From all concurring accounts of deserters and others, the enemy's army was now between thirty and forty thousand men, and an attack upon our posts was to be daily expected. These, from their essential though detached situations, had been severally strengthened in the proportion their circumstances required, having such central force in the Town as was deemed necessary for its immediate guard, and for affording a degree of succour to any point that might be more particularly attacked.

For the complete defence of the Town and its extensive Harbour, we had long been obliged to occupy a circumference of at least fifteen miles, by eight principal posts, with their several intermediate dependent ones; the greatest part of these were merely of a temporary nature, such as our means allowed us to construct; and of our force, which never exceeded twelve thousand men bearing firelocks, and composed of five different nations and languages, near nine thousand were placed in or supporting those posts, and about three thousand remained in the Town.

On the 16th, at half-past two o'clock in the morning, the enemy, who had before fired from three batteries from Fort Mulgrave, now opened two new ones, and continued a very heavy cannonade and bombardment on that post till next morning. The works suffered much. The number of men killed and disabled was considerable. The weather was rainy, and the consequent fatigue great.

At two o'clock on the morning of the 17th, the enemy, who had every advantage in assembling and suddenly advancing, attacked the Fort in great force. Although no part of this temporary post was such as could well resist determined troops, yet for a considerable time it was defended; but on the enemy entering on the Spanish side, the British quarter, commanded by Captain Conolly, of the 18th regiment, could not be much longer maintained, notwith

standing

standing several gallant efforts were made for that purpose. It was therefore at last carried, and the remains of the garrison of seven hundred men retired towards the shore of Balaguier under the protection of the other posts established on those heights, and which continued to be faintly attacked by the enemy. As this position of Balaguier was a most essential one for the preservation of the Harbour, and as we had no communication with it but by water, two thousand two hundred men had been placed there for some time past. On the night preceding the attack three hundred more men had been sent over, and on the morning of the 17th four hundred were embarked still farther to support it.

When the firing at Balaguier ceased, we remained in anxious suspense as to the event till a little before day-light, when a new scene opened by an attack on all our posts on the Mountain of Pharon. The enemy were repulsed on the east-side, where was our prrincipal force of about seven hundred men, commanded by a most distinguished officer, the Piedmontese Colonel de Jermagnan, whose loss we deeply lament; but on the back of the Mountain, near one thousand eight hundred feet high, steep, rocky, deemed almost inaccessible, and which we had laboured much to make so, they found means once more to penetrate between our posts, which occupied an extent of above two miles, guarded by about four hundred and fifty men, and in a very short space of time we saw, that, with great numbers of men, they crowded all that side of the Mountain which overlooks Toulon. The particulars of this event I am not yet enabled to ascertain, but I have every reason to think that they did not enter at a British post.

Our line of defence, which, as I have mentioned, occupied a circumference of at least fifteen miles, and with points of which we had only a water communication, being thus broken in upon its two most essential posts, it became necessary to adopt decisive

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measures, arising from the knowledge of the whole of our actual situation. A Council of the Flag and General Officers assembled. They determined on the impracticability of restoring the posts we had lost, and on the consequent propriety of the speediest evacuation of the Town, evidently, and by the report of the Engineers and Artillery Officers, declared untenable. Measures of execution were taken from that moment. The troops were withdrawn from the heights of Balaguier without much interruption from the enemy, and in the evening such posts as necessarily depended on the possession of Pharon were successively evacuated, and the troops drawn in towards Toulon. The Forts D'Artigues and St. Catherine still remained, together with the Posts of Sablettes, Cape Brun, and Malbousquet, from which last the Spaniards withdrew in the night, in consequence of the supporting Post of Neapolitans, at Micissey, having left the battery there established, and abandoned it without orders. Every attention was also given to insure the tranquillity of the Town. In the night the combined fleets took a new station in the outer road.

Early in the morning of the 18th the sick and wounded, and the British field artillery, were sent off. In the course of the day the Post of Cape Brun was withdrawn into La Malgue, the Post of Sablettes was also retired, and the men were put on board. Measures were arranged for the final embarkation, during the night, of the British, Piedmontese, and Spaniards, who occupied the Town, and of the troops of the same Nations who were now at La Malgue, amounting in all to about seven thousand men, for the Neapolitans had by mid-day embarked.

Having determined with Lieutenant-General Gravina, commanding the Spanish troops, that, instead of embarking at the quavs and in the arsenal of the Town, our whole force should assemble near Fort La Malgue, and form on the Peninsula which from

thence

thence extends into the Harbour, every previous disposition was made, and every care taken to conceal our intention. The arsenal and dock-yard were strictly guarded. The troops were ranged accordingly on the ramparts, and the tranquillity of the Town was much ensured from the time the enemy began to throw shells and shot into it; which they did from our late battaries at Micissey and Malbousquet.

About ten o'clock at night fire was set to the ships and arsenal. We immediately began our march, and the evacuation of the Town, which it was necessary should be made with secresy and expedition. The Fort of St. Catherine baving, without orders, been quitted in the course of the day, and possessed by the enemy. The consequent early knowledge of our march, had we taken the common route, through the Gate of Italy, and within musketshot of that Fort, might have produced great inconvenience; we, therefore, by a sally post, gained an advanced part of the road, and without accident were enabled to quit the Town, arrive at Fort La Malgue, and form on the rising ground immediately above the shore. The boats were ready, the weather and the sea in the highest degree favourable: the embarkation began about eleven o'clock, and by daybreak on the 19th the whole, without interruption, or the loss of a man, were on board ship.

The great fire in the arsenal, the blowing up of the powder-ships, and other similar events which took place in the night, certainly tended to keep the enemy in a state of suspense and uncertainty.

As the security of this operation depended much on the protection afforded from the happy situation of Fort La Malgue, which so effectually commands the neck of the Peninsula, and the judicious use that should be made of its artillery, this important service was allotted to Major Kochler with two hundred men, who, after seeing the last man off the shore, and spiking all the guns, effected, from

his activity and intelligence, his own retreat without loss.

Captains Elphinstone, Hollwell, and Mathews, superintended the embarkation, and to their indefatigable attention and good dispositions we are indebted for the happy success of so important an operation. Captain Elphinstone, as Governor of Fort La Malgue, has ably afforded me the most essential assistance, in his command and arrangement of the several important posts included in that district.

It is impossible for me to express, but in general terms, the approbation that is due to the conduct and merits of the several Commanding Officers, and indeed of every Officer, in every rank and situation. Troops have seldom experienced, for so long a time, a service more harassing, distressing, and severe ; and the officers and men of the regiments and marines have gone through it with that exertion, spirit and good will, which peculiarly distinguish the British soldier. At Fort Mulgrave, Lieutenant Duncan, sen. of the royal artillery, was so essentially useful, that to his exertions and abilities that post was much indebted for its preservation for so long a time.

The general service has been carried on with the most perfect harmony and zeal of the navy and army. From our defficiency in artillery men, many of our batteries were worked by seamen; they, in part, guarded some of our posts, and their aid was peculiarly useful in duties of fatigue and labour. În all these we found the influence of the superior activity and exertions of the British sailors.

It was the constant attention of Lord Hood to relieve our wants and alleviate our difficulties.

The Sardinian troops we have always considered as a part of ourselves. We have experienced their attachment and good behaviour, and I have found much assistance from the ability and conduct of the * .1794. Chevalier

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