works of a chriftian, nor the virtuous actions of philofophy. Moral philofophy, purified and perfected by christianity, would, in my opinion, produce fuch a pattern and rule of virtue, that the morals and actions of the majority of mankind would, on comparifon therewith, appear rather bad than good. But if we take a lower standard of virtue and goodness than what revelation holds out, and apply this to the moral conduct of men, rather confidering their conftant behaviour in their common occupations, focial employments, and endeavours to fupport themselves and families, and the uniform courfe of their domeftic life, than certain confpicuous actions occafioned by rare circumstances or occurrences, I am perfuaded, that we may juftly maintain the actions of the greater part of mankind to be rather beneficial than injurious, and, upon the whole, attended with more good than bad confequences. Some good thoughts on this subject may be found in an effay by Dr. Jortin, in the first volume of the Theological Magazine, that well deferves to be read. He obferves, that the calculation of a man's good and bad actions must be taken from the general courfe of his private life, and his conduct towards his relations and domestics, and he will then be found commonly to perform far more acts of compaffion, benevolence, and gratitude, than of cruelty, envy, ingratitude, and malice.

The picture that Hartley draws of mankind in general feems to me to be perfectly juft. Every man has actually within him the feeds of every virtue, and of every vice, and the proportion in which they thrive and ripen depends, in general, upon the fituations in which he has been and is placed.

Circumftances may occur forcibly to prevent the feeds of focial virtue from unfolding, and proportionably to ftrengthen thofe of selfishness and malevolence; fuch are thofe extraordinary occurrences

Sf 4

which

which firft excite men to vicious actions, and which, if they continue any time, induce fuch a facility in thofe actions, that the mind, depraved by them, feems to poffefs a difinterefted love of vice, and to practise it for its own fake. Let us fuppofe a fociety of men in fuch urgent want, and fo preffed by the greatest long-continued diftrefs, that each of them not only cannot affist the rest, but rather must be injurious to them, and that each is unable to fupport himself but at the expence and ruin of the others: let us fuppole, that this extreme of mifery, and the peril continually before their eyes, renders each anxious for himself alone, and draws all his attention to the fupport of himself, whilft his whole foul is occupied by a continued fenfation of pain; the neceffary confequence of fuch a fituation would be, that all compaffion, all fympathetic and benevolent fentiments, would be gradually weakened, and at length totally deftroyed. On the other hand, infenfibility, hardheartedness, envy, and cruelty, in fuch extraordinary circumftances, becoming the means of fupport, and so far resembling virtues, would almost irresistibly gain the upper hand. I remember to have read an account of fome Englishmen, exposed for a time to extreme mifery and want in the wilds of America: the minds and conduct of thefe, according to the relation of one of the unfortunate fufferers, wholly agreed with and confirm what I have just been faying. Envy and malevolence were the predominant fentiments of thefe men towards each other, each looking upon the reft as his enemies.

There are circumftances on the other hand, and thefe are the most common fituations of human life, in which a man may and muft ferve others, if he would ferve himself. Any civil fociety, but tolerably good, is thus far preferable to a favage ftate, that in general, and in most cafes, it connects the fupport and welfare of one with the maintenance and

weal

UNIVERSITY

of Hartley on Man CALIFORNIA 633

weal of the whole. The celebrated Rouffeau, when' he exalted the state of nature so far above focial life, left this point entirely out of the queftion, and, confidering his fubject folely on that fide which favoured his bold affertion, placed in the ftrongest light all thofe circumftances in which civil fociety occafions a variance and collifion of interefts betwixt its members, and fo far gives birth to bad and injurious actions. With equal care did he guard against difplaying thofe circumftances and occurrences in focial life which tend to the promotion of beneficence, good-will, and compaffion. It is obvious, however, that in this ftate fentiments of benevolence are far more promoted and difplayed, than thofe of malice. How much, for example, are wrath and revenge moderated and reftrained in civil fociety! In the ftate of nature we may prefume that occafions of injury, wrath, and revenge, will lefs frequently occur, as the favage has fewer wants than the member of a civilized community: but then, as he has proportionally fewer means of fatisfying his wants (unless with Rouffeau we rate much too high the natural powers of the favage to fupply his neceffities, and the provifion fpontaneously afforded him for this purpose by the unlaboured earth) the cafe will nearly be reduced to an equality on both fides. But the great difference lies here; the wrath of the favage rages implacably, and his revenge, whilft he confiders only his future fecurity, will not eafily terminate but with the deftruction of his enemy. This is the reason why anger, and implacable revenge, are efteemed exalted virtues by all favage nations, and are in general prized by people in proportion as we find amongst them more or lefs traces of barbarism, Civil fociety, on the contrary, moderates and sets bounds to anger and revenge, by holding out, and, in proportion as it approaches perfection, actually procuring to the injured party a reparation for his damage,

damage, and the injuftice done him, rendering the avenging himself in many cafes unneceffary, and even hazardous, and taking from him the trouble of fecuring himself from future injuries by exercifing it. Herein alfo we have the teftimony of experience, that the more perfect the state of fociety, that is the more impartially, ftrictly, and fpeedily juftice is adminiftered in it, the lefs implacable revenge, and the fewer violent inftances of it occur. It is true, that the most perfect civil fociety cannot wholly remove all oppofition and collifion of interefts betwixt its members, though it may reconcile the benefit of individuals with the good of the whole. These are imperfections probably infeparable from its nature. In this refpect, however, civil fociety may unquestionably be carried to a far higher degree of perfection, than it has ever yet attained in any community hitherto exifting. To a wife and benevolent fovereign, who fincerely wishes the improvement of mankind, no object can be of greater importance, than to remove all fuch variance and oppofition of interefts, or to render the cafes as few as poffible in which we may procure advantages to ourselves, without at the fame time our endeavours promoting the good of others, or of the community; ftill fewer fhould thofe be in which we cannot benefit ourselves, but at the expence of others, or of the whole. Such are the cafes in which moft men give way to selfishnefs and vice.

The occurrences of domeftic life, in which man is -principally to be confidered, if we would judge of his character and conduct, are far more favourable to the promotion of focial inclinations, and the practice of virtue, than to the production and exercife of vice and wickednefs. At leaft, in civil fociety, and in domeftic life, man has far more opportunities for good than for bad actions.

PROP.

PROP. LIV. p. 238.

Whether there be Evangelical Counfels.

THE manner in which our author handles the doctrines of morality feems to be very natural, and at the same time contributes to the perfpicuity of his propofitions. It alfo affords him an opportunity of placing in a proper light many things important in morals, that are ufually paffed over as of little moment. The doctrine of pleasures and pains delivered in the former part of this work conftitutes the ground-work of his moral fyftem, whilst he delivers rules for our conduct with refpect to them. To understand this rule of life then, it is neceffary that we fhould not lofe fight of that doctrine.

As the attainment of thofe pleafures, and the avoidance of those pains, are the scope of our defires, and the object of our endeavours, and, as morality is properly the rule of happiness, it must teach us how to conduct ourselves fo as to obtain as much as poffible of the former, and escape as much as poffible of the latter. Human happiness arifes from the fatisfaction of our defires and inclinations, and is occafioned by the pleafures anfwering to them. It is highly useful to analyse this into thofe pleasures of which it principally confifts, and hence to prefcribe fuch regulations for our defires, that they may not fail of their ends. To obtain happiness and avoid mifery are unquestionably the first principles of morality. But these principles are far too general for practical application, and hence are infufficient for our use. In practice, then, we mult decompound them into fubordinate principles. Here the divifion of our author feems to be fupremely excellent, as it wholly exhaufts the fubject, and there is not a fingle