into consideration, in which he declared, "That it was a great satisfaction to him to reflect, that, notwithstanding the many events unfavorable to the common cause, the prospect resulting from the general situation of affairs had in many important respects been materially improved in the course of the present year. That the distraction and anarchy which had so long prevailed in France had now led to a crisis, of which it was as yet impossible to see the issue. Should this crisis terminate in any order of things compatible with the tranquillity of other countries, and afford a reasonable expectation of security and permanence in any treaty which might be concluded, the appearance of a disposition to negociate for a general peace, on just and suitable terms, would not fail to be met on his part with an earnest desire to give it the speediest effect." At the conclusion of his speech, the king mentioned the anxiety and uneasiness he felt at the extremely high price of grain, recommending it to the parliament to adopt such measures as might be the means of alleviating the present distress. CHAP. I. 1795-6. On the 8th of December, Mr. Pitt delivered a BOOK III. message from his majesty to the house of commons, making mention of the establishment of such a form of government in France as appeared capable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity, and expressive of his readiness to meet any negociation on the part of the enemy, with a desire to give it the speediest effect in producing a peace." Next day, Mr. Pitt moved an address in reply, which gave rise to a debate, when an amendment was proposed by Mr. Sheridan, denying that any change in the French government could affect the principle of negociation, and requesting_that_the treaty might be entered on immediately. The amendment was declared to be "perfectly consistent with the spirit of the message, which admitted that Great Britain might now safely treat. Where, then, could be the objection to declare that she would treat with France? It was a vulgar, and indeed the most vulgar of opinions, to suppose that it was disadvantageous to a power at war to be the first to offer terms of peace. The experience of history proved the reverse. Were peace now offered on reasonable terms, it would not be possible for the French government to refuse their assent." Mr. Pitt, however, insisted that he should be left unfettered, and the amendment was of course negatived without a division. Mr. Fox moved an amendment to the address: and, after enumerating the different disasters of the campaign, and experimentally stating that the French were capable of maintaining the accustomed relations of amity and peace with other countries, "prayed his majesty that such terms of As the British government seemed to adopt no peace should be offered to the French republic as measures towards a pacification, Mr. Grey moved, should be consistent with the honor of the crown, on the 15th of February, 1796, for an address to and with the security and interests of the people." his majesty, beseeching him to communicate to the This amendment was opposed by Mr. Pitt, who executive government of France his willingness to considered the finances of France as in a state meet any disposition to negociate, with an ardent absolutely undone, since 720,000,000 of assignats desire to give it the speediest effect. If ministers were then in circulation. They were not in a intended to prove themselves sincere in their decondition for carrying on war during another cam- sire for peace, they should make direct proposals, paign, which led him to think that the situation and acknowledge the republic without reserve, of things was very much improved. He extolled It might perhaps be said, that this was humiliating the new constitution of France, when contrasted to such as were in the habit of employing the with those forms which preceded it; and declared language of disdain; but ministers ought to learn that the depreciation of paper currency in France humility from misfortune, and submit to an alterhad been the incessant tale with which parliament native which had been rendered unavoidable from had been deluded from year to year. He allowed their own folly. Mr. Pitt recommended confidence that every objection to the form and principles of in ministers, and said, that if it was improper to that government, considered as obstacles to nego- confide in such a manner, it would be proper to ciation, would be entirely at an end. The Duke apply to his majesty to have them removed, of Bedford proposed an amendment to the address After putting the question, the motion of Mr. Grey in the house of peers, similar to Mr. Fox in the was negatived by a great majority. lower house; but both of them were negatived by great majorities. A number of expedients were pointed out in the early part of the session, in order to alleviate the distresses of the poor, by diminishing the price of bread-corn. Bills were brought in for changing the existing laws respecting the assize of bread; to prevent the manufacture of starch from wheat, distillation from any articles of grain, &c.-In so far as these laws had any operation, they were admitted to be beneficial. The Earl of Guildford in the house of peers, and Mr. Fox in the house of commons, moved an address to his majesty on the 10th of May, which declared, "That the duty incumbent upon parlia ment no longer permitted them to dissemble their deliberate opinion, that the distress, difficulty, and peril, to which this country is now subjected, have arisen from the misconduct of the king's ministers, and are likely to subsist and increase as long as the same principles which have hitherto guided these ministers shall continue to prevail in the councils 1796. BOOK III. of Great Britain.-It is painful to us to remind your majesty of the situation of your dominions at CHAP. I. the beginning of the war, and of the high degree of prosperity to which the skill and industry of your majesty's subjects had, under the safeguard of a free constitution, raised the British empire, since it can only fill your mind with the melancholy recollection of prosperity abused, and of opportunities of securing permanent advantages wantonly rejected. Nor shall we presume to wound your majesty's benevolence, by dwelling on the fortunate consequences which might have arisen from the mediation of Great Britain between the powers then at war, which might have insured the permanence of our prosperity, while it preserved all Europe from the calamities which it has since endured,—a mediation which the kingdom was so well fitted to carry on with vigor and dignity, by its power, its character, and the nature of its government, happily removed at an equal distance from the contending extremes of licentiousness and tyranny.-From this neutral and impartial system of policy your majesty's ministers were induced to depart by certain measures of the French government, of which they complained as injurious and hostile to this country. With what justice those complaints were made, we are not now called upon to determine, since it cannot be pretended that the measures of France were of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of adjustment by negociation; and it is impossible to deny that the power which shuts up the channel of accommodation must be the real aggressor in war. To reject negociation is to determine on hostilities; and, whatever may have been the nature of the points at question between us and France, we cannot but pronounce the refusal of such an authorised communication with that country, as might have amicably terminated the dispute, to be the true and immediate cause of the rupture which followed. "Nor can we forbear to remark, that the pretences under which your majesty's ministers then haughtily refused such authorised communications, have been sufficiently exposed by their own conduct in since submitting to a similar intercoursé with the same government. "The misguided policy which thus rendered the war inevitable, appears to have actuated your majesty's ministers in their determination to continue it at all hazards. At the same time we cannot but observe, that the obstinacy with which they have adhered to their desperate system, is not more remarkable than their versatility in the pretexts upon which they have justified it. At one period the strength, at another the weakness of the enemy, have been urged as motives for continuing the war; the success as well as the defeats of the allies have contributed only to prolong the contest; and hope and despair have equally served to involve us still deeper in the horrors of war, and to entail upon us an endless train of calamities. "After the original professed objects had been obtained by the expulsion of the French armies from the territories of Holland and the Austrian Netherlands, we find your majesty's ministers, influenced either by arrogance or by infatuated ambition and the vain hope of conquests, which, if realized, could never compensate to the nation for the blood and treasure by which they must be obtained, rejecting unheard the overtures made by the executive council of France, at a period when circumstances were so eminently favorable to your majesty and your allies, that there is every reason to suppose that a negociation commenced at such a juncture must have terminated in an honorable and advantageous peace; to the prospects arising from such an opportunity they preferred a blind and obstinate perseverance in a war which could scarce have any remaining object, but the unjustifiable purpose of imposing upon France a government disapproved of by the inhabitants of that country; and such was the infatuation of these ministers, that, far from being able to frame a wise and comprehensive system of policy, they even rejected the few advantages that belonged to their unfortunate scheme. The general existence of a design to interpose in the internal government was too manifest not to rouse into active hostility the national zeal of that people; but their particular projects were too equivocal to attract the confidence or procure the co-operation of those Frenchmen who were disaffected to the government of their country. The nature of these plaus was too clear not to provoke formidable enemies, but their extent was too ambiguous to conciliate useful friends. We beg leave farther to represent to your majesty, that, at subsequent periods, your ministers have suffered the most favorable opportunities to escape of obtaining an honorable and advantageous pacification. They did not avail themselves, as it was their duty to have done, of the unbroken strength of the general confederacy which had been formed against France, for the purpose of giving effect to overtures for negocia tion. They saw the secession of several powerful states from that confederacy; they suffered it to dissolve without an effort for the attainment of a general pacification. They loaded their country with the odium of having engaged in a combination, charged with the most questionable and unjustifiable views, without availing themselves of that combination for procuring favorable conditions of peace. That, from this fatal neglect, the progress of hostilities has only served to establish the evils which might certainly have been avoided by negociation, but which are now confirmed by the events of the war, We have felt, that the un justifiable and impracticable attempt to establish royalty in France by force, has only proved fatal to its unfortunate supporters. We have seen with regret the subjugation of Holland, and the aggrandizement of the French republic; and we have to lament the alteration in the state of Europe, not only from the successes of the French, but from the formidable acquisitions of some of the allied powers on the side of Poland,-acquisitions alarming from their magnitude, but still more so from the manner in which they have been made: thus fatally learning that the war hastened alone to establish the very evils for the prevention of which it was avowedly undertaken. "On a review of so many instances of gross and flagrant misconduct, proceeding from the same pernicious principles, and directed with incorrigible obstinacy to the same mischievous ends, we deem ourselves bound, in duty to your majesty and to our constituents, to declare that we see no rational hope of redeeming the affairs of the kingdom, but by the adoption of a system radically and fundamentally different from that which has produced our present calamities. "Unless your majesty's ministers shall, from a real conviction of past errors, appear inclined to regulate their conduct upon such a system, we can neither give any credit to the sincerity of their professions of a wish for peace, nor repose any confidence in them for conducting a negociation to a prosperous issue. Odious as they are to an enemy, who will still believe them secretly to cherish those unprincipled and chimerical projects which they have been compelled in public to disavow, contemptible in the eyes of all Europe, from the display of insincerity which has marked their conduct, our only hopes rest on your majesty's royal wisdom and unquestioned affection for your people, that you will be graciously pleased to adopt maxims of policy more suitable to the circumstances of the times, than those by which your majesty's ministers appeared to have been governed, and to direct your servants to take measures which, by differing essentially, as well in their tendency as in the principles upon which they are founded, from those which have hitherto marked their conduct, may give this country some reasonable hope, at no very distant period, of the establishment of a peace suitable to the interests of Great Britain, and likely to preserve the tranquillity of Europe." This address gave rise to much interesting debate in both houses of parliament. At length the English ministry condescended to enter into a negociation, and two unsuccessful attempts were made during the spring and winter; the first by means of Mr. Wickham, ambassador to the Helvetic states, and the next through the medium of Lord Malmesbury, who repaired to Paris ex 1796. pressly for that purpose. On the 24th of October, BOOK III. his lordship presented a memorial, stating, "that in the opinion of his Britannic majesty, the prin- CHAP. 1. ciple of compensation would best serve as a basis for the definitive arrangements of peace. Great Britain, from the uninterrupted success of her naval war, finds herself in a situation to have no restitution to demand of France, from which, on the contrary, she has taken establishments and colonies of the highest importance, and of value almost incalculable. But, on the other hand, France has made, on the continent of Europe, conquests to which his majesty can be the less indifferent, as the most important interests of his people, and the most sacred engagements of his crown, are essentially implicated therein. The magnanimity of the king, his inviolable good faith, and his desire to restore repose to so many nations, induced him to consider this situation of affairs as affording the means of procuring for all the belligerent powers, just and equitable terms of peace, and such as are calculated to ensure for the time to come the general tranquillity. It is on this footing, then, that he purposes to negociate, by offering to make compensation to France, by proportionable restitutions, for those arrangements to which she will be called upon to consent, in order to satisfy the just demands of the king's allies, and to preserve the political balance of Europe." The executive directory, through the medium of M. de la Croix, the minister for foreign affairs, returned the following answer, which was extremely embarrassing. They said, " that if Lord Malmesbury would have agreed to treat separately, as he was formally authorised by the tenor of his credentials, the negociations might have been considerably abridged; that the necessity of balancing with the interests of the two powers, those of the allies of Great Britain, multiplies the combinations, increases the difficulties, tends to the formation of a congress, the forms of which, it is known, are always tardy, and requires the accession of powers which hitherto have displayed no desire of accommodation, and have not given to Lord Malmesbury himself, according to his own declaration, any power to stipulate for them. Nevertheless, the executive directory, animated with an ardent desire of putting a stop to the scourge of war, and to prove that they will not reject any means of reconciliation, declares, that as soon as Lord Malmesbury shall exhibit to the minister for foreign affairs, sufficient powers from the allies of Great Britain, for stipulating for their respective interests, accompanied by a promise on their part to subscribe to whatever shall be concluded in their names, the executive directory will hasten to give an answer to the specific propositions which shall be submitted to them; and BOOK III. that the difficulties shall be removed, as far as may be consistent with the safety and dignity of the French republic." СНАР. 1. 1796. The directory seem to have imagined, that the court of London did not seriously intend to accede to the basis of pacification which M. Barthelemy had stated to Mr. Wickham; and in their reply to the memorial of Lord Malmesbury, they plainly indicated their suspicions," that the British government had a double object in view,-to prevent by general propositions the partial propositions of other powers, and to obtain from the people of England the means of continuing the war, by throwing an odium upon the republic;" and they declared without any mental reservation, "that they could not but perceive, that the proposition of Lord Malmesbury is nothing more than a renewal, under more amicable forms, of the former proposal of Mr. Wickham." Lord Malmesbury transmitted a second note on the 12th of November to the directory, in which, conformably to the orders he had received during the interval, his lordship protested," that, with regard to the offensive and injurious insinuations contained in that paper, the king had deemed it far beneath his dignity to permit an answer to be made to them on his part in any manner whatsoever. As to the difficulty started by the directory, it is justly said, that there could be no question but of a negociation, which shall combine the interests and pretensions of all the powers who make a common cause with the king in the present war. In the course of such a negociation, the intervention, or at least the participation, of these powers will doubtless become absolutely necessary; but it appears, that the waiting for a formal and definitive authority on the part of the allies of the king, before Great Britain and France begin to discuss even provisionally the principles of the negociation, would be to create a very useless delay." The same day, M. de la Croix, in a note to Lord Malmesbury, declared himself "charged by the executive directory to invite him to point out, without the smallest delay, and expressly, the objects of reciprocal compensation which he had to propose." To this Lord Malmesbury made answer," that, before the formal acceptation of this principle, or the proposal on the part of the executive directory of some other principle, which might equally serve as the basis of a negociation for a general peace, he could not be authorised to designate the objects of reciprocal compensation." After some sharp but fruitless altercation, M. de la Croix informed Lord Malmesbury on the 27th of November," that the proposal contained in his note of the 12th of November, involved in it an acknowledgment of the principle of compensation; and that principle being now formally re cognized, he was again invited to give a speedy and categorical answer to the proposal." But it now appeared, that Lord Malmesbury came totally unfurnished with any plan or projet of peace. To the astonishment of the directory, the ambas sador who had been expressly required to bring with him full powers to conclude a peace definitively with the republic, was obliged again to consult his court, and the negociation was totally at a stand till the 17th of December, when Lord Malmesbury stated, in a formal and confidential memorial, the terms agreeably to which it was conceived that a treaty might be concluded on the basis of mutual compensation. These terms imported, 1st, that France should restore all her conquests made in any of the dominions of the emperor or in Italy, and that Great Britain should render back all her acquisitions gained from that power in the East and West Indies. The second article of the projet nevertheless stipulated for "the re-establishment of peace between the Germanic empire and France, by a suitable arrangement, conformable to the respective interests and general safety of Europe.' The projet proceeded to state," that if, in addition to the entire restitution of the French colonies by Great Britain, his majesty were to wave the right given him, by the express stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht, of opposing the cession of the Spanish part of St. Domingo to France, his majesty would then demand, in return for this concession, a compensation which might secure, at least in some degree, the maintenance of the balance of the respective possessions in that part of the world." It was added, that "restitutions of any kind in favor of Holland, unless France would on her part reinstate that republic in all respects in the same political situation in which it stood before the war," as Lord Malmesbury expressly declared, in a second memorial delivered at the same time," could be admitted in so far only as they shall be compensated by arrangements calculated to contribute to the security of the Austrian Netherlands." Lord Malmesbury had a long conference with M. de la Croix on the subject of these memorials, of which his lordship transmitted a minute account to the court of St. James's. The following are the most important particulars. The French minister said, "that the plan of pacification proposed appeared to him to be liable to insurmountable objections, as requiring much more than it conceded, and, in the event, not leaving France in a situation of proportional greatness to the other powers of Europe. He said, the act of their constitution made it impossible for the republic to do what was required. The Austrian Netherlands were annexed to it; they could not be disposed of without throwing the nation into all the confu |