their character? Socrates taught that no goodness was worth having unless it could stand the test of his questioning, and he had found none which would. To that he himself added an unquenchable belief in the goodness for which he was searching, but what would the result of his teaching be on men without that faith? His opponents might well say, Here is a man who criticizes and pulls to pieces all our beliefs, who makes ridiculous all our most honoured teachers and examples, and who does not profess to put anything in their place; confesses, indeed, that he cannot. What must be the result of such conduct? What are we to do if we must give up everything that holds society together because we cannot exactly justify it on a rational basis? Two very different answers were given to such questions. Plato's answer might be expressed in the famous words of Hegel, "The wounds of reason can only be healed by deeper reason." He believed that if the work of criticism was at first destructive, it only destroyed in order to build better. It was not thinking that was wrong but insufficient thinking. Even Plato admitted that some might take harm from criticism. He urges in the Republic that dialectic should not be begun at too early an age, for the young "in their first taste of dialectic treat it as a game and use it only for purposes of contradiction. They imitate those who refute them, and refute others in their turn, delighting like puppies in dragging about and pulling to pieces whoever happens to be near them." But dialectic and criticism thoroughly pursued alone could put morality and goodness on a sure foundation. Others thought or at least felt differently. They only saw the destructive side of Socratic teaching. Again and again they must have felt, after being criticized by Socrates, that while he beat them in argument, in their hearts they were unconvinced, and that for the sake of all that they counted of value in life they must cling to beliefs and practices which reason could not defend. Plato in the Apology makes Socrates say that his accusers represent the politicians, the orators and the poets. The collocation is significant. For all these rely on what Plato calls persuasion as opposed to knowledge; all these, however much they may use definite knowledge, appeal to deep instinctive elements in the soul; all these were criticized by Socrates and denounced

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as shams. The politician could see how Socrates, by applying the analogy of the skilled trades to politics, made democracy seem ridiculous. The rhetorician could not tolerate a teacher who insisted that persuasiveness came only from knowledge, nor the poet a mode of criticism which made the authority of poetry to consist only in the scientific truth of the information it conveyed. If Socrates were right, politics and rhetoric and poetry must go. Plato was prepared to say that society must be revolutionized and all elements in it subordinated to philosophy. But there is little to wonder at if most men who only saw the threatened destruction and had not Socrates' and Plato's heroic faith in philosophy, should feel that Socrates' teaching was the ruin of Athens. There are some now-a-days who agree with them. It must be the verdict of all those who believe that in the end life is firrational, that it rests on beliefs which not only cannot be reduced to logical grounds but which are obviously illogical, that religion and morality and art are instinctive and are destroyed if subjected to a reasoning power which should be confined to the working out of the details and the machinery of life. We differ from the Athenian people only if we have the belief of Plato, that while the bases of life and society are not to be apprehended and explained by the same methods as are required for the demonstration of a mathematical problem, while our life may often be more profound than our powers of explaining it, yet apprehension of the ends of life, the power to see life as a whole and its meaning, is not contrary to reason but demands its highest exercise.

A. D. LINDSAY.

NOTE. The translation of Xenophon's Memorabilia in this volume is by the Rev. J. S. Watson, first published In 1848, as edited by the Rev. R. J. Hughes for the Temple Classics, 1904. The translation of Xenophon's Apology is by Sarah Fielding, sister of the novelist, published in 1762; pf his Symposium by James Welwood, M.D., published in 5710. The translations of Plato's Lysis and Protagoras are by J. Wright, first published in 1848; and of the Euthyphro, pology, and Crito, by F. M. Stawell, published in Temple Greek and Latin Classics, 1904.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

XENOPHON

Translations:-Memorabilia: E. Bysshe, 1712, 1758, with Intr duction by H. Morley (Cassell's National Library), 1889, 1904; S Fielding (with Apology), 1762, 1767, 1788; E. Levien, 1872 (Bayar Series); J. S. Watson (with Anabasis), Bohn, 1848, Lubbock Hundred Books, 78, 1894.

Symposium: J. Welwood, 1710, 1750.

Works (Minor), translated by several hands, 1813; A. Coope Spelman, Smith, Fielding, and others, 1831; (Minor), J. S. Watso Bohn, 1848; H. G. Dakyns, 1890.

PLATO

Translations:-The Republic: H. Spens, 1763; Davies ar Vaughan, 1852, 1858, 1866; B. Jowett, 1881, 3rd edition 188 1908; T. Taylor, with Introduction by T. Wratislaw, 1894; W. Bryan and C. L. Bryan, 1898; Translation by Sydenham and Taylo revised by W. H. D. Rouse (Methuen's Standard Library), 1900 A. D. Lindsay, 1907, 1908.

Symposium: by Percy Bysshe Shelley, in Cassell's National Libra (with other pieces), 1887; 1905; F. Sydenham (with Io, Hippia Alcibiades and Philebus, also separately), 1759-80.

Meno: by R. W. Mackay, 1869; From the text of Baiter and Ore (Oxford trans. of classics), 1880; with Apology and Crito, St. Georg Stock and C. A. Marcon, 1887.

Phædo by Theobald, 1713; Mme. Dacier (New York), 1833 C. S. Stanford, 1873; E. M. Cope, 1875; with one or more oth works: 1675; 1730 (?); by T. Taylor, 1793; C. S. Stanford, 1835 with Introduction by W. W. Goodwin (parts only), 1879, 1887; F. Church, 1880, 1886; H. Cary, Bohn, 1888; Lubbock's Hundre Books, 34, 1892; Cassell's National Library, 1888; reprint from V Whewell, 1892.

Phædrus: T. Taylor, 1792; J. Wright, with Lysis and Protagora 1848, 1888.

Works: Floyer Sydenham, 1759, 1776; T. Taylor and Sydenhai 1804; H. Cary and H. Davis, 1848-52 (Bohn), 1900; W. Whew (Dialogues), 3 vols. 1859-61; B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, 187 1875, 1892.