Military Biography.-Lord Wellington.

as such, and every soldier more immediately, finds amongst the neighbouring nations. Let no one, therefore, think that he is without an interest in the glory of his country. He has an immediate and individual interest. It is the essential quality in his character of a freeman, that he is represented only in his instruments. In his character and property he is always original.

It is peculiarly grateful to us to have the monthly duty of recording the triumphs of our brave countrymen. Let us now, therefore, be allowed so diverge from our main subject to throw a cursory view over the late and present campaign. The picture will be at once gratifying and instructive. There is one feature in which the present and late campaign differ very materially from many others in the course of the war. There was formerly a kind of quackery, which comprehended every thing within the notion of the matter and mystery of state. Hence the operations of our armies were as studiously kept from the public eye and ear as the minutes of the cabinet council. The gazettes were rare and insufficient: The French Emperor, in his bulletins, at once gave us the example of the force of public opinion, and of the means by which it was acquired. He appealed to the feelings, the passions, and the glory of his people; he excited their interest and sympathy, and he received the fruits of it. We at length learned a lesson from our enemy, and the future historian will be almost overwhelmed with his materials, instead of, like his predecessors, having to hunt them like curiosities of remote times.

The campaign on the part of Lord Wellington may not improperly be distributed into four æras: the first, his covering position at Guarda; the second, his retreat from Guarda, and the battle of Busaco; the third, his posi tion at Torres Vedras; and the fourth, his pursuit of Massena upon his late retreat. Let us briefly examine his plan and operations during these several periods. It is a matter of interest, as well as of justice, to determine whether the happy event of the campaign is the mere lucky throw of fortune, or the intended and expected issue of previous skill and concert.

Very early in the year 1811, Lord Wellington discovered that the French attack on Portugal would be on its eastern frontier, and by the way of Lower Beira. There were, indeed, but two other possible ways,-through Elvas and Alentejo, or on the side of Leon and Galicia. The route by Elvas and Alentejo was opposed by the Tagus, and, therefore, was altogether impro bable. On the side of Leou and Galicia, the invading army was met by impenetrable walls of mountains, crossing every possible line of march. In a word, no possible route was open but that through Beira, and from the points of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.

Lord Wellington's first plan, therefore, was to select the best possible station for the defence of this frontier. He accordingly took his position

Military Biography.-Lord Wellington.

along the frontier mountains of Beira, thus opposing himself to the enemy in the form of a segment of a circle, the convex part toward the enemy, This defensive line was about thirty miles in extent, but its circular form gave it the peculiar advantage, that the points were not distant from each other in proportion to the length of the line. The several posts, moreover, were very strongly secured by the nature of the ground. The Coa, and some other mountain-streams and ravines, were in front of the line through the greater part of its extent. Under these circumstances, there was scarcely a possibility of any attack which could cut off their several communications. Nothing, therefore, could have been better chosen than this defensive station. Had the English army been sufficient to have occupied it, or had the Portuguese been at that time sufficiently organised, it could not have been forced.

On this ridge, therefore, Lord Wellington posted himself, and thence kept a vigilant eye on the enemy's operations in the country below him.

The French successively besieged Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and, having succeeded in taking them both, advanced immediately against Lord Wellington. They directed their march, however, not against his front, but his flank, endeavouring to turn them on the left of his position. Lord Wellington, therefore, found it necessary to raise his camp, and abandoning his position of Guarda and the frontier, to descend into the valley of the Mondego; thus maintaining the advance of the French on the route to Lisbon.

Thus terminated the first period of the campaign; upon which two main questions are put. In the first place, why did not Lord Wellington endea vour to relieve the cities of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida? and secondly, was not his retreat from Guarda a compelled flight from the French?

The answer to the first question is very briefly, that it was not the nature of the service required of Lord Wellington to risk a battle even on equal terms, that the plan of operations upon his part was strictly defensive, and that by retiring or keeping back he necessarily drew the enemy after him,that is to say, withdrew them from their own frontier, and from their magazines and means of supply, whilst Lord W., upon his part, only fell back upon his transports, and communication with Lisbon and the sea. That the advantage of this system, therefore, was evident on the side of the English. That to have descended into the plains, and to have fought Massena, would have been to have sacrificed all these advantages, and by a military impru dence, more akin to folly than to a generous courage, to have voluntarily reduced him to the level of his enemy, and to have put the contest upon the square where fortune had given him the vantage ground. That the above points proceed upon the supposition, that the two armies were equal in number. A fortiori, how much greater is their force, when the army of Massena nearly doubled that of Lord Wellington. Masseua had concentrated his

Military Biography.-Lord Wellington.

army around Ciudad Rodrigo. The 8th corps was cantoned in such a way as to be enabled in a march of eight hours to succour the 6th corps, and to be at hand upon the least shew of an attempt to raise the siege. Massena's army, at this period, therefore, consisted of 26,000 under Marshal Ney, 22,000 under General Junot, and 23,000 under General Regnier, who me. naced the right of Lord Wellington's position. Now, what force had Lord Wellington wherewith to descend into the plains and raise the siege against an army like this. He had merely 35,000 men. Add to this, that the French cavalry were three times as numerous as that of Lord Wellington. To say all, however, in a word, Lord Wellington neither descended into the plains of Ciudad Rodrigo, nor waited an attack on the frontier of Guarda, for this very simple reason,→He had a better field of battle in view. He had Delay and Famine, for his sure allies and Torres Vedras for his Iron bulwark. With respect to the second question,-whether his retreat from Guarda was not a compulsory flight, whether it had been previously intended and de signed, the answer is included in what has been above stated. Guarda was a fine station,-granted; but was not Torres Vedras a finer. But why did he take the position of Guarda if he knew it to be indefensible? He took the position of Guarda for three reasons; in the first place, that be might hang over the French operations, and be at hand to avail himself of any error or division of their forces; secondly, that he might be at hand, that is, immediately before them, upon their movement forwards, and thereby might harass and impede their march, and avail himself of the strong positions of the road to have affairs with them upon an advantage. His third reason was, that he had not to learn that there were some most excellent patriots in the House of Commons of England, who, in their apprehension of the certain loss of our army, had the French thus unmolested reached within twenty miles of Lisbon, would have urged the instant recal of bimself and of his army. Such were some of the reasons for the position of Guarda.

A third question has been here put,-Why did not Lord Wellington de. fend the strong ground of the Zezere?—a position of which Dumourier speaks with so much skill and justice in his memoir upon Portugal.

The answer is equally prompt. The Zezere could not have been defended by a less force than that by which it was menaced. General Regnier made his appearance in that quarter with 23,000 of the best French troops. Lord Wellington must either have marched his whole army or a detachment. In the first case, what was to become of Lisbon, upon which Massena was marching by a flank route? In the latter, how was Lord Wellington to have afforded a sufficient detachment against these 23,000 mén, and at the same time keep a sufficient force to maintain a front against Massena? The main point with Lord Wellington was to keep his advance of Massena, and thus pecure the position whence he was retreating to the defence of Lisbon

Military Biography.-Lord Wellington.

The French were not a whit nearer the capture of Lisbon by gaining the Zezere. The Zezere, therefore, was not defended, for the very same reason that the position of Guarda was not defended; because Lord Wellington's army was not equal to two principal operations, and because, under such circumstances, it was a point of prudence to prefer that which was comparatively of most worth. The defence of the Zezere would not have saved Lisbon. The defence of Torres Vedras did save it. In the present improved state of tactics a river is nothing. Give me one regiment, and op. pose me with two, and I would pass the Thames at Richmond in despit● of you.

We now arrive at the second period of the campaign,—the advance of the French from Almeida, and the accompanying retreat of General Wellington from Guarda. This accompanying is one of those lucky words which suggest themselves in the moment, for it expresses exactly what it would have required more words to convey. Lord Wellington did not retreat before Massena, but accompanied him, or, if you choose, led the way to the spot where he had previously fixed upon making his stand. "If your master be as great a general as fame reports him," said Hannibal to a Centurion of Fabius Maximus, "let him come down from those hills, and fight me." "Let him make me come down," said Fabius, "and I will acknowledga him the better general."

For some days the armies of Lord Wellington and Massena continued to move towards Coimbra by the side of each other; Massena moving upon the arch, that is, upon the high ground which forms the ridge of the Mondego, whilst Lord Wellington moved upon the chord of that arch, that is, in the valley through which the Mondego flows. Of the rivers which rise in the mountains of the Sierra d'Estrella, and descending thence, intersect the plains of Beira, the principal is the Mondego. This river rises near Guarda, thence flows in a northerly direction as far as Celerico, when it turns suddenly to the west, and by that course runs into the sea past Coimbra. The valley of this river, both on the north and south banks, rises very rapidly from its level into ridges of mountains, between which, there fore, as a kind of broad ravine, the river flows. The two high roads from Guarda to Coimbra, and thence to Lisbon, are along the banks of this river, the one being through the valley on the south bank, over the Ponte de Marcella, the other along the north ridge which passes Vizeu. Lord Wellington marched along the former. Massena moved by the latter.

When Massena reached Vizeu, the line of march, that is, the high road thence to Coimbra, declined from the ridge into the valley, and was crossed by the Sierra de Busaco, a chain of mountains from north to south, over which the high road proceeded. The province of Beira, of which Coimbra is the capital, is nearly surrounded by a chain of mountains. The eastern mountains, along which are Guarda, Celerico, Trancosa, and Vizeu, are op

Military Biography.-Lord Wellington.

posed to the Spanish frontier; the northern extend along the whole breadth of the kingdom of Portugal, and separate Beira from the north provinces. The river Mondego nearly crosses the interior of Beira in a course from east to west, and, therefore, parallel to these north and south mountains, which, in fact, are its banks. From the north banks of this river runs likewise a small northerly chain of mountains. This chain is termed the Sierra de Busaco. Such was the ground over which Massena had to pass. It formed one of those strong positions which compensate to the defenders a superiority of number in the assailants. Lord Wellington, therefore, availing himself of it, threw himself across it, and awaited the approach of Massena.

Massena did not suffer him to wait long. With his characteristic impetuosity he came in front of it on the 26th of September. He consumed the remainder part of that day in covering the ground with a cloud of light troops. The object of this was evident. Massena saw the strength of the position, and hoped by this display of his numerical superiority to intimi date Lord Wellington into the evacuation of the Sierra during the night. On the morning of the 27th he found himself deceived in this expectation. He accordingly resolved upon forcing it, and made the attempt. The event was the complete repulse of the French, and their being compelled, in consequence, to deviate from the former line of march, the high road, and take a circuitous course to Coimbra. The advantage on the part of Lord Wellington was, a victory of some importance in itself, and the gaining time for a more leisurely, and therefore more orderly retreat to his lines at Torres Vedras.

A military question of some interest has been here put,—Why did Mas. sena attack the position of the Sierra de Busaco? Why did he not turn it ? There were probably three reasons for this proceeding: in the first place, the Sierra de Busaco was the high road, the direct and the shortest way. Secondly, had he forced the Sierra, he would have been immediately upon Lord Wellington, who, in this case, must either have fought in most dis advantageous ground, or must have made a retreat over the Mondego with the French immediately upon his rear. It was Massena's part to bring Lord Wellington to battle. It was Lord Wellington's to avoid it. The Moniteur has assigned as a third reason, that Massena intended it as a feint. This, however, is evidently but the excuse of a defeat. Had the attack of the Sierra been a feint, that is, a covering movement for a more main operation, why was not that operation made whilst the troops were engaged? The circuitous movement of Massena upon Coimbra was not cotemporaneous with the battle of Busaco. He remained in order of battle to watch the event of that attack. There was no offer at movement till the battle had been decided. The march to Sardao was a substitute, and not a principal.

Two military questions of greater importance have been urged with respect to Lord Wellington. In the first place, why he had not given Colonel Trant a greater force, so as to have enabled him to have acted upon the French