in italics, for the purpose of showing their important bearing on subsequent events. On the 11th Lord Gambier had informed the Board of Admiralty-as to my own personal knowledge was the fact that, "the advanced work on the Isle d'Aix was no obstacle to bombardment." "Now," says his lordship, "the ships attacking would, from the fire of this fort, be exposed to be raked by red-hot shot, and if disabled in their masts, must be destroyed. In the former letter his lordship stated that the fort was "injured in its foundations, and in no state of progress." It is now characterised as "the strong works" on the Isle d'Aix.

That there was really little damage to be feared from these fortifications, either to ships or bombs, was afterwards corroborated by the fact, that when a partial attack only was reluctantly made, neither suffered from their fire, the result proving that these works had from the first been rightly characterised by Lord Gambier as "forming no obstacle," though magnified into "strong works."

In my interview with Lord Mulgrave, I had stated to his lordship, that the works on the Isle d'Aix were no impediment, because of the facility with which the enemy's ships could be brought between the attacking British force and the fortifications, so as completely to interpose between the fire of the latter. Lord Gambier does not appear to have taken this view, but he completely proved its soundness by stating that the enemy's ships lay within point-blank shot of their own works, so as to expose them to the fire of their own forts on Aix, if these fired at all, whilst my previous knowledge

LORD GAMBIER'S STATEMENT.

353

of the anchorage made it a matter of certainty to me, that it was not difficult for the British fleet to place the enemy in such a position. Lord Gambier's assertion. was one of the main points relied on in the subsequent court-martial, and his lordship's own letter just quoted is in direct contradiction to the evidence upon which he relied for acquittal.

the

A more singular declaration is made by his lordship, that if the enemy were attacked "by fire-ships and other engines of the kind, they could run up river beyond their reach." In place of this the result, as will presently be seen, proved that the attempt to do so only ended in all runing ashore, with the exception of two, and they ultimately escaped up the river because they were not attacked at all! But we must not anticipate.

Had Lord Gambier been, as I was, from having previously blockaded Rochefort in the Pallas, practically acquainted with the soundings, he must have taken the same views that I had laid before Lord Mulgrave, and in place of writing to the Admiralty all sorts of evil fore bodings to "men and ships," he would have seen that the attack, with the means indicated, was certain in effect, and easy of accomplishment.

CHAP. XX.

SAIL FOR THE BASQUE ROADS.

MY AWKWARD POSITION. -ILL-HUMOUR
IMPRUDENCE OF ADMIRAL HAR-

OF THE FLEET. ADMIRAL HARVEY.

VEY. COMPLAINS OF LORD GAMBIER. INACCURATE SOUNDINGS.
LORD GAMBIER'S TRACTS. COBBETT'S COMMENTS ON THE TRACTS.
DISSENSIONS IN THE FLEET.-LETTER TO LORD MULGRAVE. MY PRIN-
CIPLES OF WARFARE.
MY PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

-

NIGHT-WORK.

EXPLOSION VESSELS.

WITHOUT waiting to convoy the fire-ships and explosion vessels, the Impérieuse sailed forthwith for Basque Roads in order to expedite the necessary arrangements, so that on their arrival, no time might be lost in putting the project in execution; a point on which the Board of Admiralty was most urgent, not more in a belligerent than a political point of view, for as has been stated, the public was dissatisfied that the enemy had been permitted to escape from Brest; whilst our West Indian merchants were in a state of panic lest the French squadron, which had escaped the vigilance of the blockading force before Brest, might again slip out, and inflict irretrievable disaster on their colonial interests, then the most important branch of our maritime

commerce.

The Impérieuse arrived in Basque Roads on the 3rd of April, when I was received with great urbanity

MY AWKWARD POSITION.

355

by the commander-in-chief; his lordship without reserve communicating to me the following order from the Admiralty:

"Admiralty Office, 25th March, 1809.

"MY LORD, My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having thought fit to select Captain Lord Cochrane for the purpose of conducting, under your lordship's direction, the fire-ships to be employed in the projected attack on the enemy's squadron off Isle d'Aix, I have their Lordships' commands to signify their direction to you to employ Lord Cochrane in the above-mentioned service accordingly, whenever the attack shall take place; and I am to acquaint you that the twelve fire-ships, of which you already had notice, are now in the Downs in readiness, and detained only by contrary winds, and that Mr. Congreve is also at that anchorage, with an assortment of rockets, ready to proceed with the fire-ships.

"I am also to acquaint you that the composition for the six transports, sent to your lordship by Admiral Young, and 1000 carcasses for 18-pounders, will sail in the course of three or four days from Woolwich, to join you off Rochefort. "I have, &c. &c.

"W. W. POLE.

"Admiral Lord Gambier."

Whatever might have been the good feeling manifested by Lord Gambier, it did not, however, extend to the officers of the fleet, whose amour propre Lord Mulgrave had either not attempted, or had failed to satisfy. Every captain was my senior, and the moment my plans were made known, all regarded me as an interloper, sent to take the credit from those to whom it was now considered legitimately to belong. Why

AA 2

66

356

ILL-HUMOUR OF THE FLEET.

could we not have done this as well as Lord Cochrane?" was the general cry of the fleet, and the question was reasonable; for the means once devised, there could be no difficulty in effectually carrying them out. Others asked, "Why did not Lord Gambier permit us to do this before?" the second query taking much of the sting from the first, as regarded myself, by laying the blame on the commander-in-chief.

The ill-humour of the fleet found an exponent in the person of Admiral Harvey, a brave Trafalgar officer, whose abuse of Lord Gambier to his face was such as I had never before witnessed from a subordinate. should even now hesitate to record it as incredible, were it not officially known by the minutes of the courtmartial in which it some time afterwards resulted.*

I

On ascertaining the nature of my mission, and that the conduct of the attack had been committed to me by the Board of Admiralty, Admiral Harvey came on board the flag-ship with a list of officers and men who volunteered, under his direction, to perform the service which had been thrust upon me. On Lord Gambier informing him that the Board had fixed upon me for the purpose, he said, "he did not care; if he were passed by, and Lord Cochrane or any other junior officer was appointed in preference, he would immediately strike his flag, and resign his commission!"

Lord Gambier said he "should be sorry to see him resort to such an extremity, but that the Lords of the

* Minutes of a court-martial on Admiral Harvey, on board H.M.S. Gladiator, at Portsmouth, May 22nd, 1809.