tracting parties have amicably requested his imperial majesty to consent to guarantee the execution of so desirable an object. His majesty the emperor of all the Russias has accordingly willingly agreed to a measure which tends solely to so salutary an end; and having thereunto furnished us with his full powers, we, the undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of his imperial majesty, declare and assure by this present act, in virtue of our full powers, that his majesty the emperor of all the Russias guarantees the convention which has been signed this day between his majesty the king of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and his majesty the king of Sweden, in all its extent, as well with the two separate articles which are annexed to it, and which form part of the same, as of all the other conditions, clauses, and stipulations which are contained therein, in the best possible form; and that his imperial majesty will cause to be forwarded and delivered the particular ratifications of this act of guarantee. In faith of which, we have sign ed the present act, and have caused the seal of our arms to be thereto affixed, and have exchanged it against the acts of acceptation; as shall be likewise exchanged the ratifications of the present act against the ratifications of the said acts of acceptation, in the space of six weeks, or sooner if pos sible. Done at Helsingborg this 31st day of August 1805. (L. S.) D. ALOPEUS. [This is simply the acceptance by his majesty of the Russian guar antee to the treaty of Helsing borg, of 31st August, 1805.] First separate article of the convention of Helsingborg, signed 31st August, 1805. His majesty the king of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his majesty the king of Sweden, having agreed by the present separate and additional article, that the subsidies fixed by the 2d and 3d articles of the convention signed this day, shall continue to be paid by Great Britain, during the continuance of the war between that power and France, conjointly with Russia, or as long as the state of affairs and the opera tions of the allies shall require that the fortress of Stralsund be kept in a respectable state of defence, unless the two high contracting parties shall mutually consent to the cessation of such subsidies. In both cases, if the term of their payment should happen, when the sea is innavigable, his Britannic ma jesty engages, nevertheless, to continue their payment, according to the same rate as heretofore, till the day of the return of the Swedish troops into Pomerania, which shall take place the earliest opportunity. Second separate article of the convention of Helsingborg, signed the 31st of August 1805. The Hanoverian troops, which (in pursuance of the stipulations of the second and third articles of tion of the 3d of December 1804, the secret and preliminary conventhe present convention) may be renewed by the seventh article of hereafter assembled in Swedish Pomerania, shall continue, as long as they remain in that province, under the supreme orders of the commander in chief of the united forces, Extract from a letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. secretary Fox, dated Paris, March 5, 1806.Received March 19. Paris, March 5, 1806. It may be agreeable to you to receive news from this country. I send you the emperor's speech to the legislative body. You will therein see that our wishes are still for peace. I do not ask what is the prevailing inclination with you; but if the advantages of peace are duly appreciated, you know upon what basis it may be discussed: TRANSLATION. Extract from a speech delivered by the chief of the French govern ment to the legislative body on the 2d of March, 1806. I desire peace with England. On my part, I shall never delay it for a moment. I shall always be ready to conclude it, taking for its basis the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens. No. 12. Communication made by the earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated June 13, 1806. A few days after my arrival at Paris from the depot at Verdun, Mons. Talleyrand desired me to call upon him; having done so, he told me that the French government had been looking out for some means by which a secret and confidential communicatica might be made, explanatory of the sentiments and views of France, as well as the outlines of the terms on which peace might be restored between the two countries. Having mentioned the extreme desire of making this communication in such a manner that no pub licity might in any case ensue, should the object of it not be obtained, Monsieur Talleyrand proceeded to state, in a long argument, which it is useless to repeat, as it forms the substance of several of the French government's dispatches, the reasons which prevent their treating for a general peace jointly with Russia. He said, that in a dispatch sent some weeks before to Mr. Fox, he had been ordered to name Lisle rather than Amiens for the negotiation of a definitive treaty, in order to remove all former discussions, and to facilitate to England the possession of Malta. I then took the liberty of interrupting M. Talleyrand, to say that however flattering the confidence he was ordered to place in me might: be, yet that, feeling as I did, the interests, and above all the honour of my country, it was impossible for me to be the bearer of a communication munication having peace for its object, against which I should feel obliged to vote in parliament; and viewing the restoration of Hanover in this light, I could not receive any further communication till I had explicit declaration with regard to his majesty's German domi nions. M. Talleyrand then broke off the conversation, desiring me to return the third day after. At the expiration of this time I waited upon him again, when he informed me that, considering the extreme stress which peared to be laid upon this point, Hanover should make no difficulty. Authorised by the concession of that in which the honour of the king and that of the nation appeared most interested, I inquired whether the possession of Sicily would be demanded, it having been so said, "Vous l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas; si vous la possedions elle pourroit augmenter de beaucoup les dificultes." Considering this to be very positive both from the words and manner of delivering them, I conceived it improper to make further questions. "Nous ne vous demandons rien +" amounting to an admission of uti possidetis as applicable to his majesty's conquests. M. Talleyrand mentioned strongly the recognition of the emperor and the different branches of his family as absolutely expected. On this I took occasion to state the solidity which the recognition of Great Britain would give to their establishment, and inquired whether the French government would guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman empire. The answer was yes, but it must be soon. "Beaucoup se prepare mais rien n'est fait ‡,” Reverting to the first conversation, 1 desired to know whether a middle term might not be found at the same time to obtain the object desired by the French government, and that desired by Great Britain, of not treating in a manner unconnected with Russia. To this he answered that they were entirely ready to give every facility to the arrangement of the respective interests of the two powers, or that a British minister should, being authorised by the emperor Alexander, stipulate for both. The last words of M. Talleyrand were, "Les sentiments de la France sont entièrement changes; l'aigreur qui caracterisoit le commencement de cette guerre n'existe plus, et ce que nous desivons le plus c'est de pouvoir vivre en bonne intelligence avec une aussi grande pui.sance que la Grande Bretagne." (Signed) No. 14. YARMOUTH. You are in possession of it, we do not ask it of you; if we possessed it, it might very much augment our dithculties. We ask nothing from you. A great deal is in preparation, but nothing is yet done. The sentiments entertained in France are entirely different from what they were. The asperity which characterized the commencemeat of this war, no longer exists; and what we most destre is, to live in harmony with so great a power as Great Britain. that, that, in obedience to your orders, I made all the haste in my power to arrive at Paris as soon as possible; calm at sea however prevented my getting here till the afternoon of the 16th. I immediately waited upon M. Talleyrand to deliver to him the dispatches you entrusted to my care, and requested to put off any conversation on the subject of my journey till next day. I intend employing this interval to endea vour to see M. d'Oubril, if at Paris, and communicate with him previously to the seeing again M. Talleyrand, or at any rate to obtain some knowledge of his motions. Previous, however, to my leaving M. Talleyrand, he expressed to me that although the desire of peace was equally sincere now as it was when I quitted Paris, yet that some changes had taken place which he had hinted at the possibility of when I last saw him, alluding to the readiness of Russia to treat separately; and further mentioned that the emperor had received reports from his brother and the general officers under his orders, stating that Naples could not be held out without Sicily, and the probability they saw of gaining possession of that island. I answered him, that, being ordered to require the restoration of Naples to the king of Sicily as a necessary article of peace, there would be no question of their separation. I conceive Sicily to be the great difficulty, though perhaps, were there no other, it might be got over. M. Talleyrand often and seriously stated the absolute determination of the emperor not to consent to our demands of Naples, Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, or to alienate any part of his Italian states to form a provision for the king of Sardinia. Against cessions in the West Indies or elsewhere I solemnly protested; nor do I think they care sufficiently about these objects to give any sufficient continental equivalent for them. M. Talleyrand often repeated. that the emperor had inquired whether I had any powers, adding, "qu' en politique on ne peut parler la même langue, si on n'y est également autorisé *;" and as frequently said that they considered that Hanover for the honour of the crown, Malta for the honour of the navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for the honour of the British commerce, to be sufficient inducements to induce his majesty's ministers to make peace. P. S. On Tuesday 15th June I waited upon M. Talleyrand, and began the conversation by alluding to the changes he had hinted at the night before, and desired leave to repeat the substance of what had passed at my former interviews with him, and which I had by his desire communicated. He agreed that the statement was accurate. No. 15. Extract of a dispatch from Mr. secretary Fox to the earl of Yarmouth, dated Downing-stract, June 23, 1806. Downing-street, June 25, 1806. My lord, had the honour on Saturday evening to receive your lordship's letters of the 19th, and should sooner have answered them, "That in politics it is impossible to hold the same language, unless both parties are equally authorized." 1806. (N) if if I had not been for these three days past totally incapable of atténding to business. I am very happy to learn that M. Talleyrand acknowledges your accounts of former conversations to be accurately correct; but when be does acknowledge this, I have no conception on what ground he can recede from what he said so distinctly to your lordship before, upon the subject of Sicily: "Vous l'avez, rous ne xcus demandons rient," are the words that made the more impression on me, because those contained in the latter clause of the sentence had been used by his excellency in one of his letters to me. It was on the faith of the uti possidetis being to be strictly observed as the basis, and particularly Sicily, on which satisfaction had been given to your lordship, that his majesty was induced to authorise your lordship to hold further conferences with M. Talleyrand. Any tergiversation or cavil therefore on that article, would be a breach of the principle of the proposed basis in its most essential part. To say that Hanover is an exception to the principle is in vain, in as much as Hanover is to be yielded expressly in honour of the crown; while, on the other hand, the recognitions proposed with regard to the French empire and its dependants, are not only in honour of the crown of France, but tend substantially to establish the solidity of her power. With regard to the complaint of the want of full powers; to avoid all pretence of cavil on that account, I am commanded by his majesty to transmit to you the instrument accompanying this letter. But your lordship should fairly state to M. Talleyrand, that you are not authorised to make any use of them formally until M. Talleyrand returns to his former ground with respect to Sicily. Your lordship is directed further, to acquaint that minister, that, if Russia offers to treat separately, it is only in the way in which we do; that is to say, separately in form, but in substance, in concert with each other. And here you will recollect that this very circumstance was canvassed in your former conversations with M. Talleyrand, when that minister expressed himself clearly that there would be no objection on the part of France to such preconcert. The result of what I have stated to your lordship is this: 1st, That Sicily is a sine qua non; on which subject, if the French minister recedes from his former answer, it is vain that any further discussion should take place. It is clearly within his first opinion delivered to your lordship: It is clearly with in his last description of places which are reciprocally possessed by two countries, and cannot in all probability be recovered by war. If, according to the hope conceived by your lordship, this matter should be arranged, you may open your full powers: stating at the same time, the determination of this court not to come to any final agreement without the consent of Russia. You will of course again mention the questions of Naples and Istria. If we could attain either of them it would be. well; but if we cannot, your lordship will not state these points as conclusive reasons against agreeing on preliminary articles, provided You are in possession of it; we ask nothing from you. such |