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1817.

Raborg

V.

Peyton,

(Israel v. Douglas, 1 H. Bl. 239.,) which can only be upon the footing of a privity of contract.

But the most important case is that of Bishop v. Young, 2 Bos. & Pull. 78. It was there held, in opposition to what was supposed to have been the doctrine of former cases, that debt would lie by the payee of a note against the maker, where the note was expressed to be for value received. That decision was given with measured caution, and the court expressly declined to give any opinion upon any but the case in judgment. The case in Hardres was there discussed, and although its reasoning was not impugned, an authoritative weight was not attempted to be given to it. In general, the legal predicament of the maker of a note is like that of the acceptor of a bill. Each is liable to the payee for the payment of the note or bill in the first instance; and after endorsement, each incurs the same liabilities. And if an action of debt will lie in favour of the payee of a note against the maker, it is not easy to perceive any sound principle upon which it ought to be denied against an acceptor of a bill. The acceptance of a bill is just as much an admission of a debt between the immediate parties as the drawing of a note.

The case has been thus far considered as if the action were brought by the payee against the acceptor. And this certainly presents the strongest view in favour of the argument. But in point of law every subsequent holder, in respect to the acceptor of a bill, and the maker of a note, stands in the same predicament as the payee. An acceptance is as

much evidence of money had and received by the acceptor to the use of such holder, and of money paid by such holder for the use of the acceptor, as if he were the payee. (3 T. R. 172. Id. 184. Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1515.)

Upon the whole, we do not think that the authority in Hardres can be sustained upon principle; and we see no inconvenience in adopting a rule more consonant to the just rights of the parties as recognised in modern times. In so doing, we apply the well-settled doctrine that debt lies in every case where the common law creates a duty for the payment of money, and in every case where there is an express contract for the payment of money. We are, therefore, of opinion, that debt lies upon a bill of exchange by an endorsee of the bill against the acceptor, when it is expressed to be for value received. The case at bar is somewhat stronger; for the declaration expressly avers that the bill was drawn, endorsed, and accepted for value received, and the demurrer admits the truth of the averment.

This opinion must be certified to the circuit court of the district of Columbia.

From the view which has been taken of the case it is unnecessary to consider whether the statute of Virginia applies to it or not.

Certificate accordingly.

1817.

Raborg

V.

Peyton.

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By the act of incorporation of the Union Bank of Georgetown, ch. 86.
sec. 11. the shares of any individual stockholder are transferrable
only on the books of the bank, according to the rules (conformably
to law) established by the president and directors; and all debts
due and payable to the bank, by a stockholder, must be satisfied be-
fore the transfer shall be made, unless the president and directors
should direct to the contrary. Held, that no person could acquire
a legal title to any shares, except under a regular transfer, accord-
ing to the rules of the bank; and if any person takes an equitable
assignment, it must be subject to the rights of the bank, under the
act of incorporation, of which he is bound to take notice.
A creditor may lawfully take and hold several securities for the same
debt, and cannot be compelled to yield up either until the debt is
paid; therefore, the bank has a right to take security from one of
the parties to a bill or note discounted by it, and also to hold the
shares of another party as security for the same.

APPEAL from the circuit court for the district of Columbia.

James Smith, on the 19th of March, 1811, drew a bill at sixty days sight, on James Patton, in favor of Andrew Smith, for 1,800 dollars. This bill was accepted by Patton, and was discounted in the Union Bank of Georgetown, at the instance of Andrew Smith, and when it became due, another bill of the same tenor was drawn and accepted by Patton, and discounted for the purpose of paying the preceding acceptance. This last acceptance became due on the 14th and 17th of July, and was protested for

non-payment; and at the time that it became dae, Patton held 50 shares of stock in the Union Bank, which the bank considered liable to the payment of this acceptance, under their act of incorporation.

At this time, also, James Patton had another debt pending in the bank. Being one of the original subscribers to the bank, for the above-mentioned 50 shares of stock, he borrowed of the bank, in Janu ary, 1811, the sum of 1,500 dollars, and to enable him to obtain the loan, procured Marsteller and Young, and the defendant, Laird, to become his endorsers. This loan was renewed from time to time, and was continued, without any default of payment, until about the 29th of July, 1811.

On the 26th of March, 1811, Patton obtained from the officers of the bank a certificate of his 50 shares of stock, and on that day delivered it to the defendant, Laird, to secure him, as it was alleged, against his endorsement for Patton.

On the 10th of July, 1811, Patton executed a power of attorney, authorizing the defendant, Laird, to make a transfer of his stock; and on the 22d of August, 1811, he executed a deed of assignment to the defendant, Laird, of his stock: but as this assignment was not made upon the books of the bank, it was not considered a valid assignment, according to the rules of the bank.

Laird, considering himself entitled to the benefit of these shares, under the circumstances, applied to the bank to transfer upon their books the shares for his own benefit. But the bank, upon the ground that the acceptance which Patton had failed to pay

1817.

Union Bank

V.

Laird.

1817.

Union Bank

V.

Laird.

March 14th.

March 15th.

operated as a lien upon those shares, refused to suffer the transfer to be made until that debt was paid.

Laird, some time after this refusal, to wit, on the 22d of February, 1812, paid the 1,500 dollars, for which he was endorser for Patton, reserving, nevertheless, his equitable claim upon the stock, and then instituted this suit in chancery, against the Union Bank, to compel them to suffer the transfer to be made on their books for his benefit, and to account with him for the intermediate profits. He charged in his bill, that when Patton obtained the certificate of his shares of stock, it was with a view of pledging those shares with him for his indemnification, and that the officers of the bank had a knowledge of this fact. He also alleged, that the of attorney was granted with the same view.

power

The directors of the bank filed their answer to this bill, and denied any knowledge of the object for which the certificate of shares was obtained; and alleged, that they knew nothing of any claim of Laird upon those shares, until after the protest of Patton's acceptance.

The court below made a decree in favor of Laird, that the bank should suffer him to transfer the shares for his own benefit, and have an account for the intermediate profits.

The cause was argued by Mr. Swann, for the appellants, and by Mr. Jones, for the respondent.

Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the

court.

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