ADDIT. XVII. On the Lawfulness of studying the polite Arts. The Study of the polite arts is lawful under certain ADDIT. XX. On the Expectations of the Bodies politic of the prefent State of the Earth, and particularly of No temporal dominion of Chrift clearly foretold in the fcriptures, 680-683. There will be a general con- ADDIT. XXI. Faith explained, 691-707. How neceffary to a chriftian, 707-721. Objections answered, 721- 734. Faith only valuable as productive of good works, 734-747. ADDIT. XXII. NOTES AND ADDITIONS To DR. HARTLEY'S OBSERVATIONS ON MAN. BY HERMAN ANDREW PISTORIUS, Rector of Poferitz in the Island of Rugen. TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN EDITION, PRINTED AT ROSTOCK AND LEIPSIG, 1772. ८ I EXTRACT FROM MR. PISTORIUS's PREFACE. FOUND, that of the two volumes of Dr. Hartley's work in English, the firft of which contains a complete phyfiological and pfychological fyftem, the fecond only was properly fit for my purpofe: this contains natural religion, a demonftration of christianity, its moral doctrines, a fhort exhibition of the doctrines of faith, and finally a treatife on the expectations of man. I therefore contented myself with giving a fhort though fufficient abftract of the first volume, which contains the affociation of ideas; but the fecond I have thought it neceffary to divide into two, and amplify it with my own observations." Thefe obfervations are here tranflated entire, and are to be confidered as additions to the introduction and the propofitions in the fecond part to which they refer. VOL. III. * G g NOTES NOTES AND ADDITIONS. INTRODUCTION, p.i. On Neceffity. WHEN the reader reflects, that this treatife on religion is the fecond part of a work in which Hartley confiders the nature of man, and treats the mind and body altogether as machines, he will probably take it up with miftruft and prejudice, and condemn it as irrational, without an examination. A certain freewill, of which indeed very different, and, in fome measure, very erroneous ideas have been formed, but with which, in the opinion of moft philofophers and divines, neceffity and the mechanifm of the human mind are incompatible, has ufually been confidered as abfolutely requifite to religion and morality. The fuppofition, that both muft fall to the ground, if the human foul be fubjected to corporeal or fpiritual mechanism, has been fupported both by the friends and by the opponents of religion: the former confidering as an enemy to religion every one who defends the doctrine of mechanism, and the latter having attacked religion and morality with the principle of neceffity. Hence Hartley's endeavour, not merely to fhew the accordance of mechanism with religion, but even to build all religion on the doc Notes and Additions, &c. 459 trine of neceffity, is a new and unheard of attempt, in which refpects it deferves the attention of the learned. The chain of his reflections, and the developement of his fyftem, will remove from the mind of every thinking and impartial reader, that miftruft which may arife from the prejudice of commonly received opinions: we will however premise a few general obfervations in defence of his theory. The end of morality and religion is, unqueftionably, the happiness of mankind. Man is endued with the power of being rationally virtuous, and is made capable of religion, that through the exercise of this power and this capability he may attain that happinefs which is appointed for him, and of which he is fufceptible. All that we have to inquire, therefore, is; can man, confidered as a rational, moral, and religious being, be happy, if his moral and religious notions, perceptions, and actions be fubject to mechanism ? or do mechanifm and happiness reciprocally exclude each other? That neceffity is not incompatible with happiness and virtue, is clear, as has been already obferved by others, from this principle, that, if it were, God could neither be virtuous nor happy, fince he is both from neceffity. Of happiness we know nothing, but that it confifts in a chain of agreeable fenfations, or that it is a state which man rather wills, than wills not. By mechanism we understand a power of effecting or fuffering fuch changes as are dependent on each other, by that neceffary connection which we discover in all nature, as caufe and effect, and which are united to and follow each other according to certain established laws. If the human mind be fubject to fuch a mechanifm, all its actions and fufferings, its perceptions and ideas, its defires, inclinations, and paffions muft be confequences of a neceffary connection; and fo founded on each other, that, according to one or more fimple invariable laws, they will follow one * G g 2 another 1 another in fuch a manner as to exclude every thing arbitrary, fortuitous, arifing from no motive, or aiming at no end. Compare these two definitions, of happiness and mechanifm, and fhew, that they are incompatible with each other. If you cannot do this, and prove that man is incapable of all agreeable fenfations or their confequences, when there are fufficient grounds for them, and that content and happiness, when mechanically produced, are no longer content and happiness to him, mechanism and religion cannot be proved to be contradictory. It may be faid, if religion may make a man happy on the principles of neceffity, ftill on thofe principles it cannot render hin virtuous, or an object of divine blifs and reward. To begin with the latter that man if neceffarily good is not an object of reward. Is reward, then, effentially different from content and happiness? Affuredly no otherwife than as it is a certain determinate happiness, connected with and confequent to a certain virtuous, or fuitable conduct, call it which you will. What fhould hinder the Supreme Being from permitting a neceffary good conduct to be followed by a neceffary adequate happiness? What should prevent him from making known this happiness, which he connects with the fuitable conduct of his rational creatures, and propofing it as a reward, in order to incite them by this motive to purfue fuch a conduct? As little is neceffity derogatory to virtue, unless in the definition of virtue we arbitrarily refuse all impulfe, and every kind of neceffity, fuch as confifts in the relation of caufe and effect; that is, unless we affume what has been difputed above. According to the common ufe of language we call a man virtuous who thinks and acts in a manner fuitable to his nature, deflination, and the grand purposes of his being. To afcribe to him virtue, we merely confider whether this manner of thinking and acting 1 proceed |