in consequence of the explosion of the Mercedes, one of the Spanish squadron. In it was embarked a native of Spain, who was returning from America with his whole family, consisting of his lady, four daughters, and five sons. The daughters were beautiful and amiable women, the sons grown up to manbood. With such a family and a large fortune, the gradual savings of twentyfive years industry, did this unhappy man embark for his native country. A short time before the action began, he, with one of his sons, went on board the largest of the ships, and in a few minutes became the spectator of his wife, his daughters, four of his sons, and all his treasure, aurrounded with flames, and sinking in the abyss

of the ocean. This victim of almost unheard-of BOOK VI. calamity, arrived at Plymouth, with the only remains of so many blessings, in Captain Moore's CHAP. VI. cabin, who was unceasing in his endeavours to administer all in his power towards the alleviation of his sufferings.

The justice of this procedure was called in question by many, since it took place before any formal declaration of war against Spain. To vindicate this conduct, it was said, that these vessels were only kept as hostages till Spain should give a satisfactory account of her formidable preparations, and the carnage on this occasion was charged to the account of the Spanish commander.

1804.

THE seizure of the Spanish treasure-ships immediately produced war between England and Spain. This act could easily have admitted of explanation and satisfaction; but the Spanish government demanded neither. Totally influenced and controlled by France, who was exasperated in the highest degree at seeing her prey snatched from her grasp; in obedience to her command, she issued a declaration of war against England, Dec. 12. The Spanish manifesto allowed, in its enset," the extreme difficulty of Spain or Holland avoiding a war with the enemies of France, when the connections with the latter power were considered-❞ and rested the propriety of the conduct of the court of Madrid on an implied promise, if not an actual convention, that its neutrality should be strictly observed and respected by England, upon certain conditions, which it asserted and declared Spain had adhered to rigourously. To support this reasoning, the only fact adduced was, that Mr. Frere, in one of his notes declared, that his Britannic majesty wished, as long as possible, to suspend the period of hostilities, if certain conditions were adhered to; that Spain strictly observed them, and that, therefore,

the British government was bound, by their own declaration, not to commence hostilities. These grounds for defending the Spanish declaration of war, were, it must be confessed, extremely

narrow.

On the other hand, the British government positively denied that any such convention or declaration ever existed. That there was no system of public law which could countenance the principle, that the mere implied or constructive promise of an existing administration, at home, should have the power to bind every succeeding government to acquiesce in a conduct of actual hostility, carried on by a hostility, carried on by a third power, under the name of neutrality. That the order to detain the treasure-ships was justified by the information then received, and that the execution of it was rather in the nature of an embargo and a precautionary measure, which might admit of explanation and satisfaction, than one of actual hostility. And, finally, that the war so much complained of, was the act of Spain, her declaration being, in point of fact, the first unequivocal and irretrievable measure of hostility which took place between the two countries.

BOOK VI.

Such were the material points of argument upon which the governments of Spain and Great CHAP. VII. Britain rested their justification.

1804-5.

The subject was warmly debated in both houses of parliament, and wide differences of opinion undoubtedly existed as to the justice and equitable conduct of the administration throughout this transaction. A great majority, however, seemed to allow, that Great Britain had abundant cause of provocation, and that an absolute necessity existed for attacking Spain.

The unceasing jealousy and hatred of the French government towards that of England, were sufficiently manifested in this affair, but the sentiments of the French were never more strongly depicted than in Bonaparte's address to the members composing the legislative body of the nation, on the very last day of the year.

After informing this body, that however extensive the preparations for war had been, yet the flourishing condition of the country rendered it unnecessary to impose fresh burdens upon, or demand new sacrifices from, his people; it would have been grateful to him, he added, at so solemn an epoch, to see peace reigning throughout the world, but the political principles of their enemies, and their recent conduct towards Spain, sufficiently made known the difficulty of it. He had no ambition to exercise in Europe a greater influence, but he would not sink in that which he had acquired. No state should be incorporated in the empire, but he would not sacrifice his rights, nor the ties that attached him to the states which he had created!

In order, however, that neither his own subjects, nor those of the other sovereigns of Europe, should remain in ignorance of his sentiments, some short time after, he caused his legislature to be informed, through the medium of the proper functionary, (after dilating upon the strength, resources, and general prosperity of every part of the French empire, the valor of his troops, his confidence in the prowess of his navy, and the flourishing state of his finances,) that "whatever may be the movements of the English, the destiny of France is fixed. Strong in the riches and courage of its defenders, she will faithfully cultivate the alliance of friendly nations. France will neither merit enemies nor fear them. When England shall be convinced of the impotence of her efforts to agitate the continent, when she shall feel that she cannot but lose in a war, without motive or object, that France will never accept of any other conditions than those of the treaty of Amiens, and never will consent that she shall exercise the right of breaking, at pleasure, those treaties, by appropriating Malta to herself, then England will really obtain pacific sentiments, hatred and envy exist but for a time."

Having thus laid down, with a tone sufficiently

confident and decisive, the only terms upon which he would accord peace to England, Bonaparte resolved to address his Britannic majesty personally, and in a letter written with his own hand, dated January 2, 1805, he deprecated the further continuance of a war, in the prosecution of which so much useless blood was shed, without any view or object whatever; he thought it no disgrace to take the first step towards conciliation, in a moment which afforded the most favorable opportunity to silence the passions, and listen only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. He abjured his majesty not to deny himself the happiness of giving peace to the world, nor to leave that delightful task to his children. He reminded the British monarch, that the latter had gained more, in the last ten years, both in territory and riches, than the whole extent of Europe; that his country was at the highest pitch of prosperity, and could only hope to form another coalition of some powers upon the continent against France. But that the only effect of such a measure would be to increase the preponderance and continental greatness of that country. "Did England hope to renew the internal troubles of France, or destroy her finances, or deprive her of her colonies? A war would produce no such effects: the French were happy; a flourishing state of agriculture was the support of their finances, and the colonies were but a secondary object to France; besides, had not the King of England, at that moment, more than be knew how to preserve?" After some more reasoning of the same kind, this curious document concluded, in a high-wrought strain of pathetic expostulation, in the following words:-"If your majesty would but reflect, you must perceive, that the war is without an object; without any presumable result to yourself. Alas! what a melancholy prospect! To cause two nations to fight for the sake of fighting! The world is suffi ciently large for our two nations to exist in it; and reason is sufficiently powerful to discover means of reconciling every thing, when the wish for reconciliation exists on both sides. I have, however, fulfilled a sacred duty, and one which is precious to my heart."

It must be evident, that the ruler of France had little else in view, when making this extraordinary overture, than that of indulging himself in the exercise of an act of indecorous presumption, and the satisfaction of indulging himself in the assumption of that tone of equality, with his brother the King of Great Britain, to the use of which he considered himself entitled by his novel dignity of Emperor of the Gauls. Perhaps, too, he was not averse from the desire of appearing in the eyes of Europe as anxious for peace; and proposed to himself the taking great credit with the continent for the magnanimity of this offer,

while England, on the contrary, by listening to the overtures thus made, would render these powers, yet friendly towards her, shy, and suspicious of a closer connection; or if she rejected them, would appear that ruthless and unappeasable disturber of the general tranquillity, which was in truth the character of her wily opponent. Be that, however, as it may, it is observable, that, in this important state paper, there is no longer to be found that tone of arrogant superiority which characterised the language of the French government in the preceding year: no reference to the impossibility of England contending "singlehanded" with France, nor any apparent wish to consider the former but as a powerful and equal rival.

Early in the month of February, this letter was communicated to the legislative body, by order of Bonaparte, together with the answer to it, written by one of the principal secretaries of state of the British government, and addressed to M. Talleyrand, the French minister for foreign affairs. In this reply, to which it is impossible to refuse the character of diguity, temper, and moderation, Lord Mulgrave acknowledged, on the part of his Britannic majesty, the receipt of a letter from the head of the French government. That there was nothing nearer to the heart of his majesty, than the obtaining the blessings of peace for his people, provided that it were such as would secure it to them permanently, and guard the essential interests of his states; that this great end could only be obtained by arrangements which should also ensure the tranquillity of the rest of Europe. That, conformably to this sentiment, his majesty could not attend more particularly to the overture which had been made him, until he should have consulted the powers of the continent, with whom he was engaged in confidential connections and relations, more particularly with the court of St. Petersburgh; and concluded with a well-merited eulogium upon the Emperor Alexander.

M. Segur, in presenting the above, introduced them with a speech, which plainly evinced that the French government was by no means pleased with the answer they had received. He denied the existence or the chance of a coalition on the continent of Europe against France; he asserted that Russia would not embark in a war merely to gratify England, and that the emperor lrad received the most unequivocal testimonies of the amicable dispositions of Austria and Prussia. In a word, that the hopes of England, in a third coalition, were vain and chimerical, and that " it only remained for French bravery to display its whole energy, and to triumph, at last, over that eternal enemy to the liberty of the seas and the repose of nations."

1805.

The two other great public bodies, the tri- BOOK VI. bunate and the conservative senate, were also at this period separately addressed by the proper CHAP. VII. functionaries, to the same effect with the oration of M. Segur. Both contained only illustrations,. corollaries, and amplifications of the same scheme and design, namely, the presenting a flattering picture of the French resources and government upon the one hand, and on the other, to falsify aud discolour the truth, in every particular, connected with Great Britain and her continental allies. From the speech of M. Talleyrand, however, to the tribunate, it seemed that it was the wish of the French government, that this overture should be considered as yet open, and, that after Russia had been consulted, farther discussions, of an amicable nature, might take place. "The character that pervades this answer," said the orator," is vague and indeterminate. One singleidea only presents itself with some precision, that of having recourse to foreign powers, and this idea is by no means pacific; a superfluous interference ought not to be appealed to, if there be not a desire to embarrass the discussions and to render them endless. The ordinary consequence of all complicated negotiations is to weary out good intentions and to throw back nations into a war, become more furious from the vexation of an unsuccessful attempt at accommodation.— Nevertheless, on a question regarding a multitude of interests, and of passions which have never been in unison, we should not rest upon a single symptom. Time will soon develope to us the secret resolutions of the government of England. Should they be just and moderate, the calamities of war will cease: should, on the contrary, this first appearance of accommodation prove but a false light, intended only to answer speculations of credit; to facilitate a loan, the acquisition of money, purchases, or enterprises, then we shall know how far the dispositions of the enemy are implacable and obstinate; we shall have to banish all hope from a dangerous lure, and trust without reserve to the goodness of our cause, to the justice of Providence, and to the genius of the emperor.'

Corresponding with the tone and temper of those angry ebullitions, the French official gazette at the same time published the speech of the: King of England to his parliament, with a comment upon each paragraph, indicative of the same: sentiments as had pervaded the orations. The whole of these manifestoes already alluded to, (for they can be considered in no other light than as such,) concluded with general denunciations of vengeance against the shores of Britain, which were threatened with immediate and irresistibleinvasion; and against its government, whose very existence was menaced by the exhaustion which

BOOK VI. the country must endure from a continuance of the present formidable posture of France, for ten CHAP. VII. years to come!

1805.

But whatever were the views of the French emperor, in having thus extended the olivebranch, and his holding out to Europe that it was possible it might yet be accepted, it is certain, that no means were left unattempted by him, which could increase and consolidate his power, or annoy that enemy who could alone check his career and put bounds to his ambition. His flotilla, destined for the invasion of England, was hourly augmenting, and becoming more concentrated at Boulogne, the common place of rendezvous. Powerful batteries were erected for the protection of this flotilla, the numbers of which were truly formidable. The army destined for the same purpose, and encamped on the heights commanding the town and harbour of Boulogne, had now increased to upwards of 100,000 men, perfectly disciplined, under the command of the best officers of France, and constantly exercised in embarking and re-landing in and from the flotilla, with a view of perfecting them in the great object of their destination.

Although the French ruler had assumed the title of Emperor of the Gauls, respect for the form of government he had so recently established in the northern and middle provinces of Italy, induced him to forego, at the moment of his advancement to the imperial diadem, the personal sovereignty of that country, and which still therefore retained the name of " republic," of which Bonaparte was the nominal head.

66

The entire success, however, of the experiment which the emperor had tried upon the feelings of the French nation, and the acquiescence of the greater part of the European courts to the assumption of his new dignity, emboldened him, in the course of the present year, to extend his views of family aggrandizement, and the iron crown of Charlemagne was destined to circle the brows of Bonaparte. Policy, and the lust of conquest, had, no doubt, an equal share with ambition, in exciting him to seek this honor. The southern provinces, and fertile island of Sicily, operated upon the mind of the French emperor, who disguised his real intentions.

In affected compliance with the addresses sent from the various constituted authorities of the Italian republic, Bonaparte, accompanied by his empress, set off for Milan, where he arrived early in the month of May. Meetings were immediately convened, and the whole republic, at the feet of Bonaparte, humbly besought him to relieve them from the burden of governing themselves, and to take upon himself, and his heirs, the Italian diadem. To this flattering request the French emperor was not found inexorable;

and, on the 26th day of May, he added to his other titles that of " King of Italy." The coronation took place at Milan, with the utmost splendour, solemnity, pomp, and the most imposing magnificence. The emperor, seated on a superb throne, having on his right the honors of the empire, on the left the honors of Italy, and before him the honors of Charlemagne, was invested with the usual insignia of royalty by the cardinal archbishop, and finally ascending the altar, seized upon the celebrated iron crown there deposited, and placed it upon his head, saying, at the same time, with a loud voice, and in a tone of defiance, (it being a part of the ancient ceremonial on the enthroning of the Lombard kings) the remarkable words-" Dieu me la donne; gare à qui la touche!" (God gives it to me; beware those who touch it!)

After the ceremony, than which nothing could be more magnificent, a constitutional code, being the third which this country had received from France, was communicated to the states, and eagerly accepted by them. The most remarkable of its provisions were, the placing the regal authority solely in the person of Bonaparte, with the privilege of naming his successor; after which, however, the crown, with certain limitations, was to be hereditary. It was decreed that, hereafter, the monarch must constantly reside within the Italian States; but that, while the present king retained the crown of Italy, he might cause him self to be represented by a viceroy, who must, however, reside within the boundaries of the kingdom. After the death of Bonaparte, the kingdom of Italy must never again be vested in the same person with that of the French empire, but be entirely disparted and separated from it; and ample means were allowed and provided for the maintenance of the regal dignity, the endowment of the queen, and every other expense incident to the high station the country had placed in the hands of Napoleon, the first of that name, King of Italy.

Immediately after the promulgation of this body of laws, Prince Eugene, (Beauharnois) sonin-law to the new monarch, was appointed viceroy:-a new order of knighthood was instituted, that of" the iron crown," with considerable revenues attached to it; and the organization of the new kingdom was entirely arranged and completed.

By causing himself to be crowned King of Italy, the French emperor meant to strengthen his frontiers, and guard against his inveterate enemy, the King, or rather the Queen of Naples. He had now resolved to unite Genoa to his own territory; this also took place at Milan: on the 4th of June, the Doge of Genoa, in a full meeting of the great officers of state, intreated the French

emperor to grant the Genoese the happiness of being his subjects. He returned the following

answer:

"I will realize your wish; I will unite you to my great people. It will be to me a new means for rendering more efficacious the protection I have always loved to grant you. My people will receive you with pleasure. They know that, in all circumstances, you have assisted their arms with friendship, and have supported them with all your means. They find besides, with your ports, an increase of maritime power, which is necessary to them to sustain their lawful rights against the oppressors of the seas. You will find, in your union with my people, a continent. You have only ports and a marine. You will find a flag, which, whatever may be the pretensions of my enemies, I will maintain, on all the seas of the universe, constantly free from insult, and from search, and exempt from the right of blockade, which I will never recognize but for places really blockaded, as well by sea as by land. You will find yourselves sheltered under it from this shameful slavery, the existence of which I reluctantly suffer with respect to weaker nations, but from which I will always guarantee my subjects."

Having arranged all his weighty affairs, he left Italy, and arrived at Paris on the 12th of August, from whence he repaired without delay to Boulogne, to organise his army and flotilla for the invasion of England. The Moniteur gave a long account of the splendour of his reception, from which the following is an extract:

"Seated on the throne of one of the kings of the first race, the emperor had on his right Prince Joseph, behind him the great officers of the crown; the ministers, marshals of the empire, and colonels-general, on each side; in front and on the steps were his majesty's aid-de-camps; and on benches at the foot of the throne were the counsellors of state, the generals from the interior on the right; and on the left the civil and religious functionaries; the space in the middle was occupied by the imperial guard, and the musicians on one side, and 2,000 drummers on the other; at its extremities were the grand staff of the army, and the general staff-officers of the camp. The emperor saw on his right the two camps and the batteries, the entrance of the port, and part of the roads; and on his left the port of Vimereux, and the coasts of England. In front of him advanced sixty battalions formed in twenty columns; still nearer the throne were platoons of legionaries of all ranks; the heights were occupied by twenty squadrons in battle array, and covered with an immense crowd of spectators, and the tents appointed for the ladies.

"At noon the emperor left his but, and a salute from all the batteries of the coast announced his arrival; on bis appearance the drums began to

beat, and shouts of joy from the army and spec- BOOK VI. tators marked his presence; the drums then beat a charge, and the different columns instantly CHAP. VII. closed their ranks.

"All in their turn received the reward of honor from the hands of Bonaparte; the decorations were held up by several officers in the helmets and bucklers of the armour of Dugueselin and, Bayard.

"The emperor passed the evening in his hut, and all the legionaries were entertained at the tables of Prince Joseph; the minister at war, the minister of marine, Marshal Soult, and Admiral Bruix, in tents decorated in a military style, and the health of the emperor was drunk with enthusiasm amidst the report of all the artillery of the batteries on the coast."

Such were the daily aggressions and increasing pretensions of the chief of the French, that laudable exertions were at length made to assert the independence of Europe, and set bounds to his ambition. On the 11th of April, a treaty of concert between the King of Great Britain and the Emperor of Russia was signed at St. Petersburgh, whereby, after observing that the state of suffering in which Europe was placed demanded speedy remedy, the contracting parties mutually agreed to consult upon the means of putting a stop thereto, without waiting for further encroachments on the part of the French government. In this view, they agreed to employ the most prompt and efficacious means to form a general league of the states of Europe; and, in order to accomplish the end proposed, to collect together a force, which, independently of the succours furnished by his Britannic majesty, might amount to 500,000 effective men, aud to employ the same with energy, in order either to induce or to compel the French government to consent to the reestablishment of peace, and of the balance of Europe.

The objects proposed to be effected by this league were, the evacuation of the Hanoverian territory and the north of Germany; the establishment of the independence of the republics of Holland and Switzerland; the re-establishment of the King of Sardinia, in Piedmont, with as large an augmentation of territory as circumstances would permit; the future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, the island of Elba included, by the French forces; the establishment of an order of things in Europe, which might effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different states, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations.

His Britannic majesty engaged to contribute to the common efforts, by employing his forces, both by sea and land, as well as vessels for transporting troops in the general plan of operations,

1805.