Albany, February 18, 1813. SIR, Your dispatches of the 10th were received last evening. Nothing shall be omitted on my part in endeavoring to carry into effect the expedition proposed. I fear the very large magazines of provisions on lake Champlain will be unsafe unless a considerable part is removed at some distance from the store, or a considerable force is assembled at Burlington and vicinity by the time the two brigades shall move. Another motive for having a large force on that lake, will be, that of preventing the enemy from sending almost his whole force from Lower Canada to Kingston, as soon as our intentions shall be so far known as to afford satisfactory evidence of our intentions in relation to the conquest of Upper Canada; and unless an imposing force shall menace Lower Canada, the enemy's whole force may be concentrated in Upper Canada, and require as large a force to operate against them as would be necessary to operate towards Montreal. It may be advisable to draw out a body of New Hampshire militia to serve for a short time, in Vermont. You will judge of the expediency of such a measure; but I do not believe that there will be a sufficient body of new raised troops in season for taking the place of the two brigades. I am, &c. H. DEARBORN. SIR, War Department, February 24, 1813. Before I left New York, and till very recently since my arrival here, I was informed, through various channels, that a winter or spring attack upon Kingston was not practicable, on account of the snow, which generally lays to the depth of two, and sometimes of three feet, over all that northern region during those seasons. Hence it is, that in the plan recently communicated, it was thought safest and best to make the attack by a combination of military and naval means, and to approach our object, not by directly crossing the St. Lawrence on the ice, but by setting out from Sackett's Harbor, in concert with, and under convoy of the fleet. Later information differs from that on which this plan was founded; and the fortunate issue of major Forsyth's last expedition shews, that small enterprises at least, may be successfully executed at the present season. The advice given in your letter of the instant, has a bearing also on the same point and to the same effect. If the enemy be really weak at Kingston and approachable by land and ice, Pike (who will be a brigadier in a day or two) may be put into motion from lake Champlain, by the Chateauge route (in sleighs) and with the two brigades, cross the St. Lawrence, where it may be thought best, destroy the armed ships and seize and hold Kingston until you can join him with the other corps destined for the future objects of the expedition; and if pressed by Prevost before such junction can be effected, he may withdraw himself to Sackett's Harbor, or other place of security on our side of the line. This would be much the shorter road to the object, and perhaps the safer one, as the St. Lawrence is now every where well bridged, and offers no obstruction either to attack or retreat. Such a movement will, no doubt, be soon known to Prevost, and cannot but disquiet him. The dilemma it presents, will be serious. Either he must give up his western posts or to save them, he must carry himself in force, and promptly to Upper Canada. In the latter case, he will be embarrassed for subsistence. His convoys of provisions will be open to our attacks, on a line of nearly one hundred miles, and his position at Montreal much weakened. Another decided advantage will be, to let us into the secret of his real strength. If he be able to make heavy detachments to cover, or to recover Kingston, and to protect his supplies, and after all maintain himself at Montreal and on lake Champlain, he is stronger than I imagined, or than any well authenticated reports make him to be. With regard to our magazines, my belief is, that we have nothing to fear; because, as stated above, Prevost's attention must be given to the western posts and to our movements against them. He will not dare to advance southwardly while a heavy corps is operating on his flank and menacing his line of communication. But on the other supposition, they [the magazines] may be easily secured; 1st, by taking them to Willsborough; or 2d, to Burlington; or Sd, by a militia call, to protect them where they are. Orders are given for the march of the eastern volunteers, excepting Ulmer's regiment and two companies of axemen, sent to open the route to the Chandiere. The southern detachments will be much stronger than I had supposed. That from Philadelphia will mount up nearly to 1000 effectives. With great respect, &c. JOHN ARMSTRONG. SIR, Head Quarters, Albany, February 25, 1813. I this day received by express from Colonel Macomb, the inclosed account from Major Forsyth. His known zeal for a small partizan warfare, has induced me to give him repeated caution against such measures, on his part, as would probably produce such retaliating strokes as he would be unable to resist; but I fear my advice has not been as fully attended to as could have been wished. He is an excellent officer, and under suitable circumstances would be of important service. I have requested the governor to order Gen. Brown out with three or four hundred of such militia as he can soonest assemble, to join Forsyth; and I have ordered. Colonel Pike, with four hundred of his command, to proceed in sleighs by what is considered the shortest and best route to the neighborhood of Ogdensburgh, or to Sackett's Harbor. On his arrival at Potsdam, or Canton or Russell, he will be able to communicate with Brown or Forsyth, or both, and act with them, as circumstances may require. The affair at Ogdensburgh will be a fair excuse for moving troops in that direction; and by this movement it will be ascertained whether the same route will be the best in future: the distance by that route from Plattsburgh to Sackett's Harbor, is but little more than one half of what it would be by the route proposed, and I am assured by a gentleman, whom I can confide in, that there will be no difficulty by that route. Chauncey has not yet returned from New York. I am satisfied that if he had arrived as soon as I had expected him, we might have made a stroke at Kingston on the ice, but his presence was necessary for having the aid of the seamen and marines. From a letter received this day from Colonel Porter at Niagara, it appears that the enemy were preparing to strike at Black Rock. I can give him no assistance. Hon. John Armstrong, secretary of war. General Dearborn learning that sir George Prevost had passed Montreal with troops on his way to Kingston, left Albany in haste and arrived at Sackett's Harbor in 52 hours, 180 miles distance! He found on his arrival that sir George had already reached Kingston with a force of from six to eight thousand men. As a measure of precaution the neighboring militia were called in, and in a few days 3000 men were in garrison at the Harbor. The ice at this time was good, and a visit from sir George was confidently expected. However, he neglected to seize the favorable moment, and in the course of the month of March two brigades (Pike's and Chandler's) arrived from Plattsburgh in sleighs. Four hundred men followed the General from Albany. Sir George after visiting York and Niagara, relinquished his meditated coup de main against Chauncey's flotilla, and returned to Montreal. On the 15th of March it was unanimously determined in a council of the principal officers at the Harbor, including Com. Chauncey, that they ought not, under existing circumstances, to make an attempt on Kingston before the naval force could act. After this General Dearborn and Commodore Chaunsey decided that it was best first to capture York and |