But let it be conceded that the proviso of the 11th section was repealed by implication, when the position of the officers and soldiers was changed, and a new prohibition enacted and applied to the new reserve; still it would be difficult to maintain that this silent repeal, implied from the removal of the object for which it was originally and chiefly intended, should apply to another object originally preserved by the provision, and for which it continues to be necessary. But the court does not found its opinion on this position, however well it may be supported by justice. The proposition is believed to be perfectly correct, that the act of 1783, which opened the land office, must be construed as offering for sale those lands only which were then liable to appropriation, not those which had before been individually appropriated. Whatever the legislative power may be, its acts ought never to be so construed as to subvert the rights of property, unless its intention so to do shall be expressed in such terms as to admit of no doubt, and to show a clear design to effect the object. No general terms intended for property to which they may be fairly applicable, and not particularly applied by the legislature ; no silent, implied, and constructive repeals, ought ever to be so understood as to devest a vested right. But it is contended, that this construction of the acts of 1783 is forced upon us, because the rights of others, and not the right of General Greene, are exempted from the operation of that section which of 1817. Rutherford V. Greene's heirs. 1817. fers for sale all the land within the described terri Rutherford tory; and the exception of one object excludes V. others of the same character. Greene's heirs. Without inquiring what would be the force of this argument, if, in point of fact, rights similar to those of General Greene were received, and his omitted, let the fact be examined. The first reservation in the act for opening the land office, related to the lands of the Cherokee Indians. Nothing could be more obvious than the necessity, as well as propriety, of prohibiting all entries on Indian lands lying within the boundary offered for sale, if the legislature intended they should not be entered. The Indian title was not derived from the state of North Carolina; and to infer from the recognition of this title, that others actually derived from the state, if not also recognized, are annulled, is not admitted to be correct reasoning. The only other reserve in this act is of the land within the limits allotted to the officers and soldiers, and within these limits was the land surveyed for General Greene. Our attention is next directed to the act to amend the act "for the relief of the officers and soldiers," &c. This act narrows the limits within which the military lands shall be surveyed, or changes them, so that, in either case, the lands of General Greene are no longer within them. Nothing can be more obvious than that provisions relating to lands within this particular territory can have no implied application to a title previously acquired by General Greene to lands not lying within it. The 8th section of the act prohibits all persons from entering lands within the bounds allotted to the officers and soldiers. The 9th section excepts out of this prohibition the commissioners and surveyors, &c., appointed to lay off the military lands, and prescribes the mode by which they may appropriate and acquire title to lands given to them by the legislature. The 13th section enacts that Governor Martin and David Wilson be entitled, agreeably to the report of the committee, to two thousand acres of land each, adjacent to lands allotted to officers and soldiers for which they may receive titles in the same manner as the officers and soldiers. The insertion of this reservation in this act leads almost necessarily to the opinion that the lands granted to Martin and Wilson were a part of those to which the act related; and the words of the section show that their title was acquired by this act, By no course of just reasoning can it be inferred from these permissions to make appropriations within bounds not open to entry generally, that a vested right to lands not lying within the limits to which this act relates, is annulled. It is clearly and unanimously the opinion of this court that the act of 1782 vested a title in General Greene to 25,000 acres of land, to be laid off within the bounds allotted to the officers and soldiers, and that the survey made in pursuance of that act, and returned in March, 1783, gave precision to that title, 1817. Rutherford V. Greene's heirs. 1817. Johnson V. Pannel's heirs. and attached it to the land surveyed. That his rights are not impaired by the acts of 1783, and the entry of the appellant, all of which are subsequent to his survey; and that it is completed by the grant which issued in pursuance of the act of 1784, and which relates to the inception of his title. The decree of the circuit court, dismissing the bill of the complainant, is affirmed, with costs. Decree affirmed. (LOCAL LAW.) JOHNSON V. PANNEL's heirs. It is essential to the validity of an entry, that the land intended to In taking the distance from one point to another on a large river, the fective, unless the particular object is one of sufficient notoriety. If, after having reached the neighbourhood, the locative object cannot be found within the limits of the descriptive calls, the entry is also defective. A single call may, at the same time, be of such a nature (as, for example, a spring of general notoriety) as to constitute within itself both a call of description and of location; but, if this call be accompanied with another, such as a marked tree at the spring, it seems to be required that both should be satisfied. The call for an unmarked tree of a kind which is common in the neighbourhood of a place sufficiently described by the other parts of the entry to be fixed with certainty may be considered as an immaterial call. Therefore, where the entry was in the following words, "D. P. enters 2,000 acres on a treasury warrant on the Ohio, about twelve miles below the mouth of Licking, beginning at a hiccory and sugar tree on the river bank, running up the river from thence 1,060 poles, thence at right angles to the same, and back for quantity," it was held that the call for a sugar tree might be declared immaterial, and the location be sustained on the other calls. The entry was decreed to be surveyed, beginning 12 miles below the mouth of Licking on the bank of the Ohio, and running up that river 1,060 poles; which line was to form the base of a rectangular parallelogram to include 2,000 acres of land. 1817. Johnson V. Pannel's heirs. THIS cause was argued by Mr. Talbot, for the Feb. 25th. appellants, and Mr. M. B. Hardin, for the respondents. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion March 6th. of the court. This case depends on the validity and construction of an entry made in the state of Kentucky by David Pannel, the ancestor of the appellees, in these words: "David Pannel enters 2,000 acres on a treasury warrant on the Ohio, about twelve miles below the mouth of Licking, beginning at a hiccory and sugar tree on the river bank, running up the |