Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South AsiaStanford University Press, 2007 - 262 páginas Does the proliferation of nuclear weapons cause ongoing conflicts to diminish or to intensify? The spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia offers an opportunity to investigate this crucial question. Optimistic scholars argue that by threatening to raise the cost of war astronomically, nuclear weapons make armed conflict in South Asia extremely unlikely. Pessimistic scholars maintain that nuclear weapons make the subcontinent war-prone, because of technological, political, and organizational problems. This book argues that nuclear weapons have destabilized the subcontinent, principally because of their interaction with India and Pakistan s territorial preferences and relative military capabilities. These findings challenge both optimistic and pessimistic conventional wisdom and have implications beyond South Asia. |
Contenido
The Problem of Proliferation | 1 |
Militarized Behavior During the South Asian Proliferation Process | 14 |
Territorial Preferences and Military Capabilities | 32 |
The Nonnuclear Period | 64 |
The De Facto Nuclear Period | 92 |
The Overt Nuclear Period | 115 |
Beyond South Asia | 141 |
Dangerous Deterrent | 169 |
Appendix | 185 |
Bibliography | 243 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia S. Paul Kapur Vista previa limitada - 2009 |
Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia S. Paul Kapur Vista de fragmentos - 2007 |
Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia S. Paul Kapur Sin vista previa disponible - 2008 |
Términos y frases comunes
acquisition of nuclear Active Forces Tanks adversary Aggregate Ratio Aircraft Defense Spending all-out argues Asian attack Author interview Bangladesh behavior Benazir Bhutto Bomb China Chinese Cold War Combat Aircraft Defense Conflict Unending conventional aggression conventional conflict conventional military conventionally danger Delhi despite diplomatic DPRK facto nuclear period Forces Tanks Combat Ganguly Hagerty Ibid incentives India and Pakistan Indian government Indian leaders Indo-Pakistani conventional Indo-Pakistani relations instability Kargil conflict Kashmir dispute Kashmir insurgency launch Line of Control militarized disputes military capabilities Nawaz Sharif nonnuclear period North Korean nuclear capability nuclear deterrence nuclear escalation nuclear level nuclear proliferation nuclear weapons nuclear weapons capacity overt nuclear P. R. Chari Pakistan Army Pakistani leaders political proliferation's region result retaliation revisionist Sagan Sharif Simla Agreement South Asia South Asian security Soviet Union stability/instability paradox subcontinent Tanks Combat Aircraft territorial preferences threat Total Active Forces University Press Ussuri River violence weak Zhenbao Island
Referencias a este libro
South Asia's Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Comparative Perspective Rajesh M. Basrur Sin vista previa disponible - 2008 |