay complying with the instructions he had received; and he has, therefore, the honour of addressing the following observations to his excellency lord Hawkesbury, which recal to recollection the spirit and the leading features of the verbal communications which he has previously made to him. By the conditions of the fourth paragraph of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, the English troops were to evacuate the island of Malta and its dependencies, three months after the exchange of the ratifications. Ten months have elapsed since the ratifications have been exchanged, and the English troops are still at Malta. The French troops, on the contrary, who were to evacuate the Neapolitan and Papal states, have not waited the expiration of the three mon ths which were granted to them to withdraw, and have quitted Tarentum, the fortifications of which they had re-established, and where they had collected 100 pieces of cannon. What can be alledged in justification of the delay in evacuating Malta? Has not the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens provided for every thing? and the Neapolitan troops being arrived, under what pretext do those of England still remain there? Is it because all the powers enumerated in the 6th paragraph, have not yet accepted the guarantee which is devolved upon them? But this is not a condition that relates to the evacuation of the island; and besides, Austria has already sent its act of guarantee: Russia, itself, has made only a single difficulty, which is done away by the accession of the first consul to the modi fications proposed, unless, indeed, England itself throws obstacles in the way, by refusing to accede to the proposals of Russia, which, after all, could not affect the engagements of his Britannic majesty, who, according to the express conditions of the treaty, is to evacuate the island of Malta within three months, placing it under the guard of the Neapolitans, who are to garrison it until the definitive arrangements of the order are settled. It should, therefore, seem impossible, and it would be without example in the history of nations, were his Britannic majesty to refuse to execute a fundamental article of the pacification, of the very one, which, in the drawing up of the preliminaries, was considered as the first, and as requiring to be settled previously to every other point, Indeed, the first consul, who cordially relies on the intentions of his Britannic majesty, and cannot suppose them to be less open and ge nerous than those with which he is animated, has hitherto been willing to attribute the delay of the evacuation of the island of Malta to any other than to maritime circumstances. un The undersigned is, therefore, charged to require explanations on this point, and he is persuaded that the British ministry will be the more anxious to furnish such as will be satisfactory, as they must be sensible how necessary they are for the maintenance of harmony, and how important they are for the honour of the two nations. The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to lord Hawkesbury the assurances of his high consideration. (Signed) F. Andreossy. Portland Place, March 10, 1802. Y y 4 No. 42. 4 at the same time, that had not even these armaments been as notorious as they were, the very circumstance of the first consul's determination to augment so considerably his arved my, in time of peace, would have been a full and sufficient motive for such a measure of precaution. 1 Your As the M. de Talleyrand now informed ance me that he was already acquainted __a- with the business; that a messenger had that morning arrived, who had 1 rupbrought him a copy of the message, art of which he communicated to me. I 1 najesty could draw from him no reply send a whatever to my observations. He parlia- confined himself strictly to the assuargis void rance which he has so repeatedly on of such made, that there was no foundation stent with whatever for the alarm which was w and the felt by his majesty's ministers; that and, at the first consul was pacific; that will mani- he had no thoughts whatever of atten for the tacking his majesty's dominions, unless forced to do so by a commenceyour lord. ment of hostilities on our part; that g apprized he should always consider the refuauto by a special sal to evacuate Malta as such a comband however, on mencement of hostilities; and that, esrand, at two as we had hitherto hesitated to do as already inso, he was justified in adopting the ie was just setting measures which might eventually be necessary. ade it to the first He disclaimed every ared under consi- idea of the armaments fitting out in c. He returned the Dutch ports having any other Comet, and though destination than to the colonies; pressed for time, and concluded, that, for his part, he could not comprehend the motives which had necessitated a resort to such a measure on the part of his majesty's government. reate the circum- nase hin sensible that I concluded " He then desired leave to go to the first consul, promising that he would let me know the result when we met at dinner at the Prussian minister's. He did not come there till near seven o'clock, and when we rose from dinner, he took me aside, aside, and informed me, that although the first consul had been highly irritated at the unjust suspicion which his majesty's government entertained, yet, he would not allow morandum to assist me, but such as I have the honour to be, &c. bury, &c. &c. &c. himself to be so far mastered by his The Right Hon. Lord Hawkes- Note Verbale referred to in No. 42. I. If his Britannic majesty, in his message, means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetsluys, all the world knows that it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of sailing for its destination, but, in consequence of his majesty's message, the embarkation and putting to sea are about to be countermanded. II. If we do not receive satisfactory explanation respecting these armaments in England, and if they actually take place, it is natural that the first consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, since Holland is mentioned in the mes M. de Talleyrand now told me, that, in order to facilitate my communication of the first consul's sentiments, he would communicate to me a paper which he had that morning drawn up with him; that it was not to be considered as any thing absolutely official; that it was a me sage. III. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and, moreover, that additional bodies should join those troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offensive and defensive position. IV. It is natural that the first consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts. V. It is likewise in the nature of things that the first consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country. VI. It is also the natural conseque'. quence of all this, that the first consul should send a fresh force into Italy, in order to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum. VII. England arming, and arming with so much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment, a step so important, as cannot fail to agitate all Europe. The result of all these movements will be to irritate the two countries still more. France will have been compelled to take all these precautions in consequence of the English armaments, and, nevertheless, every means will be taken to excite the English nation, by the assertion that France meditates an invasion. The whole British population will be obliged to put themselves under arms for their defence, and their export trade will, even before the war, be in a state of stagnation through. out the whole extent of the countries occupied by the French arms. The experience of nations, and the course of events, prove, that the distance between such a state of things and actual hostility, is unfortunately not remote. As to the differences, of which mention is made in his Britannic majesty's message, we know not of any that we have with England; for it cannot be imagined, that a serious intention can have existed in England, of evading the execution of the treaty of Amiens, under the protection of a military armament, Europe well knows, that it is possible to attempt the dismemberment of France, but not to intimidate her. No. 43. Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, March 14, 1803. My lord, The messenger, Mason, went on Saturday with my dispatches of that date, and, until yesterday, Sunday, I saw no one, likely to give me any farther information, such as I could depend upon, as to the effect which his majesty's message had produced on the first consul. At the court which was held at the Thuilleries upon that day, he accosted me, evidently under very considerable agitation. He began by asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that I had received letters from your lordship two days ago. He immediately said, and so you are determined to go to war. No! I replied, we are too sensible of the advantages of peace-Nous avons, said he, déjà fait la guerre pendant quinze ans.-As he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed only, c'en est déjà trop.-Mais, said he, vous voulez la faire encore quinze annés, et vous m'y forçez.-I told him, that was very far from his majesty's intentions.-He then proceeded to count Marcow and the chevalier Azara, who were standing together, at a little distance from me, and said to them, les Anglois veulent la guerre, mais s'ils sont les premiers à tirer l'epée, je serai le dernier à la remettre. spectant pas les traités. rénavant les couvrir de Ils ne re Il faut docrepe noir. je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez peut-etre tuer la France, mais jamais l'intimider.-On ne voudroit, said I, ni l'un ni l'autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle. Il faut donc respecter les traitês, replied he; malheur à ceux qui ne respectent pas les traités; ils en seront responsable à toute l'Europe. He was too much agitated to make it adviseable for me to prolong the conversation; I therefore made no answer, and he retired to his apartment, repeating the last phrase. It is to be remarked, that all this passed loud enough to be overheard by two hundred people who were present, and I am persuaded that there was not a single person, who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dignity as well as of decency on the occasion. I propose taking the first opportunity of speaking to M. Talleyrand on this subjećt. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) Whitworth. The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c. No. 44. Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, dated March 15, 1803. I send your excellency a copy of the note presented to me by general Andreossy on the 10th instant*, and a copy of the answer which I have, this day, by his majesty's commands, returned to it. No. 45. Note from Lord Hawkesbury to General Andreossy, dated March 15, 1803. The undersigned, his majesty's principal secretary of state for fo reign affairs, has laid before the king the note of his excellency the French ambassador of the 10th instant. In obeying the commands of his majesty, by returning an official answer to this note, the undersigned feels it necessary for him to do little more than repeat the explanations which have been already given, on more than one occasion, by himself verbally to general Andreossy, and by lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, on the subject of the note, and of the points which appear to be connected with it. He can have no difficulty in assuring the French ambassador, that his majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner; but it has not been possible for him to consider this treaty as having been founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent treaty or convention, namely, that they were negociated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and to the treaties or public engagements by which they were and that if that state of possession rially altered by the act of either of and of engagements was so matethe parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; that if there ever was a case to which this principle might be ap bound at the time of its conclusion; • Vide page 691. |