Basque roads, that the French were endeavouring to strengthen their position in Aix road by throwing up works on the south end of the Boyart shoal, the 38-gun frigate Amelia, Captain the Honourable Frederick Paul Irby, was directed to dislodge them. Accordingly, on the 1st of April, at 9 A.M., the frigate got under way and stood for the spot; and at 10 h. 15 m. A. M., wearing round, fired a broadside and drove the French away. The Amelia then sent her boats and completely destroyed the works. In a day or two afterwards Captain Irby was detached to another part of the French coast.

On the 3d Lord Cochrane, in the Impérieuse, arrived in Basque roads, and delivered to Lord Gambier the board's letter to the admiral. Twelve of the fire-ships to be employed were at this time lying in the Downs waiting for a fair wind; and six transports, to be fitted as fire-ships by the fleet, had been ordered to sail from Plymouth. The board of ordnance had also been directed, to send from Woolwich a ship laden with combustible matter, including a quantity of Valenciennes composition, also 1000 carcasses of an 18-pound caliber. The Plymouth transports not being likely to join for some days, Lord Gambier ordered eight of the largest transports of the 30 sail then in company, to be fitted as fire-ships in their stead; and it happened very opportunely, that three French chasse-marées, laden with tar and rosin, had recently been captured by the fleet.

With this supply of combustibles, and with such other materials as the fleet could furnish, the eight transports, and also, at the suggestion of Lord Cochrane, the Mediator frigate-storeship, were fitted as fire-ships; the latter by her own officers and crew, and the former by the officers and crews of the line-of-battle ships. Three explosion-vessels were also equipped, under the immediate inspection of Lord Cochrane. On the 6th the Ætna bomb-vessel anchored in the road, and on the 10th the 12 fireships from the Downs, escorted by the Beagle and Redpole sloops; who had also under their charge the Cleveland transport, laden with Congreve rockets, the ingenious inventor of which had previously arrived in the Ætna. Having already given a list of the line-of-battle ships, we here present a list of frigates and smaller vessels, employed on this expedition.

Schooner, Whiting; hired cutters, Nimrod and King-George.

Some attention is now due to the party against whom all these formidable preparations are making. Among the officers of the Brest squadron, who disapproved of the forbearance of Rearadmiral Willaumez to attack the four 74s under the command of Commodore Beresford, was Captain Jacques Bergeret, already so well known to us. What ship of the squadron that officer commanded we are unable to state, as he afterwards quitted her for Paris, and the captain's names assigned to the ships in the list given at a preceding page are as they stood subsequently to the appointment of Captain Bergeret's successor.

A letter from the last-named officer to the minister of marine occasioned Rear-admiral Willaumez to be recalled. On the 16th the latter struck his flag on board the Océan, and went on shore; and on the morning of the 17th Vice-admiral Allemand hoisted his flag on board the same ship. Rear-admiral Gourdon remained as second in command; but two or three of the captains, including M. Bergeret, were superseded by others, leaving the whole as they stand in the list already referred to.

When M. Allemand joined the fleet, he found it moored in three lines at the entrance of the passage, and too far out. He ordered the ships to weigh, and, dropping lower down, anchored them in a double indented line "ligne endentée;" which may be explained by considering each point in the following figure as a ship with her broadside bearing against it:

the two parallel lines of ships bore about north-north-east and south-south-west; and the ship's heads were to the northward. The van-ship of the outer line bore due south of the battery at the southern extremity of Isle d'Aix, and was distant from it about 640 yards. The two lines were about 250 yards apart, and the ships of each line from the stern of one to the head of the other full 170 yards; thus making the distance from the stern of the rearmost ship in the outer line to the fort (reckoning each ship's length upon an average at 70 yards) 1520 yards, or nearly seven eighths of a statute mile. Each ship was moored with one cable to the north-west and another to the south-east. At about 740 yards in front of the outer line lay the three

frigates Pallas, Hortense, and Indienne. The fourth frigate, the Elbe, was moored as the head most ship in the second or inner line. The method here taken will show, without the aid of a diagram, how the different ships were stationed:

At the distance of about 110 yards in front of the line of frigates, a boom, half a mile in length, and composed of cables secured by anchors and floated by buoys, was thrown across the channel leading from Basque to Aix road, having its northern end within rather less than 1000 yards of the rocks that lie off the south-western extremity of the island. The anchors employed in mooring the boom were of the enormous weight of 5 tons English, and the cables 31 English inches in diameter. For the information of such as are unacquainted with the subject it may be useful to add that the bower anchor of the Caledonia, the largest ship in the British navy, weighs 4 tons, and that her bower cable measures in diameter, or did measure before iron ones were adopted, 25 inches. For any thing that appears in the accounts, the existence of this formidable boom was not known to the British until after the attack which we are about to relate had commenced.

The strength of the batteries that protected the anchorage has been variously stated at from 13 to 50 guns. It is probable that the number of guns did not exceed 30; but the greater part of these were long 36-pounders; and there were also several mortars of the largest description in use. The island was garrisoned with 2000 troops; but they were all conscripts and not to be relied upon. Nor was Isle d'Aix strong in any other part than that which protected the fleet. On its north-east side, or the side which fronts the bay of Rochelle, there were only a few guns mounted, and those in bad condition and at a great distance apart. Exclusive of the batteries on Isle d'Aix, the isle of Oleron, distant three miles and a half to the west-south-west of the citadel of Aix, contained three or four gun and mortar batteries, one of which, named Saumonard, could throw its shot and shells nearly within the range of the former. Besides these artificial defences, the road of Isle d'Aix had a shoal at a short distance in its rear, and another, at a somewhat greater distance,

stretching along its southern extremity. The latter was named Palles, and was in several parts hard and rocky. The former was a bank or bar of mud, thrown up at the mouth of the river Charente.

The arrival of the 12 fire-ships, on the afternoon of the 10th, leaving no doubt in the mind of M. Allemand as to the nature of the attack in contemplation, he directed the armed launches and boats of the fleet, 73 in number, to be assembled in five divisions, in order to be ready, at the close of day, to take their stations near the boom, for the purpose of boarding and towing away the fire-ships, and of engaging any British boats that might be sent down to assist the latter in their operations. Some very excellent regulations were drawn up for the guidance of these boats, as appears by a copy of them which afterwards fell into the hands of the British. The French admiral also ordered the ships of each line to strike their topmasts and get their topgallantmasts on deck, and to unbend all useless sails: the advanced frigates, however, were to keep their topmasts an-end, and to be in readiness to get under way, the instant the signal to that effect should be made. The line-of-battle ships were also directed to be prepared to land the few troops they had on board, in case any attempt should be made by the British to possess themselves of Isle d'Aix.

On the 11th, early in the afternoon, the British admiral having completed his arrangements, the different frigates and smaller vessels moved to the stations assigned them. The Impérieuse ran down towards the inner end of the Boyart, and came to, in nine fathoms, close to the shoal; having the north point of Isle d'Aix bearing east, the south point south-east by east, and the centre of the French fleet south-east by south; the latter at the distance of about two and a half miles. The bearing of the Impérieuse, as taken from the French frigate Indienne, was nearly north-west, distant about a gun-shot and a half from the boom. The Aigle, Unicorn, and Pallas, anchored a short distance above, or to the north-west of the Impérieuse; in order to receive the crews of the fire-ships on their return, to support the boats of the fleet which were to accompany the fire-ships, and to render assistance, if required, to the Impérieuse herself. The Whiting schooner, Lieutenant Henry Wildey, and the King-George and Nimrod cutters, master's mates Thomas Mekeek and Edward Tapley, which had been fitted for throwing rockets, also took their stations near the Boyart shoal. The Etna, the only bombvessel present, although four others (Fury, Hound, Thunder, and Vesuvius) had been promised, and eight would not have been one too many, placed herself to the north-west of Isle d'Aix, as near to the fort as possible in that direction, and was covered by the Indefatigable and Foxhound. The Emerald, Beagle, Dotterel, Conflict and Growler, were stationed, to make a diversion, at the east end of the island; and the Redpole and Lyra, with

lights hoisted, and properly screened from the enemy's view, were stationed, the one near the shoal to the north-west of Isle d'Aix, the other close to the Boyart shoal, in order to guide the fire-ships in their course to the attack. Each of these brigs was distant rather less than two miles from the extremity of the French line on her side.

The 11 British line-of-battle ships, which lay at a distance of from eight to nine miles from the French fleet, also unmoored, to be ready to co-operate, if necessary; but, having unavoidably anchored in a strong tide-way, and the wind blowing hard from the north-west, the ships were again moored when the weathertide made, in order to prevent them from falling on board of each other. Mr. Edward Fairfax, the master of the Caledonia, considered the distance of that ship and those around her from the enemy's anchorage to be only six miles; but, when the French telegraphed from the citadel on Isle d'Aix, as they did every morning, they stated the distance at three leagues.

The wind, although in its direction as favourable as it could blow for the progress of the fire-ships, the whole of which had dropped to an anchorage about a mile nearer than the British fleet, was too violent to admit one part of the plan to be carried into effect, that of chaining the vessels together in divisions of four. Each fire-ship, therefore, was left to act an independent part; and at about 8 h. 30m. P. M., the night uncommonly dark, the wind even fresher than it had been, and the tide flowing at the rate of more than two knots an hour, the Mediator, and the other fire-ships that had anchored around her, cut their cables and made sail. Of the three explosion-vessels, one was swept from the stern of the Impérieuse by one of the too early abandoned fire-ships; and, although the crew of the explosion-vessel were on board ready to proceed, and did afterwards set fire to the fusee, the fusee appears to have failed. In the mean while the remaining two, one of which was conducted by Lord Cochrane, assisted by Lieutenant William Bissell and four seamen, proceeded towards the road of Isle d'Aix. These two explosionvessels appear to have been ignited when within less than three quarters of a mile from the French line: how near to it they exploded, and what effect the blast produced, the French themselves are the most competent to state. The effect that such machines were calculated to produce may be conceived from the manner in which they were prepared. Lord Cochrane's vessel alone contained about 1500 barrels of gunpowder, started into puncheons placed end-upward, fastened to each other by cables wound round them, and jammed together with wedges, having moistened sand rammed down between them, so as to render the whole, from stem to stern, quite solid, and thereby increase the resistance: besides which, on the top of this mass of gunpowder, lay between 300 and 400 shells charged with fusees, and nearly as many thousands of hand-grenades.