that durst speak against the opinion of any of the great lords? And why might not then men, by means of corruption of the servants, counsellors, and of some of the lords, move the lords to partiality, and make them also favourable and partial as were the same servants or the parties that so moved them ?

Then could no matter treated in the Council be kept quiet. For the Lords oftentimes told their own advisers and servants that had sued to them for those matters how they had sped in the Council and who was against them. How may the King be counselled to refrain giving away his land, or giving officers grants or pensions of abbeys by such great lords to other men's servants, since they most desire such gifts for themselves and their servants?

Which things considered, and also many others which shall be showed hereafter, it is thought good that the King had a council chosen and established in the form that follows, or in some other form like thereto. First that there were chosen twelve ecclesiastics and twelve laymen of the wisest and best disposed men that can be found in all parts of this land, and that they be sworn to counsel the King after a form to be devised for their oath. And, in particular, that they shall take no fee, no clothing, and no reward from any man except from the King as do the justices of the King's Bench and of the Common Pleas when they take their offices. And that these twenty-four men be permanent councillors, but if any fault should be found in them, or if the King should desire it by the advice of the majority of the Council, he should change any of them. And that every year be chosen by the King four lords spiritual and four lords temporal to be for that year of the same council, exactly as the said twenty-four councillors shall be.

And that they all have a head or a chief to rule the Council, one of the said twenty-four, and chosen by the King and holding his office at the King's pleasure, which may then be called Capitalis consiliarius. . .

These councillors might continually, and at such hours as might be assigned to them, discuss and deliberate upon the matters of difficulty that have fallen to the King, and upon the policy of the realm, how the going out of money

may be restrained, how bullion may be brought into the land, how plate, jewels, and money lately taken out of the country may be got back again. For all this truly wise men will soon find the means. Also how the prices of merchandise produced in this country may be maintained and increased, and how the prices of merchandise imported into England may be lowered. How our navy may be maintained and augmented, and upon such other points of policy which are of the greatest profit and advantage to this country. How also the laws may be amended in such things in which they need reform.

Through the activity of the Council the Parliament will be able to do more good in a month by way of amending laws than they do now in a year, if the amendments proposed be debated and made ripe for their hands by the Council.

Sir John Fortescue complained that the greatest lords' of the King's Council, the Cabinet of the time, attended chiefly to their own business and to that of their friends and retainers, neglecting that of the King and Nation, that they practised a shameless favouritism, did not keep secret the affairs of State, and thus made a wise policy and efficient administration impossible. He proposed that a new council of twenty-four of the wisest and best-disposed men should be established, one-half being laymen, and one-half clerics. Before the Reformation the Church represented learning and was comparable to the professional classes of the present day. Besides Churchmen had learnt the art of organisation, of administration and of government through their Church. Lastly, as the Church was an international body, Churchmen were best acquainted with international affairs. Hence, ecclesiastics were the greatest administrators and diplomats of the time. The twenty-four councillors were not to be 'great lords,' corresponding to eminent politicians of the present. They were to be chosen on the ground of their capacity for business and to be permanently employed. In modern language, they were to be permanent officials, experts. They were to be reinforced by four lords spiritual,

than the former. While the literature dealing with legislation and with domestic politics in all its branches is exceedingly vast, there is not a single book in the English language, except perhaps the American Federalist, which deals adequately and critically with the science of national organisation and administration. As the nation-builders of England have apparently not recorded their views as to the best form of national organisation, we must turn for information to the great constructive statesmen of the Continent and of the United States.

Richelieu, the great organiser of France, one of the wisest statesmen of all time, stated his views on government in his little-known Testament Politique.' It was written for the use and guidance of King Louis the Thirteenth, to whom it was dedicated, and for that of his successors and of the future Ministers of France. In Chapter VIII. 'Du Conseil du Prince,' which might be translated On the Cabinet,' we read:

Among statesmen it is a much debated question whether it is better that a sovereign should govern the State in person, according to his own views, or whether he should be largely guided by his Council and do nothing without its advice. Either form of government might be advocated in bulky volumes.

The worst government, in my opinion, is one which is entirely in the hands of a sovereign who is so incapable, and at the same time so presumptuous, that he pays no attention whatever to any council. The best government of all is one where the mainspring is the will of the sovereign who, though capable of deciding for himself, possesses so much modesty and judgment that he does nothing unless he is supported by good advice, acting on the principle that several eyes see more than a single one. . . .

A highly-gifted ruler is a great treasure to his State, and an able council in the fullest sense of the word is no less precious. But the co-operation of an able ruler and a good council is of inestimable value because on such co-operation is founded the happiness of States.

There are no doubt only few sovereigns who can govern their States without assistance, but even if there were many such gifted men they should not endeavour to administer it by themselves.

Many qualities are required in a good minister, and the most important are four ability, faithfulness, courage, and industry.

The ability of ministers does not consist in that form of self-conceit which is usually found in pedants. Nothing is more dangerous for a State than men who endeavour to govern it by means of abstract principles drawn from books. Such men have completely ruined States because the rules of the past cannot always be applied to the present, for time, place, and persons differ. . . .

In considering the ability of ministers, two facts are of particular importance. In the first place, men of the greatest natural genius are often more dangerous than useful in handling affairs of State unless they have more lead than quicksilver in their composition. Many men are fertile in good ideas. They abound with original thoughts. However, such men are often so changeable in their plans that in the evening they have abandoned their intentions of the morning. They have so little staying power and logic that they change their good plans as readily as their bad ones, and never steadily pursue any policy. I may say with truth, and I know from experience, that the unsteadiness and changeableness of such people is no less dangerous in the management of national affairs than the ill-will of others.

The second fact which must be borne in mind is that nothing can be more dangerous for a State than to give a position of great authority to men who have not sufficient gifts to guide themselves, but who, nevertheless, believe that they have so much ability that they need not be guided by others. Men of that stamp can neither form a good plan for themselves nor follow the advice of those who might give them good counsel. Hence they commit constantly very great mistakes. One of the greatest vices which a public man may possess is presumption. Although humility is not required in those whose destiny it is to administer a State,

they should possess modesty. Modesty is absolutely necessary to them, especially as the most capable men are often least able to bear with assistance and advice, without which even the ablest men are little fit to govern. Men of the greatest genius, unless possessed of modesty, are so much enamoured with their own ideas that they are apt to condemn the proposals of all other people, even if their views are better than their own Hence their natural pride and their high position are apt to make them altogether unbearable. Even the very ablest man must often listen to the advice of men whom he believes to be less able. It is prudent for a minister to speak little and to listen much, for one can profit from all kinds of advice. Good advice is valuable for itself, while bad advice confirms the good. . . .

The leading men must be industrious, as I have stated. However it is not necessary that a man directing public affairs should be working unceasingly. On the contrary, nothing is more harmful for him than unceasing labour. The nature of affairs of State makes relaxation necessary, and the more important the office is the more necessary is relaxation. The physical and mental strength of man is limited, and unceasing labour exhausts both in little time. It is necessary that those who manage affairs of State should make these their principal pre-occupation, and that they should devote to them their whole mind, their whole thought, and all their strength. Their greatest pleasure should consist not in their amusement, but in their success. Statesmen directing the affairs of a country should survey the whole world in order to be able to foresee the events of the future. Then they will be able to take measures against the evils which may come, and to carry through those measures which are required in the national interest.

As the number of the physicians is often responsible for the death of the patient, even so the number of ministers is more often harmful than advantageous to the State. I would add that no more than four ministers can be usefully employed, and one of these should be invested with superior authority. This leading minister should be the mainspring of the State. He should be like the sun in the firmament. He should be guided only by his intelligence and should guide