cripple, and very sickly; and, for want of sufficient assistance, had his attention too much distracted by the number of wounded officers and men that, in rapid succession, were brought to the cockpit.

.*

The Astrée, when subsequently captured by the British, mounted 44 guns, similar to those carried at this time by other French frigates of her class; and she had, it appears, on commencing the action with the Africaine, a complement of 360 men and boys. The Iphigénie carried her English armament, consisting of 42 guns, similar to those of her class ;* with a complement, as acknowledged, of 258 men and boys. The loss sustained by the French frigates, as stated in the letter of Commodore Bouvet, amounted to nine men killed, and one officer and 32 men wounded, on board the Iphigénie, and one man killed and two wounded on board the Astrée; total, 10 killed and 35 wounded. The damages of the French frigates bore a proportion to their loss of men. The Astrée was very slightly injured in hull or spars. The Iphigénie had her masts, yards, and rigging more or less wounded and cut, but none of her masts so dangerously struck as to require renewing.

The twofold disparity, against which this action was fought, is as palpably conspicuous, as the valour that commenced, and the firmness that continued it; and yet the judgment of Captain Corbett, in not waiting the arrival of the Boadicea, has been questioned. Had the Africaine shortened sail for that purpose, there can be little doubt that the French frigates, who had clearly seen the Otter and Staunch in the morning, would have pursued their course to Port-Louis. A near approach would soon have discovered to them, that the supposed Indiaman was a real frigate, and a large one too; and Commodore Bouvet, brave as he undoubtedly was, would, we think, have declined engaging two British frigates, a frigate-built sloop of war, and an armed brig; and who could blame him? With respect to the conduct of the Africaine in commencing the action, it is not easy at all times to distinguish between discretion and shyness; and the very thought of such an imputation, as the mildest of the two terms may convey, is enough to fire the blood of any man who holds his gallantry sacred. Ten frigates, lost like the Africaine, weigh less, as a national misfortune, than one frigate given up without any, or even with an inadequate, resistance.

No sooner was the Africaine in possession of her captors, than her shot-lockers were ransacked to supply the Iphigénie, whose guns were of the same caliber; but only 50 round shot remained of the former's originally ample store. That they had been expended in the action is certain; but there is reason to believe, that the Africaine's crew had been very little, if at all, exercised at the guns consequently that, in nine times out of ten, the

* See vol. iv., p. 156.

men might as well have fired blank cartridges as shot. A proof of this has already appeared in the trifling execution done to the two French frigates. That the Iphigénie, although mounting English guns, had stood in no actual need of shot for them, we infer, because not a complaint of the kind is discoverable in Captain Bouvet's account of the action. On the other hand, the French could have had but a very small quantity of English round shot left, and would naturally be anxious to procure as many of the Africaine's shot as they could, in order that the Iphigenie might be ready to defend herself in case of being attacked.

At a few minutes before the Africaine hauled down her flag, a breeze began to swell the sails of the Boadicea; and the latter, very soon after daylight, "passed within musket-shot of the enemy." It was now discovered that the Africaine was a prize to the two French frigates, and greatly disabled, while they apparently had suffered but little. At 6 A. M. the Boadicea tacked and stood to windward of the Iphigénie and Astrée, to look for the Otter and Staunch; whose very bad sailing was at this time particularly unfortunate. At 6 h. 10 m. A. M. the Africaine's foremast was seen to fall by the board; at 7 A. M. her mizenmast and main topmast, and at 8 A. M. her mainmast. Her bowsprit, or the head of it, also, we believe, went; and thus was the Áfri caine a totally dismasted hulk.

We regret to find, that the only paragraph in Commodore Rowley's letter respecting the state of the Africaine's masts is the following: "Day dawned and showed us the result; the enemy appeared to have suffered little; the Africaine was in their possession, with no apparent loss but that of her mizen topmast." To this we cannot do better than oppose, in addition to the facts we have gleaned from the Boadicea's log, an extract from the official letter of Lieutenant Tullidge. "Of the Africaine's subsequent recapture by the Boadicea, their lordships must of course have been informed by Commodore Rowley. I must add, however, that her remaining masts and bowsprit fell over the side soon after our quitting her." But, as Lieutenant Tullidge's letter, owing to the unfair and impolitic practice of suppressing the official details of a defeat, simply because it is a defeat, never appeared in the London Gazette, the contradiction, we fear, comes too late to produce much effect. In saying that the Africaine, when first seen by the Boadicea in the grey of the morning, had all three of her lower masts standing, Commodore Rowley was correct; but he omitted to mention, what all on board the Boadicea must have seen, or the entries would not have been in her log, that, within three hours afterwards, the Africaine was totally dismasted.

At 7 h. 30 m. A. M. the Boadicea discovered the Otter and Staunch to windward, and at 10 A. M. was joined by them. At 40 minutes past noon the Boadicea and her two companions

bore up, with a fine breeze from the south-south-east, for the two French frigates and the wreck of the Africaine. At 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the Boadicea hauled up her foresail, and came to the wind on the larboard tack. At 3 h. 30 m. P. M. she and her consorts again bore up; and in ten minutes afterwards the Astrée, taking the Iphigénie in tow, abandoned the Africaine and made sail to windward. At 5 P. M., by which time the Boadicea had arrived close abreast of the Africaine, the latter fired two guns and hauled down the French colours.

The surprising spectacle was now seen of several of the Africaine's late crew swimming off from her to the Boadicea. Upon their arrival on board, the men expressed the utmost eagerness to renew the action with the two French frigates, under an officer whose mild system of discipline had been made known to them through the same channel, as that by which they had formerly learnt the very opposite system pursued by the commander, whom they were compelled to receive as the successor of Captain Raggett. If the act of the late Africaine's sailors, in swimming to the Boadicea, betrayed the nature of their feelings respecting Captain Corbett, it as decidedly showed, that, although their ship had been captured, their spirit was unsubdued.

On board the Africaine, at her recapture, were found_about 70 of her wounded and 83 of her remaining crew, with the French prize-master and his nine men. At 9 P. M., the two French frigates still in sight working to windward, the Boadicea took the Africaine in tow; and, accompanied by the Otter and Staunch, proceeded towards the bay of St.-Paul. On the 14th, at daylight, the Astrée and Iphigénie were again descried by the Boadicea and her crippled and two remaining consorts, and continued to be seen until 11 A. M.; when they disappeared, but were again discovered at 5 P. M., and remained in sight till dark. On the 15th, at noon, Commodore Rowley anchored in St.Paul's bay; but in the evening, weighed with the Boadicea, Otter, and Staunch, and made sail to the north-east. On the 16th, at daylight, the two French frigates were seen close oft Castle St.-Bernard. The latter then stood away to windward, and the British ships steered for the road of St.-Dénis. On the 17th, at daylight, the two frigates were discovered to windward, in company with an armed brig. At 9 h. 40 m. the Iphigénie and Astrée bore up, as if with the intention of attacking, but more probably to reconnoitre, the Boadicea and her two consorts; who were then waiting off St.-Dénis for the return of a boat which Commodore Rowley had sent to the shore. At 11 h. 20 m. A. M. the French ships hove to, and shortly afterwards made sail to windward. At 2 P. м. Commodore Rowley put back toward St.Paul's; at 6 P. M. lost sight of the two French frigates; and on the 18th, at 5 A. M., reanchored in the bay. The armed brig, seen with the Iphigénie and Astrée, was the honourable company's cruiser Aurora, of 16 guns and 100 men, which they had just

before captured. On the 22d, in the morning, Captain Bouvet, with his two frigates and prize, anchored in the harbour of PortLouis. We shall by and by see, that the French commodore would have done better had he remained another day cruising off Isle Bourbon.

By way of excuse for the abandonment of his first prize on the approach of the Boadicea, accompanied by a sloop of war and a gun-brig, Commodore Bouvet thus expresses himself: "I thought it best not to wait for the enemy in the unrigged and dismantled state in which I found myself. I was therefore compelled, much to my regret, to abandon to him my prize, although but a hulk, filled with the dead and the dying." "Je jugeai à propos de ne pas attendre l'ennemi dans l'état de délabrement et de dénuement où je me trouvais. Je fus aussi constraint, à mon grand regret, de lui abandonner ma prise, quoique ce ne fût qu'une carcasse chargée de morts et de mourans."

We are somewhat fearful of pressing too hard upon the French commodore, lest he should turn upon us and say, that, being crippled and deficient of ammunition, the Iphigénie could have made but a feeble resistance against the Otter and Staunch, while Commodore Rowley, with the Boadicea, might have gone in chase of the Astrée; and that admitting the latter to have escaped to windward, the Iphigénie, whose rate of sailing at best was but indifferent, would, now that her rigging was in disorder, undoubtedly have been recaptured. In justice to Captain Rowley, however, it becomes us to add, that he could have had no knowledge of the low state of the Iphigénie's ammunition; and, considering that the Boadicea was at this time the only British frigate upon the station, and that two French frigates, the Vénus and Manche, were cruising in the neighbourhood, it behoved the commodore to be particularly cautious in risking the loss of the small force left under his orders.

We, at a former page, attributed the little execution done by the Africaine to her two opponents, to the unskilfulness of her crew in gunnery. As one proof that the men had not been exercised at the guns, they frequently during the action threw the quoins aside, or put them in on their edges; in the one case elevating, in the other depressing, the guns beyond all mark. It is the general belief, we know, that the Africaine's crew were disaffected, on account of the ill treatment they had experienced from their captain. We regret to have to state, that the more our inquiries have been extended on that point, the more they have convinced us, that Captain Corbett was an excessively severe officer. We trace him in his career of cruelty, from the Seahorse to the Néréide, from the Néréide to the Bourbonnaise, and from her to the Africaine. If, in the Africaine, he flogged less than he did on board the Néréide, it was because the crew of the former, taken generally, were much better seamen than the crew of the latter.

There are many who will insist, that Captain Corbett's deathwound was inflicted by one of his own people. Had the wound been caused by a musket or pistol ball, a possibility might exist that such had been the case; but what becomes of the assertion, when the wound, and that the partial excision of a limb, was inflicted by a cannon ball? Others, and some of them officers of known veracity, have informed us that, unable to brook his defeat, Captain Corbett, during the temporary absence of an attendant, cut the bandages from his amputated limb, and suffered himself to bleed to death. A contemporary, in the statement, "Captain Corbett did not (we fear would not) survive his capture, "* appears to be of the same opinion. Still, looking to the source whence we derived it, we are disposed to consider our first information as the most correct, that the want of proper surgical aid, coupled with the existence of a compound fracture above the amputated limb, was the immediate cause of Captain Corbett's death.

On a subsequent day, April 23, 1811, the surviving officers and crew of the late Africaine were tried by a court-martial for the loss of their ship, and most honourably acquitted; and Lieutenant Tullidge was declared to have behaved "in the most gallant and determined manner, although he had received four severe wounds during the action." We are happy to add, that, on the 1st of the succeeding August, this brave and deserving officer was promoted to the rank of commander.

Returning to the proceedings of the year 1810 off the Isle of France, we have to state, that on the 17th of September, in the morning, the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate Ceylon, Captain Charles Gordon, from Madras on her way to Isle Bourbon, arrived off Port-Louis, in the expectation of falling in with the squadron under Commodore Rowley. After reconnoitring the harbour, and, on account of the many large ships within it, estimating the French force of seven frigates and a large corvette, Captain Gordon bore up and made all sail on his course alongshore towards Isle Bourbon. Since 8 A. M., when off Canonnier point, the Ceylon had been descried from the signal-posts; and, although at first taken for an enemy's cruiser, was afterwards, chiefly on account of her having a poop, believed to be an Indiaman with troops on board. The French men of war at this time in Port-Louis were the Vénus, Manche, and Victor, and at 1 h. 15 m. P. M. Commodore Hamelin weighed and put to sea with the Vénus and the corvette, in pursuit of the Ceylon, then nearly abreast of Morne-Brabant, at the south-western extremity of the island.

This will be the proper place to show how the parties, now on the eve of coming to blows, stood in point of relative force Some time in the year 1805 the British government authorized

* Brenton, vol. iv., p. 477.