the act, but I cannot think there was any criminal intention. The loss of the Arethusa's signallog was a far more questionable matter: that book was stolen from the officer who had charge of it, and was never afterwards found *.

The reader will not fail to remark that the evidence given by Captain Jervis, on the trial in question, was straightforward, clear, and manly; and neither the court nor the prosecutor could detect the most trifling error in his account of the transaction; and there can be no doubt it decided the court in the verdict of honourable acquittal which it pronounced on Lord Keppel. Sir Hugh Palliser, his accuser, was afterwards tried, and acquitted also.

I entered the service ten years after this remarkable trial; and it was even then, and for years afterwards, the common topic of conversation in every department of the naval service. It also afforded much useful instruction to our officers; and its good effects were seen in the battles of the 12th of April, 1782, and the 1st of June, 1794.

• I may here observe that it might obviate any future difficulty of this kind if printed log-books were issued, bound, numbered, and paged, in one regular form, under the stamp and seal of the Admiralty. Certain it is, that, as books of reference or authority, they were quite undeserving of notice in my early days. They were afterwards, I am aware, greatly improved; but unless printed in due form by the Admi

EVIDENCE GIVEN BY CAPT. JOHN JERVIS IN THE TRIAL OF ADMIRAL THE HON. AUGUSTUS KEPPEL.

1 Q. By the prisoner. From my first seeing the French fleet to the time of their being brought to battle, did they show any intention of coming to action, or did they always avoid it?

*

A. On the 23d of July, in the afternoon, when the French fleet was first discovered by the English fleet, I did think they showed a disposition to give battle; from the 24th, in the morning, as soon as they discovered the force of the English fleet, I am convinced they never did design to give battle.

2 Q. Did I use my utmost endeavours, as an

ralty only, the pages numbered, the books strongly bound, and each officer (from a rated midshipman to the captain) compelled to keep them, and made accountable for any deficiency in them, I should not be disposed to think much better of this species of public naval record than I have hitherto done. Censure or praise, reward or degradation, should invariably attend any examination of them, where the one or the other appeared to be merited. I have known a young man who had passed for a lieutenant note down in his journal, for the transactions of a sabbath day, "Parson employed preaching;" and I have seen whole months filled up with the words, "Ditto weather," now and then varied with, "Opened a cask of beef," &c. In a service like our's, when not a day passes over our heads without something novel that must strike the most careless observer, it is surely inexcusable neglect not to mark down every thing that occurs; but, in the presence of an enemy's fleet, a young officer who would not take the trouble to make observations, and commit them to paper while fresh on his memory, proves himself, in my opinion, quite unfit for his profession. Let it be remembered that Howe, and Nelson, and Jervis, and many other great men, never omitted this practice.

officer, to bring them to action, from the morning of the 24th till they were brought to action?

A. You used the most unremitting endea

vours.

3 Q. Had you commanded a British fleet in the situation the French fleet was, with respect to the fleet under my command during the 24th, 25th, and 26th of July, would you have hesitated a moment to have led it down to battle, on account of the wind or weather, on any part of those days?

A. Any officer who had hesitated a moment would have been unworthy of command in the British fleet.

4 Q. Do you remember the signal being made early in the morning of the 27th July for several of the ships of the vice-admiral of the Blue's division to chase to windward?

A. I do.

5 Q. Was there at that time any greater indication of the French fleet's designing to come to action than on the preceding day?

A. There was not.

6 Q. What was the position of the vice-admiral of the Blue and his division at that time?

A. To the best of my recollection, the viceadmiral of the Blue, in the Formidable, was on

the lee-bow of the Foudroyant, at the distance of three miles and a half, or thereabouts.

7 Q. What, in your judgment, was the object of that signal? and do you think it a proper one under the circumstances in which it was made?

A. I reflected on the signal when it was made, so that I have no sort of doubt in answering the question. I observed at the time that it must have been made to combine the division of the vice-admiral of the Blue with the centre division.

8 Q. What, in your opinion, would have been the consequence if I had formed the line of battle early in the morning, instead of bringing up the leewardmost ships by signal to chase?

A. I am clearly of opinion that you would not have brought the French fleet to action on that day.

9 Q. Did you see the French fleet upon the larboard-tack just before the action began? A. I did.

10 Q. Was not our getting into action with the enemy very sudden and unexpected, from the shift of wind?

A. That was the principal event which produced it.

11 Q. What would have been the conse

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D

quence if I had formed the line of battle at that time?

A. You would have given an opportunity for the enemy, when they were in great disorder, to have got into some form, and thereby subjected your fleet to an attack before it could have been got into order, or given the French time to escape out of gunshot if they had been disposed to do so.

12 Q. As I am charged with having advanced to the enemy, and made the signal for battle without having formed the line, I desire you will inform the Court if you think I was justifiable in doing so under the circumstances you have stated.

A. To the best of my judgment and ability, you certainly was.

13 Q. I am charged with having stood to a great distance beyond the enemy, before I wore to stand towards them again—I desire to know if the fact be true.

A. It is not true.

14 Q. Did I make the signal for the line of battle as soon as I wore*.

A. You did.

* To wear, preterit, wore—to turn a ship's head from the wind, and thus alter her course to any other point of the compass, or to sail on the opposite tack.