effence exhaufts all poffibility, whofe magnitude is above all measure, and who no longer admits of faying, why is there not yet a greater? All finite beings, indeed, that we obferve, feem to point to fuch an immenfurable infinite being. The difficulty which our author notices in the laft place proceeds only from a misconception. We afcribe a caufe to exiftent things only fo far as we diftinguish their reality from their poffibility, or advance, that, befides what is neceffary for us to comprehend their poffibility, which is the want of incompatibility, we require something more to comprehend their reality. The cause of their being what they are must be in themfelves, or external to them. In themselves it cannot be, for that would be the fame as to fay, that they produced themselves. But were there a cafe in which we must say, that the cause of its reality is in the thing which exifts (and this we can and muft say of God) there can be no cause of its reality but its poffibility. He is, fince he can be, and in him reality and poffibility are no way diftinguishable from each other. This, it is true, runs into the so often difputed proof of the being of God from his poffibility which proof, I confefs, is not to me fufficiently evident. I cannot, however, without a contradiction, maintain the oppofite fide of the queftion; I cannot fay, God does not exist because he is poffible; or, his poffibility and reality are not fo clofely connected, that the former prefuppofes the latter. Were I to fay this, I must annihilate the idea of a self-existent neceffary being, and return to that of accidental things, which, actually to be, require fomething more than to be poffible, or which require grounds for their poffibility, and, befides thefe, grounds for their reality.

PROP. III. p. 9.

On the. Infinity of God.

OUR author dwells longer on the proof of the di vine attributes of power and knowledge, and particularly of the infiniteness of thofe attributes, than is ufual with the German philofophers, who commonly content themselves with the firft argument, that an infinite being must be infinite in every thing which he is or has, and confequently his attributes must be infinite. Indeed it is abfurd and contradictory, that a being can be finite in one refpect, and infinite in another; or that the powers and qualities of a being, which conftitute the effence of that being, and through which it properly exifts, fhould be of different and indeed oppofite natures. him who understands the meaning of the words this must be as evident as the position, that a finite being must have finite powers, and cannot poffefs infinite qualities.

То

Let us however examine our author's particular proofs for the infinity of God's attributes. The inftances and evidences of power and wisdom which we find in nature are innumerable and incomprehenfible; with respect to our comprehenfion, then, at leaft they are infinite: and this conception of a relative infinity ultimately lofes itself in our minds, and is changed into an abfolute infinity. He fhews alfo, that we are led from the pofition of a fufficient caufe to admit an infinite univerfe, or univerfe infinite in number and extenfion: fince if we fuppofe the univerfe to be finite, or limited in number and extenfion, we muft inquire after the cause of this limitation, and as we can find none, we must reject the fuppofition. Thus the whole

comes

of Hartley on MaxIVERSITY 73

comes to this, from the idea we havelofa dependent being, a being inconceivable without an external caufe, and which confequently never actually has all that it is capable of having, or the reality of which is never the fame with its poffibility (and fuch the author supposes the world to be) does it not naturally follow, that fuch a being cannot be infinite in the strict sense of the word, or as we fay that God is infinite?

That is truly and metaphyfically infinite which has every thing poffible, that is, every thing real, or which has no limits. To be infinite, and to have no limits, are the fame. But what is that which can have no limits? Unquestionably nothing but a reality. In God every reality is without limits: were it limited, or might it be conceived greater than it is, it would not have, or rather would not be, all that it might. For this there must be fome cause; and this cause must be either in God, or out of him. In the latter cafe, he would no longer be a felfexiftent independent being; he would not be God: in the former, the limiting cause must be in his will, which is inconceivable, or in his other realities oppofing and limiting one another. Were fuch a limitation of God's realities conceivable, it would follow, that there was actually fome negation in the idea of God; fince all limitation muft arife from a negation, or a contradiction. But no reality confidered in itself can be contradictory to the others. reality, generally or abfolutely taken, involves a negation and with relative realities we have nothing to do. All God's realities, therefore, abfolutely confidered, are affirmative, whence no contradiction, and confequently no limitation of one by another is poffible. Are we, however, justified in confidering every reality in God as abfolute? Certainly fince God is and must be actually all that is poffible; confequently the grounds of the negation of all limits

No

are

are in his very effence. This, I think, would appear more clearly, were we to confider a relative reality with its causes. The degree of mental capacity which a beast poffeffes is a reality of a relative kind. To the beast, a higher degree, the understanding of a man for inftance, would be no reality, and for this reafon, because it would be incompatible with the other qualities which the beaft has, and muft have. Now if we suppose a being poffeffing every thing that would render the highest degree of understanding not only poffible, but capable of acting in the most perfect manner; in fuch a being the highest degree of understanding would find nothing by which it could be limited his understanding must be without limits, or an abfolute reality. Thus it is with God, and with all his realities. His unlimited effence, or his independent neceffary existence, excludes all limitation of his realities, and exalts them to the state of absolute, fo that they never admit a negation,, bút are ever affirmative; confequently they allow of no collifion, no cause of limitation. I do not think it rightly and accurately fpeaking, therefore, to fay: God has all the realities and perfections that can poffibly coexift. The laft is a fuperfluous addition. All realities, abfolutely confidered, as in the self-existent being they must be, may coexift, nothing being denied by either of them. All being affirmative, no oppofition, no contradiction betwixt them is poffible. Otherwife it appears to me, that no limited true reality external to God is poffible, of which the original and fource is not in him. He could not permit any reality actually to be out of him, if he poffeffed it not himself. God is the most real being; whatever is real must be in him.

To return again to the question of the infinity of the universe. When I fay, that the truly infinite is that, which, devoid of limits, is either fo great that we can conceive nothing greater, or, if we confider

it as actually exifting, the reality of which is equal to its poffibility, according to this definition, infinity is applicable only to the felf-exiftent being, and we muft deny it to the univerfe as diftinct from or dependent on him. Infinity, according to which a being is all that it is capable of being, flows from felf-existence, and is indeed only another expreffion for the fame thing; confequently it cannot be a property of a dependent being. What follows may ferve farther to explain this difficult question.

If I confine myself to the question, whether the universe be infinitely extended, I must inquire, whether the universe admit of an infinite number of parts and as this may ftill be equivocal, I muft farther inquire, whether any term be to be fet to its duration. In this fenfe of the question, I admit, that the parts of the universe may be increased a parte post to infinity, not merely in thought, but in reality. If it be asked, whether the number of its parts be infinite a parte ante, I know not what I fhall answer. My cuftomary ideas of accidental things, which render me unable to conceive them without a beginning and without an origin, ftick fo clofely to me, that I cannot clearly comprehend the queftion, much lefs folve it. I cannot conceive an infinite universe in this fenfe otherwife than as an actual one, and confequently, as it appears to me, confifting of an infinite number of unities. I readily confefs, that fuch a number is to me inconceivable. It may further be afked; is the number of parts of the universe exifting at one time infinite, or fo great, that it would be abfurd to increase it in idea? To the given impoffibility of an actually determinate, and at the fame time infinite number, the following may be opposed. The infinite understanding of God is equally determinate, fince it actually is; but infinity alone can measure it, to every created mind it is infinite. Suppofe it to be divided into an infinite number of

finite