defended the action of the Church in the Middle Ages, partly on the ground of the religious unity of that time. The religious dissensions of modern times, as they alter the condition, change also the relative obligations of Church and State.

And as there is no common religion, so there is no head of a religious commonwealth. Nor have the spiritual rulers in any country direct influence over the appointment of sovereigns. Here again the Church, instead of exercising any right of protest, and refusal, can only observe a prayerful silence.

Finally, and perhaps chiefly, the changed state of society in modern times relieves the Church of many of those duties which were imposed upon her by her position as sole guardian of public justice, sole refuge of the oppressed, sole bulwark against tyranny. Though we consider that, when the Church was recognized, subjects enjoyed far more of real liberty, though we consider the modern state to be in theory, as our author says, a despotism founded on physical force, or the brute will of a majority,-careless of that Divine sanction which upholds the real rights equally of rulers and of subjectsthough we know that the Church would have led the world. to a civilization far nobler, because more Christian, than the world can ever reach by its own powers,-still we admit that the Church's influence is less absolutely necessary to the social order now than it was a thousand years ago. Liberty of opinion and speech is a substitute, though a poor one, for the mighty power of the Church in checking despotism. There is a general respect for law and order. Passion is more under control. Each State possesses a government able to protect the rights of property. Justice is, on the whole, well administered.

It is unfair, then, to argue that the modern Church makes the same practical claims as did the medieval Church. It is equally unfair to pretend that the Church considers the refusal of her claims to justify her in setting herself in opposition to the State. She cannot, indeed, admit the theoretical principles on which the modern State professes to rely, but it is false that she cannot, as her opponents assert, come to any terms with the State. On the contrary, she imposes on her children a full and loyal general acceptance of its authority. Witness the condemned proposition (63) of the Syllabus"We may refuse obedience to lawful princes, nay, may rebel against them." And lest the term "lawful" should be considered, as adversaries pretend to consider it, an ambiguous term, it will be well to bring forward some formal proof of the loyalty of the Church even to the non-Catholic moder State.

As to our own country, although indeed S. Pius V., on the principles of medieval law, then still acknowledged by the greater part of Europe, forbade obedience to the rebellious heretic Queen Elizabeth, his immediate successor suspended the force of the Bull, the title of James I. was fully recognized, and from that time to this, in spite of persecution and oppression far greater than that which drove non-Catholic Englishmen into open rebellion against the house of Stuart, the Catholics of Great Britain have kept unshaken fidelity to their sovereign. Surely, in face of such a fact and with the very evidence of our present loyalty, it is not only malicious but most unfair to say that the Catholics of Great Britain do not acknowledge Queen Victoria as their lawful queen. On the Continent again, is it not clear, as much from the manner of their opposition in what they consider wrong as from their loyal obedience to the general law, that Catholics acknowledge their rulers to have a claim on their true allegiance? Is it not evident that the Catholics of Germany, of Belgium, of Russia, acknowledge their princes to be their "lawful princes"?

The Church indeed may and must forbid her children to obey such commands of the State as may be against the law of God, but this does not interfere with their general allegiance. Pius VI. condemned the "civil constitution of the French clergy," but he upheld the authority which introduced it (H., I. 57). Pius VII. speaks in the same sense, and we would especially recommend to our readers the words of Gregory XVI. (ib., pp. 60, 61), in which, while he beautifully expresses his own doctrine, he exhibits it at the same time as in perfect accordance with that of his predecessors. The only real question for the spiritual authority to consider is whether the rulers in the modern State are ordained of God. . the ministers of God" (Rom. xiii.). Such the Church fully admits modern rulers to be, as being the guardians of the social order, as acknowledged by the society in which they rule. And their claim on our obedience is not negatived by the fact that the law or social system which they administer and defend may contain some anti-Christian principles. To these of course we cannot give our adhesion, and yet our loyalty is not thereby impaired. We recognize the State's general authority because God sanctions it; such commands as are without His sanction have no claim on our obedience. Catholics do not, as many moderns do, make the State infallible, all-powerful, the fountain of all rights; but they allow it a real authority, limited, like all human authority, to that which is according to God's law. There is an exact parallel in the history of early Christianity. Indeed, we

appear, as the author remarks, in many ways to be approaching a state of things analogous to that which prevailed in the time of the Apostles. And as their refusal of obedience, in regard of the teaching of the Gospel, to the Jewish authorities, did not prejudice their general obedience,* and as the rejection by the early Christians of such State laws as prescribed idolatry did not "divide their allegiance," so the obedient children of the Church in these days can and do shine also as obedient, faithful subjects of the State.

We have now completed the first part of our task, and we trust that we have sufficiently proved that the principles of the Church regarding her own power are and have been, in themselves and in their application, consistent with a full recognition of civil authority.

II. We come now to those essays which treat of the great historical facts brought forward to support the charges, and especially the charge of usurpation, made against the Mediæval Church.

Our space will not allow us to treat all these important subjects in full. We will therefore select as a specimen the Essay (VIII.) on S. Gregory VII.

This is of course devoted chiefly to the history of his contest with Henry IV. of Germany. With regard to this contest we will, in the first place, briefly remind our readers of the facts as given by our author (pt. I. §§ 1—7).

Henry had already given grave trouble to the predecessors of Gregory, in their efforts to reform the Church. He had led a scandalously immoral life, usurped the Church revenues, and encouraged simony. Still the new Pontificate opened under fair auspices. Henry, already in difficulties with his Saxon subjects, was induced to seek a reconciliation with the Holy See, promising repentance and obedience. For some time. relations continued friendly, but as Henry's difficulties lessened he began to return to his wicked courses, and the Pope, who had previously had to complain of his faithlessness and neglect, at the end of the year 1075 "wrote to him"-we quote the words of a Protestant historian-" as the last trial of kindness, a threatening letter, couched in language of paternal severity, but at the same time tempered with gentleness." The con

*Be ye subject to every human creature for God's sake (1 Peter ii. 13). The Greek is Krion, which, from the context, is clearly to be rendered constitution or form of government.

"He that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God" (Romans xiii. 2).

Thus clearly did the Church, by the mouths of her greatest and earliest teachers, declare for all time the duty of obedience to the civil power. + Neander, vol. vii. p. 13.

tents of this letter certainly gave Henry, after his professions, no fair ground of offence. If Gregory points out his serious faults, he makes the kindest promises, and goes so far as to offer to meet the king halfway on the subject of investitures. Shortly after this letter Gregory despatched three envoys to urge the considerations which it expressed, exhorting Henry to change his conduct, and threatening him, in case of refusal, with that excommunication which must be the punishment of such crimes. Surely up to this point no exception can fairly be taken to Gregory's action by those who remember that Henry had acknowledged Gregory to be his spiritual superior, and the Vicar of Christ. But the haughty and headstrong king, under the influence of evil counsellors, dismissed the envoys in an insulting manner, and had the audacity to make his synod of Worms pass a sentence of deposition, as illegal as it was futile, on Gregory. Gregory, who was in council at Rome when he received the announcement of this act of rebellion, calmly and with the consent of 100 bishops, proceeded to pass the threatened sentence of excommunication upon Henry, and to release his subjects from the obligation of their oath of allegiance. This, however, was not a real deposition; it was merely a suspension, and was only to come into full force by the contumacy of Henry, that is, by his remaining under the ban for a year and a day. This consequence was admitted by the Germans themselves as German law. The princes at Tribur determined to proceed to a new election. After fruitless negotiations with them, Henry was forced to agree to the conditions they imposed. The chief of them was that the Pope should be invited to a great assembly of the princes at Augsburg, to meet on the 2nd February, 1077, and there should finally decide on all the accusations against Henry. Meanwhile Henry was to live privately at Spiers as an excommunicated man. He started immediately for Italy to seek the absolution of the Pope, and in January, 1077, met him at Canossa, on his way to join the assembly. After voluntarily giving such proofs of repentance as the spirit of church discipline in that age would have required, he obtained absolution on what we must consider, under the circumstances, the most easy condition, that he should not resume his imperial rights until he had met and satisfied his accusers. The fickle king had hardly left the Pope's presence, when, finding himself strong in the support of his Lombard partisans, he broke through all his promises, put himself in direct opposition to Gregory, and prevented him from continuing his journey to the assembly, now necessarily deferred. The impatient princes in Germany proceeded to a new election, naming Rudolph of Suabia, a

man in every way pleasing to the Pope, as their future emperor. But the Pope held firmly to his purpose and first decision, and notwithstanding the faithlessness of Henry, and the bitter complaints of Rudolph's party, insisted on deciding nothing till a fair deliberation had taken place. It is a clear proof how completely Gregory's action is prejudged by most of his opponents, that instead of praising him for his disinterested impartiality, it is only made a new charge against him. Surely it is unfair to reproach a judge who is called on to decide between two parties, because he insists on remaining neutral till the legal inquiry has been made. The civil war, which raged through the disobedience and impatience of the parties concerned, can no more be laid to the charge of Gregory than could a duel between two litigating parties be laid to the charge of a judge who was reserving his decision till the parties had presented their case.

Besides, Gregory's decision would rather have had the effect of embittering the struggle, as is evident from the fact that when, at last (in 1080), Henry's contumacy and fresh crimes had really put him beyond the benefit of the Pope's help, and Gregory was obliged to give his support to Rudolph, the contest became more fierce than ever. Rudolph was slain in the same year, and Gregory was in the power of Henry. Violence prevailed over justice, and Gregory was driven into exile, where he died, 1085.

This brief outline of the facts, with our antecedent and accompanying remarks, seems to us enough by itself to justify the conduct of Gregory. But we prefer to give a more exact and formal defence, and at the risk of repetition will briefly show that Gregory had a right to excommunicate Henry and to release his subjects from their obedience to him; that he was justified in using this right, and that he used it with Christian moderation.

It seems to us that, with regard to the abstract right of excommunicating sovereigns who are also members of the Church, there can be no question. Protestants and Catholics agree in this. S. Paul only appealed to the necessary privilege of a society when he said, commanding the excommunication of a scandalous sinner, "Do you not judge those who are within ?" (1 Cor. v.). Gregory could appeal to many precedents as well as to established law (H., VIII. 393-4). The temporal consequence of such excommunication is a different thing, and varies according to the laws and principles of the time. We must repeat that it is not fair to judge the Middle Ages by the ideas of modern times. We do not maintain that in these days excommunication would include