finite terms; each of these terms would form a part of an infinite, without any one of them conftituting an infinite understanding feparately. Each would ever be capable of being conceived greater, and more terms might ftill be added till the num ber became infinite. Apply this to an infinite number of exifting things. If the number of things exifting in the universe be actually infinite, and if we conceive the understanding of God as confifting of an infinite number of finite terms, fo far they will agree, and what holds good of the one will hold good of the other. In my opinion, however, this does not apply in the prefent inftance, nor can the notion of a really exifting infinite number be thus fupported. The understanding of God, would fay, is a perfect unity, indivifible, immenfurable. It is fo totally different from thofe of every other intelligent being in quality, as well as in degree and in quantity, that it is not only incommenfurate to them, but does not admit of being measured. If, then, I divide the understanding of God into feveral terms, to make one real infinite number by adding thefe terms together, or to fhew the poffibility of fuch a number, my divifion is merely chimerical, and, as I can affume no actual determinate unity, I can no more produce a number of unities, than I could produce a number from an arbitrary divifion of an abfolute unity, if I were to fuppofe it something real. Now when I confider the univerfe and its parts, I have things actually exifting diftinct from one another, I have real not imaginary unities, and these must conftitute a number: but if thefe actually conftitute a number, they muft bear a proportion to unity, and there is no contradiction in fuppofing this proportion ftill greater and greater: confequently this number cannot be infinite in the foregoing fenfe of the word. Notwithstanding all its difficulties, however, if we would folve this queftion with fome degree of certainty, certainty, I believe we must have recourse to a perfect universe. God would produce the most perfect, whence it muft contain as many and as great things as poffible, and, which is of most importance, these must have the greatest poffible harmony with each other. The number of actual things harmonizing with one another contributes not fo much to perfection as the degree in which they harmonize, with this diftinction, that whilft perfection increases with the number, fo long is a greater number requifite to the attainment of the greater perfection. The queftion, then, will come to this: does infinite extenfion, or an infinite number of actual things contribute moft to the perfection of the universe? The latter can only be true, if an infinite number admit greater harmony than a limited one. We cannot but make the following conclufion: were only one individual molt perfect univerfe amongst more lefs perfect poffible, it would be an exception to the rule of the greateft perfection, and a fyftem of actual things derogatory to the perfection of the whole would be poffible. Other fyftems, befides those which actual are, prefuppofe, befides the altered fyftems, other exifting things. Hence all that is poffible does not actually exift, and this world is not infinitely extended, becaufe, if it were infinitely extended a greater perfection would be loft. I muft ftill obferve, that infinite extenfion is not to be confounded with infinite duration. Of this it is clear, as the late Reimarus has fufficiently proved, that it can never be infinite by fucceffions, even though they proceed without end. So we perceive Hartley cannot deduce an infinite univerfe from the pofition of fufficient caufes: as the queftion, why did not God create more exifting things than a limited univerfe contains? may always be anfwered thus: the greatest perfection and the wisest ends required no more, nay would admit no more. PROP. PROP. IV. p. 13. To follow Bodily Mifery. On the fpiritual Happiness of Man. WHEN We defire pure happiness, we know not what we defire, we are ignorant of ourtelves and of our nature, and how far we are capable of happinefs. It is even difficult for us to form an idea of pure happiness. The moft general opinion is, that we are to understand by it an uninterrupted state of pleafing fenfations, at leaft an everlafting exciufion of all pain and mifery, or fuch a ftare as a man would not wish to exchange for any other. If we admit that the happiness of man be compounded of fenfual and mental enjoyments, to procure him pure happiness, the fountains of both must flow uninterruptedly, nor must one bitter drop be mixed in the ftream of pleasure that he quaffs. According to this, datum his pleasures must be continually increafing, and never diminished: for the diminution of pleasure, or a lefs degree of it, is pain, which would detract from pure happiness. Or, if this were not the cafe, he must remain unalterably in the fame degree of enjoyment, and at the fame time his tafte muft not be weakened by its continuance; his capacity for pleasure, and the ftimulus of the object, or its power of pleafing him, muft ever poffefs the fame force and efficacy. Both the former and the latter fuppofition are repugnant to the actual, and, in my opinion, the effential conftitution of nature. According to this we must conceive every pleasure to be an enjoyment (this is indifputably the cafe with fenfual pleasures at leaft) and every enjoyment prefuppofes a defire, every defire a need. The fenfation of a need differs from the fenfation of enjoyment, and the state of defire is, compared with the ftate ftate of enjoyment at leaft, an unpleasant fenfation. The man, then, who would enjoy, and find pleafure in enjoyment, must first defire, and in defiring and needing he must find pain and difquietude. If this pain and difquietude of defire be frequently little noticed by us, it is because they are greatly leffened by the certain expectation of approaching pleasure, and the anticipation of enjoyment. They cannot, however, be wholly annihilated; for, if they were, the taste of enjoyment would be equally imperceptible. We only obtain a lively fenfation of enjoyment by comparing it with a preceding want, or with its oppofite. Thus much is certain from experience, that the fenfation of health, which is to man the greatest of all fenfual pleasures, and which fhould be, and in certain circumftances actually is, the fum of all, is reduced to an almost imperceptible and indifferent fenfation, if we have not an opportunity of comparing it with the oppofite fenfations of pain and fick nefs. It only rifes to that noticeable height and force which we call pleasure, when it follows, or admits of a lively comparison with its oppofite fenfation. I do not affert that comparison is abfolutely the fole cause of pleasure. On the contrary, I am much inclined to admit, that there is fomething pofitive and abfolute both in fenfual and mental pleafures; though I must confefs that it is extremely difficult to give an exact ftandard for them, and that this standard must be different in each individual. In general terms I would fay, that the more or lefs obfcure perception of order in the body and mind conftitutes abfolute fenfual and mental pleasure. Where this order is perceived to preponderate in the body or mind, there would I place the beginning or limits of pleafure: thence forwards the fenfations rife through the different degrees of pleasure to ecftafy and blifs, whilft backwards they proceed through the various degrees of pain to confummate confummate wretchedness. Still the comparison of our fenfations with their oppofites unquestionably contributes much to their rifing or finking in this fcale; and experience feems to tell us, that in fenfual enjoyments we are indebted to comparison for our principal pleasures. If we confider mental happiness, and particularly its most important part moral happiness, or the fum of thofe pleasures which arife from the perfect confcioufnefs of ourfelves, from the faculty of forming general ideas, from the remembrance of the past, profpect of the future, and the capability of advancing towards perfection by means of thefe, comparison feems here far lefs neceffary than in fenfual happinefs. Still here there is a need, and from this need arifes an impulfe to act; confequently fome difquie-. tude is neceflary. This difquietude preceding action, if it be not abfolutely painful, cannot, on comparison, be equally pleafing with the consciousness of having attained the end. Now if this progreffive round of efforts and attainments be continually recurring, there must be a fucceffion of more and lefs pleafing fenfations. Thus, then, here alfo pure happiness, in the frist fenfe of the word, is inadmiffible. It is evident, too, that in proportion as the difficulties of attaining the ends propofed, and confequently the preceding difquietude, are increased or leffened, the pleasures of attaining thofe ends will be increafed or jeffened alfo. If we deprive a man of the dangers of the combat, we rob him of the reward of victory. How little pure happiness is compatible with our nature may also be conceived from the degree of perfection which is effential to it. Man, as experience tells us, when he enters into being, has nothing but capacity, and the foundations of what he is to be. This capacity muft firft be unfolded, thefe foundations built upon. He must acquire expertnefs by practice, become by degrees what he is capable of becoming, |