NEGLECT OF THE ADMIRALTY.

337

upwards of thirty years afterwards, the late Earl of Minto generously remedied the injustice by conferring upon me the ordinary good service pension. A comparison of my services with the services of those who were rewarded with pensions of 1000l. and 12007. a year, will show the actuating principle of the Admiralties of those days, which bestowed on me nothing but marked neglect.

CHAP. XIX.

APPOINTMENT TO COMMAND FIRE-SHIPS IN BASQUE

ROADS.

UNDERTAKING AGAINST ROCHEFORT.-HOPES EXCITED.-PRESENT MYSELF AT THE ADMIRALTY. —AM CONSULTED BY LORD MULGRAVE.-LORD GAMBIER'S STATEMENT.

ANXIETY OF

GOVERNMENT. -MY PLAN OF THE COMMAND PRESSED UPON

DECLINE THE COMMAND.

RETURN TO THE IMPÉRIEUSE.

LORD GAMBIER OBTAINS THE LAURELS,

PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK.-
BUT DISSUADES THE ATTACK.

THE ISLE D'AIX. - LORD GAMBIER'S STATEMENT.

ALMOST immediately after arrival of the Impérieuse at Plymouth, I received the subjoined letter from the Hon. Johnstone Hope, Second Lord of the Board of Admiralty :

"Admiralty, March 21, 1809.

"MY DEAR LORD, I congratulate you on your safe arrival after the fatigues you underwent at Trinity. Be assured your exertions there were highly applauded by the Board, and were done most ample justice to by Lord Collingwood in all his despatches.

"There is an undertaking of great moment in agitation against Rochefort, and the Board thinks that your local knowledge and services on the occasion might be of the utmost consequence, and, I believe, it is intended to send you there with all expedition; I have ventured to say, that if you are in health, you will readily give your aid on this business.

"Before you can answer this I shall be out of office, and

on my way to Scotland, as I found I could not continue here and keep my health. But if you will write to Sir R. Brotherton in reply, and state your sentiments on the getting at the enemy at Rochefort, I am sure it will be kindly taken.

“I am, my dear Lord, your's faithfully,
"W. JOHNSTONE HOPE.

"Captain Lord Cochrane."

On the receipt of this letter hope appeared to dawn. The St. Vincent or any other official animus against me had evidently been satisfied with the punishments with which I had in one shape or other been visited. I was now to be consulted and employed on matters in which my experience and services were to be fully recognised, and my ambition of being ranked amongst those brave defenders of my country, to whose example I had looked up, was about to be fulfilled! Alas, for the simplicity of my ideas! Nothing could be further from the intention of those who wanted to consult me!

Scarcely had the letter reached me, when a telegraphic message was transmitted from the Admiralty, requiring my immediate presence at Whitehall. A brief narrative of recent events will show the reason for the summons.

Early in the year Lord Gambier had been appointed to blockade the French fleet at Brest. Towards the end of February they, however, contrived to elude his vigilance, and got out without leaving a trace as to the direction taken. Despatching Admiral Duckworth in pursuit, his lordship returned to Plymouth. Admiral Duckworth meanwhile reached Cadiz, where he ascertained that the Brest fleet had not entered the

340

PRESENT MYSELF AT THE ADMIRALTY.

Mediterranean. He then ran for Madeira, in the hope of obtaining intelligence of them, should they, as was feared in England, have made for the West Indies.

The fact was that the French squadron, consisting of eight sail of the line and two frigates, had gone to L'Orient, and liberated the ships there blockaded. They next made for Isle d'Aix, intending further to reinforce themselves with the ships at that anchorage, and thence proceed to harass our West India colonies. By the vigilance of Admiral Stopford they were, however, discovered and thwarted as to their ultimate purpose, though successful in forming a junction with the Rochefort squadron. On finding Admiral Stopford in their vicinity, though with four ships of the line only, they put into Basque Roads, subsequently withdrawing into Aix Roads, where Admiral Stopford having been reinforced, blockaded them with seven ships of the line. On the 7th of March Lord Gambier arrived in Basque Roads with an additional five sail, several frigates and small vessels, the British squadron being now numerically superior to that of the enemy.

On presenting myself at the Admiralty, the First Lord (Mulgrave) did me the honour to consult me confidentially as to the practicability of destroying or disabling the French squadron as it lay at anchor under the protection of the batteries of Isle d'Aix, where, as his lordship told me, the commander-in-chief did not consider it prudent to attack them. Lord Mulgrave further stated that the Board of Admiralty, fearing that "the French fleet might again slip out, as it had done at Brest, were extremely desirous that it should forth

AM CONSULTED BY LORD MULGRAVE.

341

with be destroyed. With that view they had already consulted various naval officers on the practicability of accomplishing the object by means of fire-ships; but that their opinions were discouraging."

"Now," added his lordship, " you were some years ago employed on the Rochefort station, and must, to a great extent, be practically acquainted with the difficulties to be surmounted. Besides which, I am told that you then pointed out to Admiral Thornborough some plan of attack, which in your estimation would be successful. Will you be good enough again to detail that or any other plan, which your further experience may suggest. But first let me tell you what Lord Gambier has written to the Admiralty on the subject.”

Lord Mulgrave then read me an extract from Lord Gambier's letter, to the following effect, that “an attack by means of fire-ships was hazardous, if not desperate;" but that "if the Board of Admiralty wished to order such an attack, it should be done secretly and quickly."

I respectfully reminded his lordship that he was asking me to suggest means for an attack which the admiral commanding considered "hazardous, if not desperate;" and which other naval officers, no doubt my seniors in the service, had pronounced impracticable. On both these accounts there was reason to fear that if means suggested by me were adopted, the consequence would be an amount of ill-feeling on the part of those officers, which any naval officer in my position should feel reluctant to provoke.

Lord Mulgrave replied that "the present was no