took little part; Hardwicke was kept in order by Granville, who had generally dined and pleased himself with unpalatable truths about his colleagues; and Mansfield, if he ever had an opinion to express, was reduced to silence by Pitt's withering The Chief Justice of England has no opinion to give on this matter.'

Pitt made Cabinet government a success by subordinating the Ministers to his imperious will and his vast ability, by not allowing his so-called colleagues to restrain his daemonical energy and his all-embracing genius.

To those who have studied English history at its source it is clear that Great Britain was most progressive, that her government was most efficient, and that her diplomacy and army were most ably handled in the time of the Tudors, of Cromwell, and of the elder Pitt, when she enjoyed the advantages of one-man government. England's experience confirms the views of Richelieu, Bismarck, Frederick the Great, Napoleon the First, Alexander Hamilton, and of the greatest statesman of antiquity given in these pages.

Unfortunately the British Cabinet tends to become from year to year more unwieldy and more inefficient. A friendly and discriminating American critic, Professor Lowell, wrote in his classical book, The Government of England':

The number of members in the Cabinet has varied very much at different times, and of late years it has shown a marked tendency to increase. . . . The development of the parliamentary system has made it necessary for the Cabinet to have an ever stronger and stronger hold upon the House of Commons; and, therefore, the different shades of feeling in the party that has a majority in that House must be more and more fully represented in the Cabinet. This alone would tend to increase the number of its members; but far more important still is the fact that a seat in the Cabinet has become the ambition of all the prominent men in Parliament. Consequently the desire to be included is very great, and the disappointment correspondingly acute. For these various reasons there is a constant pressure to

increase the size of the Cabinet. The result is not without its evils. A score of men cannot discuss and agree on a policy with the same readiness as a dozen. There is more danger of delay when action must be taken. There is a greater probability of long discussions that are inconclusive or result in a weak compromise. There is, in short, all the lack of administrative efficiency which a larger body always presents, unless, indeed, that body is virtually guided and controlled by a small number of its own members.

The unwieldiness and inefficiency of British Cabinets are still further increased by a very important factor which Professor Lowell has not mentioned. The Prime Minister and other influential Ministers who wish to control the national policy through the Cabinet endeavour to strengthen their position by keeping some of the ablest men outside the charmed circle and by introducing into it a number of nonentities, a bodyguard of their own, which increases their influence and voting power and correspondingly diminishes the Cabinet's efficiency. This residuum of nonentities is naturally sometimes fought for by the leading Ministers who wish to secure its support. Lord John Russell significantly wrote to Lord Lansdowne on May 28, 1854: It seems to me that the presence of many able men in the Cabinet tends to discordance of opinion and indecision.' In the third volume of Morley's Gladstone' we read, ' A slight ballast of mediocrity in a Government steadies the ship and makes for unity.'

Great Britain is governed by a Cabinet composed of the most eminent party leaders and of those of their followers whom they wish to have near at hand. The management of Army and Navy, the direction of the diplomatic service, &c., are political prizes, are 'spoils of office.' The highest administrative positions have become political perquisites. They are given to men not for their administrative qualifications, but exclusively on account of their political and social influence without any regard to their aptitude. High office is often given to politicians who have had no practical

experience whatever in administration, and sometimes to men who are utterly unfitted for a Ministerial post. No one can faithfully serve several masters. As a politician-minister has probably a business of his own to attend to and must devote much time to party politics in the House of Commons, he can attend only perfunctorily to the business of State. Naturally, disorder, delay, and stagnation in departmental administration is the result. In former ages the national Government was mismanaged by Court favourites. Their place has been taken by party favourites.

The Cabinet is supposed to decide all important questions unanimously. The Army, the Navy, the Diplomatic Service, the national finances, &c., are nominally directed by a single amateur, but in important questions each service is directed by the combined wisdom of some twenty amateurs. One of these knows a little of the business in hand, and the remaining twenty-one know less. Thus, a party politician, who all his life has done nothing except make speeches, has suddenly to take over the functions of a general, an admiral, a diplomat, an expert on agriculture, an authority on shipping and finance, &c., in rapid succession. To do this efficiently he must have a greater and more universal genius than was vouchsafed to Napoleon the First or to the elder Pitt. Jack-of-all-trades are masters of none. Napoleon wrote to Berthier on October 24, 1803:

L'expérience prouve que le plus grand défaut en administration générale est de vouloir faire trop; cela conduit à ne point avoir ce dont on a besoin.

In former ages when matters were simple, when the public services were rudimentary, when a few clerks and a door-keeper could handle the business of one of the great Government departments, it was perhaps possible for an amateur to direct successfully a department of State. Now, when the administrative departments have grown to gigantic size, and when the Services have become all-embracing and highly technical, none but great experts can satisfactorily

manage a great department. Aristotle wrote in the fourth century before Christ:

A State requires many assistants and many superintendents. . . . We observe that the division of labour greatly facilitates all pursuits, and that each kind of work is best performed when each is allotted to a separate workman. To the complicated affairs of Government this observation is particularly applicable.

If a careful division of administrative labour, if Government by specialists was recognised to be necessary in the tiny Greek City-States 2300 years ago, how much more necessary then is expert government in a modern worldempire of 400,000,000 inhabitants?

Blackstone wrote in the time of Frederick the Great in his celebrated Commentaries':

It is perfectly amazing that there should be no other state of life, no other occupation, art, or science, in which some method of instruction is not looked upon as requisite, except only the science of legislation, the noblest and most difficult of any. Apprenticeships are held necessary to almost every art, commercial or mechanical: a long course of reading and study must form the divine, the physician, and the practical professor of the laws; but every man of superior fortune thinks himself born a legislator.

During the last three centuries British national organisation has progressively deteriorated.

Napoleon wrote at St. Helena un mauvais général vaut mieux que deux bons. War is a one-man business. The greatest generals of all time-lack of space prevents giving their opinions in this place-have stated that nothing is more dangerous in warfare than to allow military operations to be directed by a military council, by a council of experts. The great War was for a long time directed not by a council of military experts, but by a council of politicians, by the Cabinet. When Mr. Churchill was reproached for the failure

of the Dardanelles Expedition, Mr. Asquith declared in the House of Commons that Mr. Churchill was not to blame, that it had been approved of by the Cabinet as a whole,' and the House and the country were perfectly satisfied with that explanation. No one asked whether that expedition had been originated and approved of by the experts! As long as military operations are jointly directed by a body of amateurs, disaster is more likely to be the result than success. The British Government, as hitherto constituted, is not the organisation of efficiency, but its negation. It is an organisation similar to that which caused the downfall of Poland. It is the organisation of disorganisation. Amateurs are bound to govern amateurishly, and their insufficiency will be particularly marked if they have to run an unworkable Government machine and are pitted against perfectly organised professionals.

The assertion that inefficiency is inseparable from democracy is not true. Democracy means popular control, but popular control need not mean disorganisation. It need not mean government by amateurs. A highly successful business may have a number of amateur directors, but these will in reality be merely supervisors. The actual management and direction will be left to an expert manager. Similarly, a jury of twelve good men and true does not expound the law, but leaves that technical duty to a single expert, the judge. The fact that democracy and the highest efficiency are compatible is illustrated by the British police, which is at the same time the most democratic, the most efficient, and the least corrupt police force in the world. However, the London police are directed not by a board of politicians, but by a single great expert, who possesses vast powers, and who is controlled by politicians to whom he is personally responsible. Committees are excellent for investigation and deliberation-twenty eyes see more than two-but they are totally unsuitable for decisive and rapid action, especially in the age of railways and telegraphs. Only one man can usefully command a ship,