squadrons, all those positions fell, one after the other, to the insurgent army, and General Rochambeau, and the remains of that great army which had been judged fully sufficient to reconquer the colony, were necessitated to surrender prisoners of war to the naval force of Britain. By this event the sanguine hopes which Bonaparte had entertained of restoring to France the most valuable of her foreign possessions, was completely frustrated.

St. Domingo was not the only loss which France sustained in the West Indies. The islands of St. Lucie and Tobago were also wrested from her. The expedition which was prepared for the attack of those colonies, sailed from Barbadoes on the 20th of June, and arrived at daybreak, on the 21st, off St. Lucie; in the course of the day they effected their landing, drove in the advanced posts of the enemy, took the town of Castries, and summoned the French general Nogues to surrender at discretion. That officer, however, refusing to accede to those terms, Lieutenant-general Grinfield, who commanded the expedition, resolved upon attacking the Fort of Morne Fortunee by assault, as the rainy season was soon expected to commence. The attack was made the next morning at four o'clock, and the place was carried in the most gallant manner in about half an hour, without much loss, if the boldness of the enterprise be considered. That on the British side, was about 138 men killed and wounded, including some officers. The number of the French garrison made prisoners of war amounted to 640. Besides the possession of a valuable sugar island, this victory was important in many points of view. In the first place, the storming so gallantly a fort strongly garrisoned by the French, proved again to the world that French troops were not invincible; and that the same armies which beat them in Egypt could conquer them again in any part of the world. At the same time that it established the reputation of the British army for gallantry and spirit, it was attended by a circumstance that displayed that generosity of national character, which is inseparable from true courage. The French general had refused a capitulation; he was determined to abide the assaults; and although it might be supposed that conquering troops, provoked by the losses which the obstinacy of the enemy exposed them to, would have revenged themselves by a bloody victory, yet, to the honor of the British name, notwithstanding the extent of the provocation, they did not kill or wound a single Frenchman after the works had been carried. This was a triumph worthy of a civilized nation, and the brilliant display of British gallantry and generosity on this occasion was of infinitely more importance than even the capture of St. Lucie.

1803.

This first success of the British, was of a na- BOOK VI. ture to excite respect and admiration from those great powers of Europe that remained anxious CRAP. IV. spectators of the contest between France and England; while the successes of France in Hanover could only be considered by them as a daring violation of the territories of an independent and neutral nation, and an alarming proof of the disregard with which Bonaparte viewed his most solemn treaties.

On the 1st of July the island of Tobago surrendered to General Grinfield, who, after the conquest of St. Lucie, directed his force thither. The garrison were too feeble to oppose any resistance, and therefore immediately proposed a capitulation, in virtue of which they were to be sent over to France at the expense of Great Britain. Beside the French islands of St. Lucie and Tobago, in the West Indies, the Dutch settlements of Berbice and Demarara fell into the hands of the British in the course of the present year, but without experiencing any resistance worth a particular detail.

When two nations such as France and England were at war, it might naturally be expected that each would have recourse not only to every measure of serious annoyance, but also to such as might afford matter of temporary triumph; of the latter nature may be reckoned the successes of the British arms in the West Indies.

By treachery to the brave Toussaint (as related in the preceding book), Bonaparte had acquired St. Domingo; and, previously to the recommencement of hostilities with England, the first consul appeared determined to establish a colonial power both in St. Domingo and Louisiana, which would bid fair not only to out-rival the British empire in the West Indies, but also to check the rising greatness of the United States of America. These objects were entirely deranged and defeated by the rupture with England; his plan of possessing himself of Egypt and the Levant, had been also crushed by the constant superiority of the British fleet in the Mediterranean. The views of the first consul therefore necessarily took a different direction, and he sought to establish his power on other grounds. He made himself the absolute master of Italy, and shewed the Kings of Naples, Etruria, and the pope, that no treaties could bind him to respect their neutrality, or would prevent him from entering and occupying their territories whenever he pleased, and of levying contributions upon them, the measure of which should be alone determined by a compromise between their ability and his extortive rapacity. Spain and Portugal were reduced to the state of provinces, on which he could at pleasure levy what sums of money he deemed necessary, and at the same time enjoy all the advantages of their great possessions in Southern America, without

BOOK VI. incurring the risk or expense of governing

CHAP. IV. 1803.

them.

No circumstance could evince more clearly the power that Bonaparte had, and meant to retain, over Germany, than the invasion and occupation of Hanover. Austria and Prussia contented themselves with demanding explanation upon those points; to which the answer of the French government was, that it was solely the possessions of the King of England which were attacked, but that in other points the integrity and independence of the German empire should be respected. The Emperor of Germany affected to be content with this explanation, as he was in no condition to war with France about Hanover, a country which had preserved its neutrality when he and the German empire were in the greatest difficulty and danger. The King of Prussia also, whatever discontent he might feel, professed also to be satisfied: that monarch well knew, that the first consul would by no means abandon his plan, on account of any remonstrances he could make, and he therefore did not choose to irritate him by a fruitless opposition. It must, however, have been very galling to that monarch to find, that the power of France had so soon stripped him of the title which, while it suited the convenience of Bonaparte, he was pleased to allow him, that of "Protector of the north of Germany." From the moment that the French army had entered Hanover, he perceived, as did the lesser states of the empire, that there was no power at hand to rescue the latter from the grasp of France. In vain did the imperial city of Hamburgh appeal to his protection, and to that of the head of the empire, when the French occupied Cuxhaven, and had demanded a considerable loan from them: no relief was obtained, or even a remonstrance issued, upon that unwarrantable proceeding.

Thus circumstanced, the government of Denmark was the only neighbouring power which displayed the slightest spirit. The prince royal speedily collected an army of 30,000 meu in Holstein, and took vigorous measures to defend his territories; but when he found that Prussia had acquiesced in the encroachments of France, and that the official journal of Bonaparte had begun to threaten Denmark herself in unequivocal terms, unless she immediately dispersed the army of Holstein, the prince royal found himself (though reluctantly) compelled to submit to the imperious and over-ruling necessity of the case, and his German states were again placed on a peace establishment.

Although Russia was intimately connected with the interests of the north of Europe, and must doubtless have felt much displeased at the advance of the French army, and the violation of the Germanic empire, of which she was the

ag

guarantee, yet the Emperor Alexander was so pacifically disposed, as not to consider that gression of France as an immediate ground of war. Bonaparte had solemnly alleged, that he only occupied Hanover in order to induce the King of England to give up Malta, agreeably to the conditions of the treaty of Amiens. The emperor, who eagerly wished for the restoration of peace, would probably have been glad that England could by any means have been induced to execute that article which respected the island of Malta. The British government had however most imprudently rested the war, entirely upon the possession of that island. The great and continually increasing aggrandizement of France; the violence and outrages committed by her, daily, against the independence of every nation in Europe; and her continued insult and injury to Great Britain, were all to be forgiven, if she would consent that the latter power might retain the possession of Malta. It was not at all surprising therefore that the nations of Europe evinced the most profound indifference upon the subject of the island of Lampedosa, or even of that of Malta. There were but three nations in the world that would have wished to be troubled with the possession of either, namely, England, France, and Russia. To any of these nations the possession of the latter island would be an important object, as the means of increasing or establishing their power in the Mediterranean and Russia having evidently wished and demanded the possession of Malta for herself, it could not be expected that she would be very sanguine in her efforts to procure it for England.

As therefore England had embarked in war, on a ground in which the continental powers could feel no interest; and as it was evident that the neutral nations would be obstructed and cramped in their commercial relations, as well in the prosecution of this as in every former war, it was natural for them to wish that a peace might be concluded upon any terms; and as Bonaparte professed solely to desire the execution of the treaty of Amiens, they were content to allow him to occupy Hanover as the means of compelling Great Britain to fulfil her engage

ments.

The real views of France, however, were soon more perfectly developed. The army of Hanover was but the advanced guard of that vast force which she could rapidly move into the heart of Prussia, or any northern nation that should resist her will. The armies at Boulogne and in Holland were in reality as formidable to the north of Europe as to England. In Italy, her armies had entered the kingdom of Naples, occupied all the strong places on its eastern coasts, and levied contributions throughout the

BOOK VI. an event, the French people would again be thrown into a state of uncertainty and dismay, CHAP. V. which would the better enable him to increase his personal influence and authority, by the augmenta1804. tion of his various establishments, civil and military; whilst all murmurs would be silenced by the dread of the revival of those sanguinary scenes which had occurred during the course of the revolution, and to which, it was very generally feared, the overthrow, or the weakening of the existing government, might lead.

These apprehensions were adroitly inculcated, and kept alive by his partisans, whilst the vigilance and indefatigable attention of the supreme head of the government were loudly proclaimed on all occasions. The minister of the interior concluded his speech to the legislative body, on the opening of their session of the year 1804, in the following terms:

"The French people, proud of their government, confident in their resources, and happy in their institutions, express but one sentiment love for the august head of the state; free from fear, from agitation, from disquietude, they repose in him the care of their destinies."

The flourishing state of France was pourtrayed in the most captivating colours in the official report laid before the legislative body. It was there represented, that although the republic had been forced to change her attitude, her situation was in no respect deteriorated, and that the consciousness of her strength was a sure pledge of her prosperity; that the internal tranquillity of the country had not been disturbed since the torch of war had been rekindled by a jealous enemy; that the public indignation against that -enemy was as much increased as the devotion to the first consul; that all danger of internal divisions was at an end, in despite of every effort made by the English to promote them. In short, that the war had not even interrupted the plans formed for a time of peace, such as the construction of roads, canals, bridges, and harbours, and objects of a similar nature; and that the government had pursued, with constancy, every measure that tended to establish the constitution, in conformity to the genius and wishes of the citizens, so as to attach all interests and all hopes to its duration; that the finances were in a most thriving condition, and the revenues collected with the greatest facility; that public credit had maintained itself in the midst of shocks of war, and that the sinking fund fulfilled, with constancy and fidelity, its destination; that out of two hundred millions (of livres), which might have been captured by the enemy, more than two-thirds had been saved; that the Hanoverian army, to the amount of 25,000 men, had laid down their arms to them, and that their cavalry had been remounted at the

expense of a possession dear to the King of Eng land, and which would be a security in their hands of the justice which he would hereafter be obliged to render them; that France would never acknowledge less advantageous conditions than those of the treaty of Amiens; and, finally, that the most perfect harmony subsisted between France and the United States, Helvetia, Italy, the Ottoman empire, and that the tranquillity given to the continent, by the treaty of Luneville, was secured by the last proceedings of the diet of Ratisbon.

Such was the substance of the report made by the government, and which was well calculated (allowing its truth to remain undisputed) to tranquillize the minds of the French people, and inspire them with a firm reliance on their ruler. But, admitting the general truth of this statement, and forgetting for a moment, that, in all similar publications, every unfavorable circumstance is suppressed, it might be presumed, that the source of so much national prosperity, like the overflow of a mountain torrent, might be but of short duration. The whole of this flattering representation being founded upon the supposition, that the pecuniary resources of France were adequate to the maintenance of the various establishments therein mentioned, without touching upon the additional expenses occasioned by the war, it should be observed, that extraordinary funds, to the amount of 150 millions tournois, (about 6,250,000. sterling) had been received, in the course of the preceding year, from contributions levied on the United States, Hanover, the Hanse Towns, Spain, and Portugal; independently of which aid, nearly a fourth part of the French army was maintained at the expense of Italy, Holland, and Hanover. As France was thus aggrandizing herself at the expense of other powers, it behoved Europe, for the happiness of the world at large, to prevent this from being a permanent revenue.

While France was thus lulled into credulity by the artifice of Bonaparte, an event occurred which materially contributed to accelerate the completion of his projects.

Early in the month of February, a plot was detected, the object of which seemed to have been the overthrow of the government. The principal persons implicated in it, were General Pichegru, Georges Cadoudal, formerly a leader of the insurgents in Britanny, Lajollais, a confident of the former, and several other individuals attached to the latter. It likewise appeared that General Moreau had, to a certain extent, entered into the views of Pichegru, and had had some secret interviews with him since his return to Paris. It was also positively asserted, that the conspirators had come to the resolution of making away, in the first instance, with Bonaparte.

The first intimation of this intrigue is said to

have been given by a confidential agent of the parties, who had been arrested near Calais, on his return from England.

Lajollais, Moreau, and several others, were hereupon arrested; but Pichegru and Georges, though known to be at Paris, found means, for a short time, to screen themselves from the researches of the police.

On the 17th of February, the following report, relative to this conspiracy, was made to the government, by the grand judge, minister of justice:

"Citizen First Consul!

"New plots have been hatched by England; this was the case even amidst the peace which she swore to maintain, and when she violated the treaty of Amiens, she counted less on her strength than on the success of her machinations. But government was vigilant; the steps of the agents of the enemy were followed by the eye of justice the people of London were no doubt expecting to hear the explosion of that mine which had been dug under our feet. At any rate, the most ominous reports were spread, and they were indulging the most criminal hopes; on a sudden the agents of the conspiracy were arrested; proofs have accumulated, and they are so strong and so evident, that they carry with them conviction to every mind. Georges and his band of assassins had remained in the pay of England; their agents were still traversing La Vendée, Morbilian, the Côtes du Nord, and were endeavouring, but in vain, to find partisans, of whom they were deprived by the moderation of government and of the laws. Pichegru, unmasked by the events which preceded the 18th Fructidor, year 5, (Sept. 5, 1797,) and unveiled, in particular, by that correspondence which General Moreau had addressed to the directory, had carried with him to England his hatred against his country. In the year 8, he and Villot were in the train of the armies of our enemies, in order to unite with the brigands of the south. In the year 9, he conspired with the committee of Bareuth, and since the peace of Amiens he has still been the hope and the counsellor of the enemies of France. The British perfidy associated Georges with Pichegru, the infamous Georges, with that Pichegru whom France had esteemed, whom she wished for a long time to consider as incapable of treachery! In the year 11, a criminal reconciliation united Pichegru and Moreau, two men between whom honor ought to place eternal hatred. The police seized at Calais one of their agents, at the moment when he was returning a second time from England. This man had in his possession documents which confirmed the reality of a reconciliation at that time inexplicable, had not the bonds which united them been formed by criminality. On the arrest of this agent, General

1804.

Moreau appeared for a moment to be agitated. BOOK VI. He took some private steps to ascertain whether government was informed of it; but it was passed CHAP. V. over in silence, and he himself, when he recovered his tranquillity, concealed from government an event which could not but awaken its vigilance. He observed silence even when Pichegru was publicly admitted into the councils of the British ministry, when he united in a notorious manner with the enemies of France. Government was disposed to consider his silence as arising from the dread of a confession, which would have humbled him, as it considered his retirement from public affairs, his suspicious connections, and his imprudent language, as the effect of peevishness and discontent. General Moreau, who could not fail of being suspected, since he maintained a secret correspondence with the enemies of his country, and who, in consequence of this suspicion, which was too well founded, would at any other period have been arrested, was suffered to enjoy in tranquillity his honors, an immense fortune, and the kindness of the republic. Events, however, rapidly succeeded each other: Lajollais, the friend and confidant of Pichegru, went privately from Paris to London, returned to Paris, carried to Pichegru the ideas of General Moreaucarried back to Moreau the ideas and designs of Pichegru and his associates; the brigands of Georges were preparing, even in Paris, every thing that was necessary for the execution of their common designs. A place was assigned between Dieppe and Treport, at a distance from molestation or the eye of vigilance, where the brigands of England, brought over in English ships, landed without being observed, and where they found corrupted men to receive them-men paid to conduct them during the night from fixed stations, previously agreed on, and thus to convey them to Paris. At Paris lurking-places were procured for them in houses hired before-hand, where they had confidants to protect them: they had some of these in different quarters and streets at Chaillot, in the Rue de Bacq, in the Fauxbourg St. Marceau, in the Marais. A first debarkation was effected, consisting of Georges himself, and eight of his brigands. Georges returned to the coast to assist at the landing of Coster St. Victor, condemned by a sentence passed in the affair of Nivôse 3, and of ten other brigands. In the commencement of the present month a third landing was effected; it consisted of Pichegru, Lajollais, Armand, Gaillard, brother of Raould, Jolin Marie, one of the first confidants of Georges, and some other brigands of the same stamp.Georges with Joyau, called d'Assar, Saint Vincent and Picot, went to receive this third debarkation: the whole assembled at the farm de la Poterie. A fourth landing was expected; the vessels were in sight, but contrary winds prevented