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exertions were made to rally the men and to bring them again to battle, which partly succeeded in the first instance. but ultimately, and in a short time, all attempts were vain, and the forces routed; and the first line, together with the horse, were totally routed and retreated in a road which forked in three directions; one branch led by Rock Creek Church, to Tenley Town and Montgomery court house, another led to George Town and a hird to the city of Washington. It does not appear that any movement was made or attempted by the cavalry or horsemen, although the enemy to the left were in open and scattered order, as they pursued or pressed upon our lines, and a most fortunate moment presented itself for a charge of cavalry and horsemen.

It may

be proper here to observe, that Gen. Winder states his exertions to direct the retreating line to the capitol, with a view of rallying. This intention is corroborated by Col. Sterret ; but it appears as if this determination was not generally understood by the officers or men. Col. Kramer, posted on the right of the road and in advance of Commodore Barney, was next drawn from his position after having maintained his ground with considerable injury to the enemy, and retreated upon the command of Cols. Bealls and Hood, on a commanding eminence to the right. After the retreat of the militia under Col. Kramer from his first po sition, the enemy's column in the road was exposed to an animated discharge from Major Peter's artillery, which continued until they came in contact with Com. Barney; here the enemy met the greatest resistance and sustained the greatest loss, advancing upon our retreating line. When the enemy came in full view, and in a heavy column in the main road, Com. Barney or dered an 18 pounder to be opened upon them, which completely cleared the road, scattered and repulsed the enemy for a moment. In several attempts to rally and advance, the enemy was repulsed, which induced him to. flank to the right of our lines in the open field. Here Capt. Miller opened upon him with the three 12 pounders, and the flotilla men acting as infantry with consid

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-erable effect. The enemy continued flanking to the right and pressing upon the command of Cols. Beall and Hood, which gave way after three or four rounds of ineffectual fire, at a considerable distance from the enemy, while Col. Beall and officers attempted to rally the men on this high position. The enemy very soon gained the flank and even the rear of the right of the second line. Com. Barney, Capt. Miller and some other offieers of his command being wounded, his ammunition waggon having gone off in the disorder, and that which the marines and flotilla men had being exhausted; in this situation a retreat was ordered by Com. Barney, who fell himself into the hands of the enemy.

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The second line was not exactly connected, but posted in advantageous positions in connection with and supporting each other. The command of Gen. Smith, including the Georgetown and city militia, still remained in order and firm without any part having given away, as well as the command of Lieut. Col. Scott of the regulars, and some other corps. The enemy's light troops had in the mean time advanced on the left of the road, and had gained a line parallel with Smith's command, and in endeavoring to turn the flank Col. Brent was placed in a position calculated to prevent it, the enemy also advanced, and came within-long shot of part of Col. Magruder's command, which opened a partial fire, but without effect; and at this moment and in this situation Gen. Winder ordered the whole of the troops, then stationary, to retreat, which was effected with as much order as the nature of the ground and the occasion would permit; these troops, after retreating 5 or 600 paces, were halted and formed, but were again ordered to retreat by Gen. Winder. Gen. Winder then gave orders to collect and form the troops on the heights west of the turnpike gate, about one mile and a half from the capitol, which order was in part executed, and the forces formed by Gen. Sinith and the other officers, when Col. George Minor came up with his regiment of Virginia volunteers, and united his forces with Gen. Smith's comBand, having been detained, as before stated, in obtain

ing arms, ammunition, &c.: but while in the act of formbing, Gen. Winder gave orders to retire to the capitol, with an expectation of being united with the troops of -the first line. Col. Minor was ordered to take a certain position and cover the retreat of all the forces by remaining until all had marched for the capitol. The troops were again halted at the capitol while Gen. Win- der was in conference with Col. Monroe and General Armstrong.

The first line and the cavalry, except one troop of Col. Laval's, had taken a route which did not bring them to the capitol; the most of them had proceeded north of the District of Columbia, and others dispersed and returned home, and sought refreshment in the country. The commanding Gen. represented the diminution of his force, the dispersion of a large portion of it, the want of discipline, the great fatigue of the the troops, and believed that it would be impossible to make effectual resistance to the invasion of the city, nor did he think it would be proper to attempt to defend the capitol, the troops being without provisions, and which would leave every other part of the city to the mercy of the enemy, and the prospect of loosing his army. In this consultation the secretaries of state and war, it appears, concurred in their views with Gen. Winder, and advised him to retire and rally the troops upon the heights of Georgetown; this produced an order for the whole forces to retreat from capitol hill through Georgetown. On receiving this order the troops evinced the deepest anguish, and that order which had been previously maintained was destroyed. Gen. Smith in his report uses this language when the order for a retreat from capitol hill was received, the troops evinced an anguish beyond the power of language to express." The troops were halted at Tenleytown, and an attempt was made to collect them together, which only partially succeeded. Some returned home; some went in pursuit of refreshments, and those that halted gave themselves up to the uncontrolled feelings which fatigue, exhaustion, privation and disappointment produced. The force

thus collected were marched about five miles up the Potomac, and early in the morning, Thursday the 25th, orders were given to assemble the troops at Montgomery Court house. Gen. Winder seems to have taken this position with a view to collect his forces, and to interpose for the protection of Baltimore, in case the enemy marched upon it as it was anticipated by him. On the 23d, Gen. Winder dispatched an order to the command- ing officer at Fort Washington to place patroles on every road leading to the garrison; and upon the event of his being taken in the rear of the fort, to blow it up and retire across the river. On the 26th, the army at Montgomery took up the line of march about ten o'clock towards Baltimore; Gen. Winder proceeded on to Bal-- timore. On the 27th, Gen. Smith's brigade marched to this district.

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The distance from Benedict to the city of Washington, by Bladensburg, is upwards of fifty miles. The enemy was without baggage waggons or means of transportation; his troops much exhausted with fatigue; many compelled to quit the ranks, and extraordinary exertions used to keep others in motion; and as if unable to pursue our forces, remained on the battle ground; the enemy's advance reached this city about 8 o'clock in the evening, the battle having ended about 2 o'clock, or before. The main body of the enemy remained on the heights west of the turnpike gate.

Doctor Catlett, the superintending surgeon, who was: admitted to attend upon the wounded, and who passed through the enemy's camps and remained at Bladens-burg until the city was evacuated, had the best opportunity of estimating the loss on both sides, as well as a good spportunity to ascertain the number and force of the enemy. His estimate is as follows:

Of the enemy-On capitol hill, 700; turnpike hill, 2000; wounded at Bladensburg, 300; attendants, 500; wounded and attendants in the city of Washington, 60; -killed at Bladensburg and the city, 180; total force, 3540. This statement is corroborated by all information in his power, besides his own observations. Mr.

Law estimated the enemy, on his march, at 5000; but from the best information, his estimate would be about 4,500. Col. Monroe, who viewed the enemy on his march, estimated the number at about 6000. Gen. Wiader states that the best opinion at the Wood Yard, made the enemy from 5 to 7000. Our forces are variously estimated; and, indeed, from the manner of collecting them, and their dispersion, makes it difficult to ascertain the number with perfect accuracy. Gen. Stansbury represents Col. Ragan's regiment at 550, Col. Shutz's regiment at 700; Col. Beall's and Hood's at 800; Col. Sterret's regiment at 500; Major Pinkney's command, including two companies of artillery, 500; making, 2953. But Gen. Winder estimates Col. Beall, 6 or 700; deduct 100, this leaves 2853. To which add the command of Gen. Smith, and militia that united with him at the Wood yard, Battalion Old fields, the regulars under Lieut. Col. Scott, Barney's command, the cavalry, &c. $200; making an aggregate number of 6053. Besides this force, several detachments are spoken of by Gen. Winder's officers not known, amounting to several hundred. But as a small detachment was left at the Eastern Branch bridge, others, particularly some of the cavalry, were on detachment, reconnoitring, &c. the number of our forces may be estimated at least 6000, including about 20 pieces of artillery, two 18 pounders, S twelves, and the others 6 pounders. Our loss on the field of battle, killed, is estimated, by the superintending surgeon, at 10 or 12, and the wounded, some of whom died, at about 30. Gen. Winder's official report esti

mates our loss at about 30 killed and 50 wounded,

The probable estimate of British forces on the 24th August: Total 4,500. Killed at Bladensburg and in the city, 180; wounded at both places, 500. American forces, 6,000. Killed, 20; wounded, 40; besides the regiment under Col. Minor, 600 infantry and 100 horse, which met the retreat on the west of the turnpike gate; and Gen. Young's brigade, about 500, which was order ed to remain on the banks of the Potomac, about 12 miles from the city of Washington, until the evening of

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