honor and reputation, joined in the same cause. The ministers, weak and unprincipled, hated and despised, were unable to resist the torrent which hurried the Prussian monarchy to destruction. These ministers, as destitute of wisdom as of probity, as incapable of profiting by experience as of acting a fair or honorable part, had, in the mean time, been engaged in another criminal negociation with Bonaparte, and had been again outwitted by his superior craft and artifice. The peace of Presburgh had left the forms of the Germanic constitution entire, and from some of the articles of that treaty it appears doubtful, whether the French emperor entertained thoughts at that time of the speedy subversion to which it was afterwards condemned. The residence of his troops in Germany, occasioned by the unlucky affair of Cattaro, probably suggested, and the prospect of peace with Russia certainly matured, a design suitable to his restless mind, of destroying what remained of that ancient structure, and of erecting in its room a new confederation of princes, at the head of which he should himself be placed. This project seems to have been already conceived in the beginning of June, and early in July the details of the plan were settled; but it was resolved not to publish them, in case peace could be obtained. On the 10th of that month the Russian plenipotentiary, D'Oubril, had his first conference with General Clarke, who was appointed to negotiate with him on the part of France. The true character of the Russian minister was soon discovered. No obstacle, it was foreseen, would be opposed by him to the new arrangements proposed in Germany. The plan of confederation was, therefore, definitively settled without delay, and signed on the 17th of July, by princes and ministers, who were scarce allowed time to read the deed to which they affixed their signatures.

The members of this confederation were the Emperor of the French, the Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, the Archbishop of Ratisbon, the Elector of Baden, the Duke of Berg, the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, the Princes of Nassau-Weilburg, and Nassau-Usingen, of Hohenzollern-Hechingen, and Hohenzollern-SiegHohenzollern-Siegmaringen, Salm-Salm, and Salm-Kyrburg, Isenburgh, Birchstein and Lichtenstein, the Duke of Aremburg, and the Count of Leyen. The Archduke Ferdinand, Grand Duke of Wurtzburg, (formerly Archduke of Tuscany, and afterwards Elector of Saltsburg,) acceded to the confederation of the Rhine on the 30th of September.

By their articles of confederacy, these princes separated themselves from the Germanic empire, and renounced all connection with it; appointed. a diet to meet at Frankfort, to manage their public concerns, and settle their differences; chose the Emperor of the French for their protector; established among themselves a federal alliance,.

by which, if one of them engaged in a continen- BOOK VII. tal war, all the others were bound to take part in it; and fixed the contingent which each should CHAP. III. in that case furnish, as follows: France, 200,000; 1806. Bavaria, 30,000; Wirtemberg, 12,000; Baden, 3,000; Berg, 5,000; Darmstadt, 4,000; Nassau,. Hohenzollern, and others, 4,000; total, 258,000 men. It was settled, that none of the members of this confederacy should be dependent on any foreign power, nor enter into any service but that of the states of the confederation and their allies. No prince belonging to the confederacy could alienate the whole or any part of his dominions, but in favor of the confederates. Other German princes and states might be admitted into the con-federacy, whenever it was found consistent with the general interest. In the mean time a vast number of petty princes and counts were deprived of the rights of sovereignty, which they held under the Germanic constitution, and these, without equivalent or indemnity, were transferred to members of the confederation. The imperial city of Nuremberg was given to the King of Bavaria, and that of Frankfort on the Maine to the Archbishop of Ratisbon, formerly elector and arch-chancellor of the empire, now prince primate of" the confederated states of the empire," or confederation of the Rhine.

By these great and important innovations, the Germanic empire was virtually dissolved, and many of its states were annexed, under the name of allies, to the rising empire of the French. Bonaparte was not content, however, while the name of the Germanic empire subsisted. No sooner were the preliminaries of peace signed between France and Russia, (July 20th,) than a message was conveyed from him to the Emperor of Germany, to signify to the latter, that he mustprepare to lay aside the title of Emperor of Germany, and yield the precedence to France; and farther, that he must be ready to give his assent to the new arrangements to be proposed in a few days at Ratisbon. To this mandate the Emperor of Germany, since he could not resist the order, wisely submitted without remonstrance, and by a formal deed, August the 6th, resigned his office and title of Emperor of Germany, and annexed his German provinces and states to the empire of Austria. On the 1st of August the confederates an-nounced to the diet at Ratisbon, their separation. from the empire; and on the same day a note was presented to the diet, in the name of the French emperor, declaring that he no longer acknowledged the existence of the Germanic constitution..

When these arrangements were communicated to Prussia, her acquiescence was purchased by the delusive hope held out to her by France, of being permitted to form a confederation of statesin the north of Germany under the protection of Prussia, as the confederation of the Rhine was

1806.

BOOK VII. under the protection of France. But no sooner had Austria submitted to the loss of her ancient CHAP. III. imperial dignity; and deposited the sceptre of the Othos at the foot of the modern Charlemagne; than Prussia, whose meanness was despised, and assistance no longer wanted by Bonaparte, found herself condemned to another disappointment, aggravated by the reflection, that she was indebted for this mortification to the want of wisdom and probity in her councils. She was told, that from deference to England, Bonaparte could not permit her to include the Hanseatic towns in her confederacy, and that he was determined to take them under his own protection. He was not averse to her plan of a northern confederation; but his regard to justice and respect for the law of nations, would not allow him to see any compulsion used to make independent princes belong to it against their will. The wise prince, she was told, who governed Saxony, seemed not inclined to contract the new obligations which Prussia wished to impose upon him; and France could not see him enslaved, or forced to act against the interests of his people. The Elector of Hesse, another member of the proposed northern confederation, was reminded by the French minister at Cassel, of the inability of Prussia to do any thing for her allies. He was then invited to join the confederacy of the Rhine, and as an inducement to comply, the remaining possessions of the Prince of Orange, brother-in-law of the King of Prussia, were offered to be transferred to him.-And, when he refused these tempting proposals, the Rhenish confederation passed a resolution, by which he was cut off from access to part of his own states.

In the midst of these injuries and mortifications, Prussia discovered, that France, which had been continually urging her to the invasion of Swedish Pomerania, had engaged to Russia, to prevent her from depriving the King of Sweden of his German territories; and that after guaranteeing to her the possession of Hanover, her faithless ally had negotiated with England on the basis of the restoration of that electorate.

The reluctance of Prussia to part with Hanover, her indignation at the treacherous conduct of France, and the growing influence of public opinion upon her counsels, were the chief causes that stimulated her to risk the chances of hostility with France. About the middle of August, her government began to make preparations, and put her army on the war establishment. It was thought that Knobelsdorff was sent to Paris, in the beginning of September, for the purpose of gaining time, and not with any view to an amicable adjustment of the differences between Prussia and France. Lucchesini, who had been long the Prussian minister at Paris, when he foresaw that war between France and Prussia

was inevitable, had contrived, that one of his dispatches to his court, full of complaints against the French government, should fall into their hands. Incensed at the tone of his dispatch, the French demanded his recal from Paris, and imputed to his misrepresentations, the misunderstanding that had arisen between France and Prussia. With this demand, the court of Berlin willingly complied, and congratulated itself on the success of a stratagem, which, it hoped, had given a false direction to the suspicions of its enemy. To prolong the deceit, it made choice of General Knobelsdorff to be its minister at Paris, a warm partizan of France, sincerely attached to peace, and quite unsuspicious of the artifice which he was sent to practise. The professions of peace, which he made by desire of his court, after it had determined on hostilities, were on his part sincere; and so little was he aware of the secret designs, either of his own government or of that to which he was sent, that when Bonaparte left Paris to take the command of his army against Prussia, Knobelsdorff inquired, with the greatest simplicity, whether he should not accompany his majesty the emperor to headquarters, little suspecting against whom his march was directed.

Such a negotiator might be duped by his employers, but could not long deceive the penetration of Bonaparte and Talleyrand. Knobelsdorff arrived at Paris on the 7th of September, with a letter from his Prussian majesty to Bonaparte, full of civil and friendly expressions, to which corresponding returns, probably equally sincere, were made. On the 11th, a note was addressed to him by Talleyrand, complaining of warlike preparations in Prussia, which were publicly stated at Berlin to be directed against France; and adding, amidst professions of regard for Prussia, and of regret that she should listen to counsels so much at variance with her true interests, that the emperor had ordered reinforcements to be sent to his army. Knobelsdorff in reply, September 22, assured the French minister, that his master had entered into no concert with the enemies of France, and that the warlike preparations of Prussia had arisen from a misunderstanding, which the emperor's late interesting conversations with himself and Lucchesini, be had no doubt, would remove. On receiving these assurances, Bonaparte authorized his minister to declare, on the 13th, that he should make no public declaration on the subject of his differences with Prussia, till the effect of Knobelsdorff's report at Berlin was known.

A second communication from Talleyrand, complaining that the intelligence from Berlin wore every day a more hostile aspect, and expatiating on the natural ties between France and Prussia, war between which, he said, appeared

troops are exposed, should have reflected on the possibility of the enemy turning their flank: get ting possession of their magazines: shutting them up in a country without resources; and forcing them to fight at a disadvantage, and, if worsted, without a possibility of escape. The magazines at Hof, Zwickau, Weissenfels, and Naumburg, were left without protection, exposed to the attacks of the enemy, and when cut off from these, the Prussians had no alternative but to fight or starve. There were no resources in the barren country of Weimar for maintaining so large an army and numerous cavalry as the Prussian. There was no bread, no beer, no brandy for their men, and no fodder for their horses. When their cavalry took the field on the morning of the battle of Auerstadt, the horses had been without corn, and the men without food for two nights and a day. Another fatal error in the disposition of the army was its encampment on the left bank of the Saale, by which the electorate of Saxony, the chief fortresses of the Prussian states, and the capital itself, were laid open to the enemy; and the Prussians, in case of a disaster, were cut off from Magdeburg, the only rallying point where they could assemble, or place of refuge where they could be in safety.

The French army advanced on the 8th, in three divisions. The right, composed of the corps of Marshals Soult and Ney, and of a division of Bavarians, set out from Amberg and Nuremberg, joined at Bayreuth, and from thence marched against Hof. The centre, commanded by the Grand Duke of Berg, the Prince of Ponte Corvo (Bernadotte), and Marshal Davoust, marched from Bamberg to Cronach, and from thence to Saalburg and Schleitz. The left, composed of the corps of Marshals Lasnes and Augereau, advanced from Schweinefurth upon Coburg, Graffenthal, and Saalfeld. By these movements the left wing of the Prussians, which stretched to a great distance from their centre, was exposed to the attack of the whole French army. Aware of their danger, the Prussians at Hof, who were at the extremity of the line, and in the greatest danger of being cut off, fell back upon Schleitz before the arrival of Marshal Soult. Some prisoners, however, were taken, and all the magazines at Hof fell into the hands of the enemy. Soult, followed by Ney, at the distance of half a day's march, pressed forward to Plauen, in Upper Saxony, where he arrived on the 10th. The French centre passed the Saale at Saalburg, after a slight resistance on the part of the Prussians, and advanced on the 9th to Schleitz, where a body of 10,000 Prussians was posted under the command of General Tauenzein. An action ensued, in which the Prussians were worsted with considerable loss, and next day the French advanced to Auma, and on the 11th to Gera, within half a

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1806.

day's march of Naumburg, where lay the great BOOK vil. magazines of the Prussian army. The French left had equal success with the other divisions of CHAP. IV. their army. Lasnes entered Coburg on the 8th, and advanced to Graffenthal on the 9th. On the 10th he attacked at Saalfeld the advanced guard of Prince Hohenlohe, commanded by Prince Lewis of Prussia, and gained over it a signal victory. Prince Louis, to whose rashness and disobedience of orders in quitting his position at the bridge at Saalfeld, and advancing to attack the enemy, this misfortune was entirely to be attributed, fell in the action. The Prussians were completely routed, and lost 30 pieces of cannon, besides 600 men killed, 1,000 taken prisoners, and a great number wounded.

By the success of these operations, the French, after turning the Prussian left, became masters of their magazines, and placed themselves between their grand army and the cities of Berlin and Dresden. On the 12th, part of the French centre, under Marshal Davoust, entered Naumburg, and took possession of the Prussian magazines, which they set on fire. Their army now extended along the right bank of the Saale from Naumburg to Neustadt. Their first line was composed of the corps of Davoust, at Naumburg; of that of Lasnes, at Jena; and of that of Auge reau, at Kahla. In the second line was the grand Duke of Berg, between Zeitz and Leipzig; the Prince of Ponte Corvo, at Zeitz; the emperor and Soult, at Jena; and Marshal Ney, at Ñeustadt.

The disasters of Schleitz and Saalfeld, and the unfortunate death of Prince Louis, when known at the Prussian head-quarters, produced universal consternation, though the extent and consequences of these calamities were far from being fully understood or foreseen. Fears were entertained, that the French, after breaking through and defeating their left, would advance to Dresden and take possession of Saxony. But so remiss were they in the most ordinary precautions, and so ab. surdly confident in the strength of their positions, that one of their patroles, sent out from headquarters towards Naumburg to reconnoitre, returned without going to Naumburg, because when half way they met a traveller, who told them there were no news of the French at Naumburg. From this state of blind security they were rouzed by the blaze of their magazines on the night of the 12th, which at once disclosed to them the real intentions of the enemy, and shewed how successful he had been in accomplishing his designs. Nothing now remained for them but to risk a general engagement without delay.

Next day was employed, on both sides, in making arrangements for the important battle decisive of the fate of Prussia. The French army extended from Naumburg to Kahla, along the