COCKBURN'S DEPREDATIONS IN CHESAPEAKE BAY. cation along the shore. With this petty force, Cockburn made for the head of the bay, spreading consternation wherever he went. The inhabit.ants seem to have become so thoroughly panic-stricken that they allowed Cockburn and his men to take quiet possession of Spesutia Island at the mouth of the river not far from Havre de Grace, and to obtain supplies of fresh food for the whole British force in Chesapeake Bay, while they spent their time not in fighting, but in hiding and carrying away their property. At Elkton the few stores in the place were emptied and the goods hurried into the country, while the specie was taken to Lancaster, Pennsylvania. At Frenchtown the people worked night and day to get every box, bale and barrel to a place of safety. This town, really but a village of a dozen buildings, had acquired some importance as a place of deposit for goods transported from Baltimore to Philadelphia. Hearing of this, Cockburn, on April 28, moved into the Elk River and sent his boats with 150 marines* to Frenchtown, drove away the few militia who made a show of resistance, and burned whatever property was found.† Cockburn then sent the troops to *James, Military Occurrences, vol. ii., p. 33. Lossing (War of 1812, p. 670) says 400 men. Admiral Warren's report of May 28, 1813, to J. W. Croker. See also American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i., p. 359; McMaster, vol. iv., p. 124; Adams, United States, vol. vii., pp. 266-267; Brackenridge, History of the Late War, p. 130; James, Military Occurrences, vol. ii., pp. 33-36, and App. viii. * 15 Havre de Grace to destroy a battery lately erected there. Reaching the place early on the morning of May 3, the British captured the earthwork (defended by three cannon and about 50 men), its defenders fleeing to the woods. Cockburn's troops then entered the village and by nightfall had burned four vessels, the ferry boats, the stages, a bridge, 13 houses, two taverns, 10 stables, a saw-mill and a blacksmith shop.† According Cockburn, the purpose of this vandalism was "to cause the proprietaries (who had deserted them and formed part of the militia who had fled to the woods) to understand and feel what they were liable to bring upon themselves by building batteries and acting toward us with so much useless rancor." Having destroyed Havre to Lossing, War of 1812, pp. 670-672. For the British account see James, Military Occurrences, vol. ii., p. 37 et seq. † McMaster, vol. iv., pp. 124-125. Lossing (War of 1812, p. 672) says that 40 of the 360 houses in the village were destroyed and the value of the property destroyed was not less than $60,000. Adams (United States, vol. vii., p. 267) says some sixty houses" were set afire. See also Brackenridge, History of the Late War, pp. 130131; North American Review, vol. v., p. 160. See Cockburn's report to Warren, May 3, 1813, in James, Military Occurrences, vol. ii., app. ix. See also the account by Jared Sparks, in North American Review, vol. v., p. 157. On the manner in which the war was conducted see the correspondence between Monroe and Cockrane in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii., p. 693, and Military Affairs, vol. i., pp. 339–381. The latter document (A Report of a Committee of Congress relating to the Spirit and Manner in which the War has been waged by the Enemy) was reprinted as Barbarities of the Enemy (Troy, 1813). On the treatment of prisoners see American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii., pp. 630, 726. 16 ATTACK ON THE JUNON. de Grace, Cockburn immediately moved up the Susquehanna in his boats and, meeting no resistance, destroyed a large cannon foundry at Cecil Furnace, together with several vessels.* His handful of men passed the day undisturbed on the banks of the Susquehanna, capturing 51 cannon and 130 stand of small arms. By 10 o'clock at night the men were again on board their ships, having sustained a loss of only one man injured. On the night of May 5-6 Cockburn sent another body of 600 troops in 18 barges into the Sassafras River, where for the first time the militia (100 in number) gathered to make a respectable defence. Cockburn landed, soon dispersed the militia, and pillaged and burned Fredericktown and Georgetown with the vessels and stores he found there, inflicting a loss estimated at $70,000. The next day (May 6) he reported to Admiral Warren that Charlestown on the northeast river and other places in the upper part of Chesapeake Bay had assured him that they were at his mercy and that neither guns nor militiamen should be suffered there.! Cockburn then returned leisurely to Lynnhaven, where for six weeks the British fleet remained comparatively inactive.* Admiral Warren's attention was then drawn to Norfolk, which was of no little importance in a commercial . sense, but which was the chief obstacle between him and the Gosport navy yard, near which lay the frigate Constellation. On June 20, just before daylight, 15 of the gunboats whose duty it was to close the mouth of the Elizabeth River came out into the Roads and attacked the British frigate Junon, 38, but were finally obliged to retire, with the loss of one man killed and two wounded. The Junon lost one man killed and received only one or two shots in her hull. † In revenge, therefore, Admiral Warren determined to take Norfolk. The utmost care had been taken to provide against attack by water. Captain Walker K. Armistead had constructed forts on the banks below the town and General Wade Hampton had taken command of the troops. Five miles below the forts on the west bank was another line of works, defended by Brigadier-General Robert B. Taylor of the Virginia militia. ‡ Separated from these works by a few yards of water was Craney Island, on * McMaster, vol. iv., p. 125; Adams, United States, vol. vii., pp. 268-269. Cassin's report in Brannan, Official Letters, p. 171 et seq.; Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812, p. 200; Cooper, Naval History, vol. ii., pp. 116117; Maclay, History of the Navy, vol. i., pp. 531532; McMaster, vol. iv., p. 126; James, Military Occurrences, vol. ii., pp. 54-56, and app. xii. Some say the ship attacked was the Narcissus. McMaster, vol. iv., pp. 126–127. THE BATTLE OF CRANEY ISLAND. which a battery of seven guns manned by 100 sailors and 50 marines from the Constellation had been established.* Captain John Cassin had also moored a line of 15 or 20 gunboats across the channel of Elizabeth River, their left resting on Craney Island. The total force on the island consisted of 735 troops. The attack was planned for June 22. The land forces (in all 2,650 rank and file) were under command of Major-General Sir Sydney Beckwith, who led the main attack in person. The force commanded by Beckwith was to approach Craney Island from the rear or mainland, while Captain S. G. Pechell of the 74-gun brig San Domingo was to approach the island with 500 troops and 200 sailors directly under the fire of the American guns on the island, but not exposed to those in the gunboats. But for the lack of concert with British forces the plan would have succeeded. At daylight of the 22d Beckwith landed with 800 men, and pushed forward to attack Craney Island from the rear.|| Pechell with his 700 meng went along the shore and approached the island from the northwest. About 11 o'clock the marine force came within range of the American battery, but instead of waiting until Beckwith could reach the rear Pechell Cooper, Naval History, vol. ii., p. 117. † Lossing, War of 1812, p. 678. James, Military Occurrences, vol. ii., p. 58. || Ibid., vol. ii., p. 57. Lossing (War of 1812, p. 679) says 2,500 men. Lossing says 1,500. 17 18 THE PILLAGING OF HAMPTON. he might easily have gone around. Nevertheless he reëmbarked his troops without further effort. Three of the British boats were sunk, three men were killed and 16 wounded, and 62 reported as missing. The Americans suffered no loss whatever.* To compensate his men for the failure at Craney Island, Warren immediately devised another movement. Opposite Craney Island, ten miles away on the north shore of the James River, stood the village of Hampton, which was of neither military nor commercial importance. A sand battery manned by 400 or 500 raw Virginia militia defended the town. In In his official report of June 27, 1813, Warren said that the enemy had a post at Hampton, defended by a considerable corps, commanding the communication between the upper part of the country and Norfolk, and he therefore considered it advisable to attack it with a view to cutting off their resources.† This served as Warren's excuse for the attack. Accordingly, on the morning of June 25, Beckwith's troops were sent ashore two miles above the village with orders to take it in the rear while Cockburn with his barges made a feint in front. The militia made a good fight and in Adams, United States, vol. vii., pp. 270-275; McMaster, vol. iv., pp. 126-128; Dawson, Battles of the United States, vol. ii., p. 257; Cullum, Campaigns of the War of 1812 to 1815, p. 273; Harper's Magazine, vol. xxviii., p. 10; Virginia Historical Register, vol. i., p. 132; James, Military Occurrences, vol. ii., pp. 58-64. xiv. James, Military Occurrences, vol. ii., app. flicted a loss of nearly 50 men on Beckwith's troops, with a loss to themselves of about 30.* But they soon gave way and the British troops entered the town, where they were allowed to do as they pleased with property and persons. In his diary Lieutenant-Colonel Charles J. Napier says that every horror- rape, murder and pillage - was perpetrated with impunity and not a man was punished. In their report the American commissioners appointed to investigate the matter said: "We are sorry to say that from all information we could procure, from sources too respectable to permit us to doubt, we are compelled to believe that acts of violence have been perpetrated which have disgraced the age in which we live. The sex hitherto guarded by the soldiers' honor escaped not the rude assaults of superior force." Beck See also James, Naval History, vol. vi., p. 234; Adams, United States, vol. vii., pp. 275-276; Brackenridge, History of the Late War, pp. 134136; McMaster, vol. iv., p. 128. In his report to the House on British atrocities on July 31, 1813, Bacon said: "These barbarities may be rationally considered as the consequence of the example set by the officers of the naval force on our coast. *** That troops who had been instigated by the example of their officers to plunder the property and burn the houses of unarmed citizens, should proceed to rape and murder, need not excite surprise, however it may The shrieks * inspire horror, heard by the American prisoners, but were too weak to reach the ears or disturb the repose of the British officers, whose duty, as men, required them to protect every female whom the fortune of war had thrown into their power. The committee deeply regret that the evidence so clearly establishes the truth [of the charges * * * * * were DECATUR AND THE BLUE LIGHT TREASON. with attempted to justify the atrocities by the law of retaliation and also tried to shift the blame to some French soldiers attached to the British forces, but it cannot be denied that an officer is responsible for the conduct of the troops under his command. Warren and Beckwith subsequently dismissed the Chasseurs Brittaniques from the service.* Warren made no attempt to hold the town, but after two days retired with his troops to Lynnhaven. During the rest of the year he cruised about the bay, meeting with little resistance and keeping Virginia and Maryland in constant alarm.† In the North attacks on the coast were conducted by Commodore Sir Thomas Hardy in a manner much more creditable to British arms. arms. Nevertheless his blockade was stringent and its efficiency was shown by the failure of Decatur's efforts to evade it. Decatur was at New York with the United States, the Macedonian, and the Hornet, waiting for a chance to slip out. Despairing of running the blockade off Sandy Hook, Decatur took his fleet through the East River into Long Island Sound. He reached Montauk Point on May 29 and on June 1 attempted to run out, but was chased by three of the 19 enemy's ships and was compelled to put back to New London.* A British squadron immediately closed up the harbor and Decatur withdrew his ships as far as he could into the river and took every precaution to repel an attack. Though the British made no attempt to take the town, Decatur was obliged to remain idle all summer.† He still clung to the hope of escaping during the winter, thinking that the British (because of the severity of the weather) would then be less vigilant. But, according to his letter sent to the Secretary of the Navy, as often as he attempted the passage blue light signals would be displayed at the harbor's mouth, thus warning the British squadron. He said that these signals had been seen by many persons in the squadron, but he had been unable to detect those who communicated with the enemy. Decatur's letter of December 20 was brought up in the House of Representatives in January of 1814, but nothing resulted from the investigation.|| The northern seacoast, which had thus far experienced little molestation from the enemy, became the object of attack early in the spring. Determined to stop blockade-running, the British naval officers proclaimed a blockade of the entire seacoast and * Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812, p. 177; Lossing, War of 1812, p. 691. Cooper, Naval History, vol. ii., p. 119. || Adams, United States, vol. vii., pp. 278–280; Ingersoll, History of the Second War, vol. ii., p. 55; Waldo, Life of Decatur, chap. xiii. |