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Jurien stood to sea, and in the evening, when off Belle-Isle, steering along the coast to the south-east, descried in the offing the squadron of Commodore Beresford. On the 24th, at daylight, the Tour de Baleine made its appearance; and the British 38-gun frigate Amelia, Captain the Honourable Frederick Paul Irby; accompanied by the 18-gun brig-sloop Dotterel, Captain Anthony Abdy, both of whom had been in chase during the whole of the night, now approached so near to the Cybèle, the rearmost French frigate, that her two consorts hauled up for her support. It was about this time that Captain Jurien observed the squadron of Rear-admiral Stopford, approaching from the south-east. Being thus completely cut off, the French commodore, with the wind now at about south-east by east, steered for the Sable d'Olonne, and was followed closely by the Amelia and Dotterel. At 9 A.M. the two latter tacked to the northeast, as the three French frigates had previously done; and in ten minutes more the Amelia, having wore round, hauled under the stern of the Cybèle, and opened a fire in passing. At 10 A. M. the Amelia tacked and steered after the enemy, in company with the Cæsar, Defiance, and Donegal, who had just joined.

In a minute or two afterwards the three French frigates came to anchor in line of battle, with springs, close under the powerful batteries of the town of Sable d'Olonne. At 10 h. 30 m. A. M. the British ships stood towards the former in the following order: Defiance, Cæsar, Donegal, Amelia. At 11 A. M. the Defiance, as drawing less water than either of the other line-ofbattle ships, anchored in seven fathoms' water, within about 600 yards of the three French frigates, and opened her fire, receiving in return the fire of the latter, as well as of the batteries on shore. In about 20 minutes after the Defiance had commenced firing, the Cæsar and Donegal opened their broadsides, and in another 10 minutes the Amelia joined in the cannonade; the batteries, all the while, keeping up a heavy fire at the British.

At 11 h. 50 m. A. M., unable to withstand the fire of their opponents, particularly of the Defiance, some of whose wads had set them partially in flames, the Italienne and Cybèle cut their cables and ran on shore. Immediately the Defiance veered her cable, that her guns might again bear upon her opponents; and, while the Cæsar to get into deeper water had wore to the southwest, the Defiance, Donegal, and Amelia, continued the engagement for a few minutes longer, until the weathermost French frigate, the Calypso, that she might not mask the fire of the Italienne, and feeling sensibly the effects of that of the Defiance, veered her cable, and soon drove on shore stern foremost. The ebb-tide making, and the water falling fast, the rear-admiral, at noon, signalled his ships to stand out. At about 15 minutes past noon the Defiance cut her cable and made sail towards the Cæsar, then, with the Donegal and Amelia, nearly two miles to the southward. The three latter ships soon afterwards tacked

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and the Donegal, while in stays, fired a broadside at the enemy. After this, the British squadron stood off-shore and the action ceased.

The Cæsar had her bowsprit wounded, her fore spring-stay shot away, and her rigging a good deal cut, but had not a man hurt. The Donegal suffered also in her rigging and sails, and had one man killed and six wounded. The Defiance, who bore the brunt of the action, had all her masts badly wounded, her rigging cut to pieces, and two men killed and 25 wounded. Of the French frigates, the Italienne had six men killed and. 17 wounded, the Calypso, 10 killed and 18 wounded, and the Cybèle, eight killed and 16 wounded, total, 24 killed and 51 wounded; and all three frigates had their hulls much shattered. The loss, if any, that was sustained on shore, does not appear in the French accounts. The three French frigates, having taken the ground nearly at the top of high water, could not be got off, and were consequently wrecked; but the crews, and probably the stores, were saved..

At sunset Rear-admiral Stopford returned to his station off the Chasseron lighthouse, and observed the squadron of M. Willaumez at anchor in Basque roads. On the next day, the 25th, Captain Beresford and his three ships joining company, the rearadmiral, with his force thus augmented to seven sail of the line and five frigates, resumed the blockade of the port; in which now lay, in two divisions, a fleet of 10 sail of the line, four frigates, and a 50-gun ship, the Calcutta, armed en flûte. On the 26th the Brest squadron weighed and stood for the road of Isle d'Aix. While proceeding thither, the Jean-Bart grounded on the Palles shoal near Isle Madame; and, although an attempt was made to force her off by a press of sail, the ship became wrecked. The remaining ships of the Brest squadron anchored between the southern extremity of Isle d'Aix and the Boyart shoal, in company with the following squadron:

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With his nine French line-of-battle ships, M. Willaumez was blockaded by Rear-admiral Stopford, with eight British (the Hero having joined him), until the 7th of March, when the latter was relieved by Admiral Lord Gambier; who had received the first intelligence of the escape of the Brest squadron on the 23d of February, while, with nine sail of the line, on his way to resume the blockade of that port. The admiral then detached

Vice-admiral Duckworth, with eight ships, in quest of the French squadron, and returned to Cawsand bay with the Caledonia. In his way thither Lord Gambier fell in with the Naïad, bearing the intelligence of the arrival of the French squadron in Basque roads; and on the 3d of March, with five ships of the line, sailed for that station.

On joining Rear-admiral Stopford, his lordship's force became increased to 13 sail of the line; but, the Defiance and Triumph shortly afterwards parting company, the following 11 sail only remained:

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On the 17th of March Lord Gambier anchored his fleet in Basque roads; stationing his frigates and smaller vessels about a mile in advance, either towards Isle d'Aix or the town of Rochelle, according to the direction of the wind. As an additional guard against any attempt upon the fleet by fire-vessels, the ships were to be in constant readiness for action, and for slipping their cables, leaving buoys upon them. Two boats from each ship of the line, with fire-grapnels, were also to be sent every night after sunset on board the advanced frigates, to be ready to tow off the French fire-vessels the instant they approached. Although neither M. Willaumez, nor M. Allemand his successor, had, as far as we can learn, any idea of resorting to such a mode of attack against the British fleet, Lord Gambier, nearly a week before he began his defensive preparations, had himself suggested to the British admiralty the employment of fire-ships against the French fleet. His lordship's letter to Lord Mulgrave is dated on the 11th of March, and the following is the paragraph on the subject: "The enemy's ship lay very much exposed to the operation of fire-ships: it is a horrible mode of warfare, and the attempt very hazardous, if not desperate; but we should have plenty of volunteers for the service."*

The admiralty, however, had anticipated Lord Gambier's

* Minutes of a court-martial on the Right Honourable James Lord Gambier, Admiral of the Blue, &c., p. 114.

wishes; for, on the 7th of March, the board ordered a number of fire-ships to be prepared, guided, no doubt, by a report delivered in by Captain Richard Goodwin Keats; who, in the month of April, 1807, when the Majestueux and four two-deckers were lying at anchor in the road of Isle d'Aix, had suggested to the admiralty the propable success of "an attack of bombs, fireships, and rockets, covered and protected by a squadron;" and which squadron, adds this able and distinguished officer, should be kept " as close to Isle d'Aix with easterly, and to the Boyart with westerly winds, as possible, in order that it may be in constant readiness to act decisively, should an opportunity present itself." Thus resolved, the board of admiralty, on the 19th, by their secretary inform Lord Gambier, that 12 transports are fitting as fire-ships, that Mr. Congreve is to proceed in a transport, with a supply of rockets and of men skilled in the management of them, and that five bomb-vessels are under orders to fit for sea with all possible expedition and proceed to Basque roads. The letter of directions then proceeds thus: "All these preparations are making with a view to enable your lordship to make an attack on the French fleet at their anchorage off Isle d'Aix, if practicable; and I am further commanded to signify their lordships' direction to you, to take into your consideration the possibility of making an attack upon the enemy, either conjointly with your line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small-craft, fire-ships, bombs, and rockets, or separately by any of the abovenamed means.

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On the same day, on which these orders were written, arrived at the admiralty Lord Gambier's letter of the 11th, suggesting the use of fire-ships; and on the same day also arrived at Plymouth, from the Mediterranean, the 38-gun frigate Impérieuse, Captain Lord Cochrane. About an hour after the frigate had dropped anchor, her captain, by a telegraphic communication from the admiralty, was ordered to attend the board, it being known to their lordships, by the records in their office, that Lord Cochrane was well acquainted with that part of the French coast in which the operations were to be carried on.

On the 21st, having arrived by express from Plymouth, Lord Cochrane waited upon Lord Mulgrave, who confidentially conferred with him on the means of destroying the French fleet at their anchorage under Isle d'Aix. Lord Cochrane was decidedly of opinion that the attempt by fire-ships would succeed. The first lord of the admiralty then asked Lord Cochrane, if he would undertake to execute the plan which they had so discussed. "This, in the first instance, Lord Cochrane declined, offering, as a reason, the jealousy which such an appointment might excite in the breasts of his brother-officers serving on that station. But, at a subsequent interview, the first lord of the admiralty having stated to Lord Cochrane, that he was the only officer with whom he had communicated, who deemed the

enterprise of easy execution and little risk, and having renewed his offer of command, Lord Cochrane acquiesced, conceiving that Lord Mulgrave might have considered a final refusal as originating in motives not creditable to an officer, who had expressed so decided an opinion of the practicability of the undertaking." On the 25th the board of admiralty addressed a letter to the British admiral in Basque roads, acquainting him that they had thought fit to select Lord Cochrane, for the purpose of conducting, under his, Lord Gambier's, directions, the fire-ships to be employed in the projected attack on the enemy's fleet. This letter was delivered to Lord Cochrane; and, as soon as that active officer could reach Plymouth, the Impérieuse sailed upon her destination.

On the 26th Lord Gambier received the board's letter of the 19th, directing him to endeavour to destroy the enemy's fleet in the manner described. On the same day his lordship wrote two letters in reply. In the first, Lord Gambier admits that the French fleet lay exposed to an attack by fire-vessels; but, in the second, his lordship says: "The enemy's ships are anchored in two lines, very near to each other, in a direction due S. from the fort on the Isle d'Aix; and the ships in each line not farther apart than their own length; by which it appears, as I imagine, that the space for their anchorage is so confined by the shoalness of the water, as not to admit of ships to run in and anchor clear of each other. The most distant ships of their two lines are within point-blank shot of the works upon the Isle d'Aix: such ships, therefore, as might attack the enemy would be exposed to be raked by the hot shot, &c. from the island; and, should the ships be disabled in their masts, they must remain within the range of the enemy's fire until, destroyed, there not being sufficient depth of water to allow them to move to the southward out of distance." The admiral concludes his letter thus: "I beg leave to add, that, if their lordships are of opinion that an attack on the enemy's ships by those of the fleet under my command is practicable, I am ready to obey any orders they may be pleased to honour me with, however great the risk may be of the loss of men and ships."* It is clear from the tenour of this letter, that Lord Gambier was averse to the plan of attack by the line-ofbattle ships, conceiving it impracticable, both on account of the strength of the batteries on Isle d'Aix protecting the French anchorage, and of the supposed shallowness of the water within, or a little beyond, point-blank range of them to the southward. Hence, as the mode of destroying the French fleet in the road of Isle d'Aix was left discretionary with Lord Gambier, he chose that mode which he had himself suggested, the attack by fire-ships.

It being discovered from the anchorage of Lord Gambier in

* Minutes, &c., p. 120.

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