Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You ThinkCambridge University Press, 2014 M04 7 In Anarchy Unbound, Peter T. Leeson uses rational choice theory to explore the benefits of self-governance. Relying on experience from the past and present, Professor Leeson provides evidence of anarchy 'working' where it is least expected to do so and explains how this is possible. Provocatively, Leeson argues that in some cases anarchy may even outperform government as a system of social organization, and demonstrates where this may occur. Anarchy Unbound challenges the conventional self-governance wisdom. It showcases the incredible ingenuity of private individuals to secure social cooperation without government and how their surprising means of doing so can be superior to reliance on the state. |
Contenido
Social Distance and SelfEnforcing Exchange | 15 |
The Laws of Lawlessness | 32 |
Trading with Bandits | 57 |
Efficient Plunder | 75 |
Pirates Private Order | 105 |
Criminal Constitutions | 132 |
Efficient Anarchy | 155 |
Better Off Stateless | 170 |
An Argument for Anarchy in LDCs | 197 |
A Future for Thinking about SelfGovernance | 211 |
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| 243 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think Peter T. Leeson Vista previa limitada - 2014 |
Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think Peter T. Leeson Sin vista previa disponible - 2014 |
Términos y frases comunes
Admiralty Africa agreement anarchy Anglo-Scottish Anglo-Scottish border behavior benefit border law border reivers captain caravans cheater citizens clerics Coasean conflict consider continuous dealings cost costly countries created criminal constitutions criminal organizations cross-border cursed day of truce deadweight loss didn’t discipline of continuous discussion economic efficient plunder enforcement essay example exchange Familia familianos gang government’s homogeneity improvement incentive individuals instance institutions interactions intergroup investments law merchant LDCs Leeson Leges Marchiarum letters of marque malediction mechanisms of self-governance medieval merchant ship merchantmen middlemen Mogadishu multilateral punishment Nuer one’s organization’s owners payoff percent persons pirate crews pirate ships plunder contracts population potential predatory government prevent principal-agent problem prisoners privateers prize court problem Puntland quartermaster ransom Rediker reiving sassywood Sierra Leone social distance social rules social-distance-reducing signals societies Somalia Somaliland statelessness there’s tion trading on credit U.S. dollar UNDP vessels victims violent theft warden