The French army was now difengaged, and the main ftrength of the Auftrians broken: but there ftill remained confiderable divifions, without the difperfion, or the capture of which, the victory obtained over them would not be complete, as they would either throw themselves into Mantua, join the papal forces, or retreat into the Imperial territories, where they would help to form a new army. For thefe reafons, as not a moment was to be loft in preventing the vanquished Auftrians from effecting their retreat; on the very night of the fourteenth, as foon as the battle had terminated in favour of the French, divifions were immediately difpatched to purfue every body of Auftrians that ftill kept together. They had not quitted a ftrong pofition at Corona, near Rivoli, where they remained in expectation of being able to collect and arrange their retreating troops: but before this could be effected, a large divifion of the French, after marching with all expedition during the night of the fourteenth, came upon their rear next morning, while they were attacked in front by general Joubert. They refifted vigoronfly at firft; but were at laft thrown into diforder. Those who were able to make a retreat, directed it towards the Tyrol : but no lefs than fix thousand were fo completely furrounded, that they were obliged to lay down their arms. Buonaparte hinfelf, with a ftrong divifon, having left the neceflary orders with general Jourbert, proceeded, immediately after the battle, in queft of Provera, an Auftrian general, who had, on feveral occafions, highly distinguished himfelf, by the kilfulnels of his mas nœuvres. He was at the head of ten thousand men, and had croffed the Adige, where he had forced the French, that guarded the paflage, to retire, and he was now marching with all fpeed towards Mantua. But he was overtaken, early in the morning of the 15th, by generał Augereau, who cut off the whole of his rear. He made his way, however, by a running fight, to the French lines of circumvallation at Mantua, where he arrived at noon, after lofing two thousand men, and fourteen pieces of cannon. He was now reduced through this laft, and the other encounters on his march, to no more than fix thoufand men. With this diminifhed force, he did not, however, hefitate to affault the en trenchments of the befiegers at the fuburbs of St. George, by carrying which he would have fecured his entrance into the city but they were fo ftrong and well defended, that he was repulfed. His fituation was now fuch, that unless he could enter Mantua, he muft yield to the enemy. To avoid this dif after, Provera made a refolute attack on the French poft of La Favorita, another fuburb, while a ftrong detachment from the garrison fupported him. But this attempt, which was made in the night of the fifteenth, in hope of furprifing the enemy, failed in every point. The Auftrians, who had fallied out of the city, were driven back by general Victor: and general Serrarier took a pofition between La Favorita and St. George, which fecured this latter poft, and enabled the corps ftationed there to join that of Serrarier. Thus reinforced, he fell upon Provera's rear, while his front was occupied in the attack : of ef La Favorita, and other troops advanced upon him at the fame time: thus farrounded on every fide,all hope of affiftance from the garrison was given over, and he was compelled to furrender himself, with his whole remaining force, confifting of feven thousand horfe and foot, and twenty-two pieces of cannon, befide all the baggage and ammunition. What added confiderably to the misfortune of this day was the lofs of the volunteer corps of young gentlemen of Vienna, who were all either flain or made prifoners. This day decided the fate of Mantua. Though it continued to make a courageous defence, it was evident, that being now deprived of all reafonable hope of relief, all farther refiftance would be fruitlefs, and would only add to the numbers that had fallen in this defructive fiege. Every day brought feh tidings of the loffes and defeats of the Auftrians, who were perfed in all directions, and totally difabled from making any effectual stand. The battle of Arcola had deftroyed the fourth, and the battle of Rivoli the fifth, army oppofed to Buonaparte. He had, fince the commencement of this year, been victorious in eight engagements, two of them pitched battles, wherein the lofs of the Auftrians amounted to twenty-five thoufand prifoners, exclufive of the fain, who were calculated at fix thousand. The fatigues and exertions of the French had been fuch, that Buonaparte, in his difpatches to the directory, afferted that they had, while fighting at intervals, ocrafionally measured thirty miles of ground in a day, The Auftrians were, in the mean time, retreating to their strong holds on the Brenta, which Alvinzi was employed in rendering tenable against the purluing enemy. But the expeditious movements of the French afforded him no refpite. General Augereau croffed the lower Brenta, and advanced to Citadella, a place of ftrength, from whence he diflodged the enemy; while Maflena, paffing it in front of Baffano, compelled the Autirians to evacuate it with precipitation, though they had prepared to defend it. They withdrew to Carpanedolo, higher up the river; but were followed and defeated by the French, who forced their paflage over the bridge at that place, after an obftinate conflict, wherein they flew and took upwards of a thoufand of the enemy: this action happened on the twenty-fixth. Fortunately for the Auftrians, the heavy rains that enfued, preferved the remainder of them, who hafted, with all fpeed, towards the narrow paffes of the entrance into the Tyrol. A divifion of the French, under Joubert, overtook them, however, at Avis, and a part of their rear-guard was taken. They retired to Tortola, a place advantageoufly fituated between the lake of Guarda and the Adige, where they made preparations to difpute the march of the French to Trent: but they were driven from this poft, and led to Roveredo, which they were allo compelled to abandon by Joubert, who, purfuing his fuccets, made himself mafter of Trent Here two thoufand fick and wounded fell into his hands, and as many more had been made prifoners in the different encounters previoutly to the taking of this city. The The Auftrians had now pofted theimfelves in force at Lavis, intending to flop the progrefs of the French, by occupying the other fide of the river Lavifio; but this intention was fruftrated, by the rapid advance of Joubert, who forced them from this important pofition, after fuftaining a great lofs of their best troops, and in particular of a felect corps of Hungarians. Here the divifion of Joubert was reinforced by that of Maflena, who had been equally fuccefsful; and, in his purfuit of the Auftrians, after the action at Carpanadolo, had taken feveral places of ftrength, and driven them to the other fide of the Pradas, after feizing a large part of their baggage. The Imperial armies were now totally expelled from Italy, and nothing remained to the emperor but the city of Mantua, which was fo clofely blockaded, and fo vigoroufly preffed, that no fupplies of provifions, or of men, could enter. The garrifon, defpairing of all relief, began to think it time to furrender, weakened by the great flaughter it had fuffered in fo many fallies, and by a contagious diftemper, that committed great ravages in the city. The Auftrians agreed, at length, to a capitulation, upon the fecond day of February. The terms were as honourable as the defence had been brave. The French general fhewed a laudable propennity to pay due regard to the merit of his rival, who, notwithstanding his late ill fuccefs, was defervedly efteemed a warrior of the most diftinguifhed rank. He granted him an efcort of two hundred horie and feven hundred foot, whom he was permitted to flect, together with thirty pieces of artillery: the gene rals, and principal officers under him, were allowed, in like manner, to accompany him on their parole; the reft of the garrifon remained prifoners of war. The northern parts of the papal territories were already in the pofletion of the French, and it was expected that as foon as Buonaparte was free from inquietude, on account of the Auftrian armies fill hovering on the borders of Germany, and had fecured the capture of Mantua, he would immediately proceed to Rome itfelf, and dictate the conditions of a prace. The pope, in the mean time, relied upon the exertions of the emperor, and had determined to wait the iffue of the operations of his army, under Alvinzi, firmly hoping that it would be more fuccefsful than thofe that had preceded it. Buonaparte was fincerely defirous of a pacification with the head of the Romish church, a refpectful treatment of whom would, he was confcious, be highly gratifying to all the Roman catholic ftates and people. Prompted by these motives, and intirely averfe at coercive meafures, he wrote a letter to cardinal Mattæi, prime minifter to his holinels, requetting him to prevail on the pope to recommence pacific negociations, in order to prevent the march of the French armies into his territories, and to reprefent to him the inutility of arming his fubjects against men who had overcome fo many formidable enemies, and whom his own people were wholly incapable to refitt. This letter was dated the twentyfixth of October, 1796. Buonaparte was then preparing to march againft Alvinzi, who was at the tead of a numerous army, and had cbtained fome fucceffes over the French, which had revived the hopes of the Auftrians, and their adherents. But the battle of Arcola, wherein these were completely defeated, and the fubfequent advantages gained by the French, made, at laft, fuch an impreffion on the court of Rome, that, dreading to wait any longer for more fortunate events, the cardinal was directed to return an answer. This came to país after the lapfe of fix weeks from the receipt of the general's letter. The motive for this delay being obvious, it was neceffary to qualify it, fo as to foften his difpleafure at an anfwer being fo long deferred. The cardinal laid before the general the anxiety of the pope to remedy the diforders that had fo long distracted France, and the facrifices he had consented to make of every worldly confideration, for the fake of restoring a good understanding between France, and the Roman fee. He complained that, not fatisfied with thefe conceffions, the French government, elated with the fuccefs of its arms, had made requifitions incompatible with the dictates of his confcience, and fubverfive of all Chriftian and moral principles. Grieved at fuch intolerable demands, he had implored the affiftance of heaven, to direct him how to act in fo difficult a fituation. Doubtlefs, faid the cardinal, he was infpired, on this occafion, by that holy fpirit which had animated the primitive martyrs in the caufe for which they fuffered. Having laboured, in vain, to bring the directory to a more equitable way of thinking, he thought it neceflary to refift them by open force. He admonished the general to reflect, that the death which awaited men in battle was the commencement of eternal life and happiness to the righteous, and of everlafting mifery to the wicked, Armed with this conviction, faid the cardinal, we fhall oppofe you with that confidence in the divine aid, which a juft caufe infpires. He reminded him that he was not invincible, and that though infidels, and pretended philofophers, ridiculed the idea of affiftance from heaven, yet, if Providence were pleafed to interpofe, the French would contend in vain against the power of the Almighty, He concluded, by telling the general, that if the French were defirous of peace, the Roman fee defired it ftill more, and was willing to fubfcribe to any terms, confeientious and equitable, in order to obtain it. Such was the purport of this remarkable letter, which, to speak truth, was written at a time, when the reafonings it contained were little calculated to influence the proceedings of fuch a people as the French. Nor did the court of Vienna itself teftify much willingnefs to be connected with a power whole co-operations were likely to prove fo feeble. But the folicitations of the court of Rome were fo prefiing, that the Imperial minifters, unwilling wholly to abandon the holy fee to the control of France, confented to join a body of troops to thofe that were now raifing in every part of the papal dominions. In this dereliction of the pope, the moft fervent of his former adherents feemed, at this period, to agree without reluctance. So efficacious was either the dread, or the influence, of France over the councils councils of Spain, that, notwithstanding the earneft fupplication of the archbishop of Pigri, nuncio, at Madrid, for the interference of the Spanish monarch, in behalf of the Roman pontiff, he was anfwered, that the conduct of the court of Rome, refpecting the French, was temporifing and unfincere, and that thofe who were entrufied with the administration of its political concerns, had, by their imprudence, and erroneous management, brought them into fo critical a fituation, that it seemed adviseable, for the prefervation of the perfonal fafety of the pope, that he should refign his temporal poffeffions, in order to fecure the rights of the church, and to prove his difinterestedness, and the fervour of his piety, by an example that would prove fo edifying to all the Chriftian world. Such was the anfwer of the prince of peace, the Spanish minifter's title, to the agent of a power that had formerly exercised an almoft boundless influence over the minds of both the fovereign and people of the Spanish monarchy. This taunting and difdainful reply to an humble and fubmiffive addrefs from a fovereign prince, who, though not powerful, ftill poffeffed a flation of great dignity in Christendom, was confidered equally by the Roman catholics and proteflants as even more impolitic than infulting. It was difgraceful to a prince of the Romish communion, and it yielded up tamely, and with out need, the dominion of a very confiderable portion of Italy, to a power which all Europe was become more interested than ever, in reftraining within its former limits. The period when this tranfaction happened, which was the clofe of September, 1796, fhewed, at the fame time, from whence it originated. Spain had, a month before, concluded an alliance, offenfive and defenfive, with France, and a week after it declared war against England. But the truth was, that Spain was no longer its own miftrefs. It was become a dependant of France, and had fo little left of its former fpirit, and confequence, that it did not dare to act otherwife than by the impulfe of the French, who now directed the Spanish councils with a full consciousnets of unrefifted fway. The fituation of the Roman fee was, in the mean time, peculiarly difficult. That fpiritual power, it had fo long exerted over kings and nations, was totally vanithed. Cunning and artifice were almoft the only inftruments of the fmallest importance remaining to it, even among the princes and ftates of its own perfuafion; but even this was daily leflening, from the diminution of thofe religious confiderations on which it was founded. The principal motive, therefore, for not fuffering the downfal of the pope, had no reference to his fpiritual, but merely to his political, character; which rendered it highly expedient to prevent the papal territories from being made the prey of the French, or of their adherents. The court of Rome itfelf relied hardly upon any other motives for the affiftance it fo warmly folicited from that of Vienna. This evidently appeared from a letter, written by cardinal Bufca, the Roman fecretary of fiate to the papal nuncio at Vienna, and which was intercepted, and fent by Buonaparte to the directory. Herein all the arguments |