BOOK IX. measures which have been adopted, your royal highness will feel assured, that they could not CHAP. IV. have been recommended by his majesty's servants, nor sanctioned by parliament, but upon the sincere, though possibly erroneous conviction, that they in no degree trenched upon the true principles and spirit of the constitution.

1811.

"Mr. Perceval feels it his duty to add, that he holds himself in readiness, at any moment, to wait upon your royal highness, and to receive any commands with which your royal highness may be graciously pleased to honor him."

The prince regent, as well during the debates in parliament, as in the conclusion, fully satisfied the public wishes; and, it will not be too much to add, even went beyond the public hopes. It was always indeed a part of his character to have a suitable filial affection for his father; but the administration of princes does not always follow their own peculiar character. They are too frequently the creatures of circumstance and connection. The public, therefore, though they had no distrust of the prince, possibly had a distrust and dislike of some of the persons reputed to be in his favor; they might impute to them a degree of ambition, and particular views of policy, which did not exactly square with the public voice. It must not, therefore, be concealed, that under these apprehensions, and with these prejudices, the public had kept an anxious and attentive eye upon the conduct of the prince. They expected, hoped, and feared, they knew not what; but certainly none of them expected that wise, temperate, and considerate decision, which had been announced.

The resolution of the prince not to dismiss his father's ministers,-not to change the face of affairs more than was absolutely necessary even to carry on the public business, had been taken briefly upon two views of the relative situation of his majesty and himself. As these points had an intimate connection with the then condition of Great Britain, they certainly merit a more detailed consideration.

The first of these points was, the actual situation of the king's health, and the degree of the probability of his speedy recovery. The decision of the prince was preceded by a deliberate examination of the physicians. The public papers announced this intention of his royal highness without knowing its purpose, imputing it merely to his filial anxiety. It afterwards appeared, from the event, that the examination was taken upon Sunday, and the consequent resolution nearly upon the following day. This led, therefore, to one important conclusion. The examination of the physicians convinced his royal highness that the state of his majesty was less afflicting than the opposition papers and speakers endeayoured to represent; or, in other words, that there

were very reasonable hopes of his speedy recovery. In a private conference, the physicians were naturally more explicit and explanatory than in their previous parliamentary evidence. They considered themselves under a stronger obligation to speak precisely and explanatorily to a son examining them upon the real state of his father, than to parliament, putting thein formally upon their oath. An oath is certainly the strongest possible security against falsehold, but it is not always the most effectual means of obtaining the truth. It produces a caution, a reserve, a timidity, which, under the apprehension of saying too much, stops short of saying enough. A better and more full notion may be generally procured from a familiar conference than from the most solemn justiciary inquiry upon oath. From some reason or other, this is more particularly the case in respect to medical evidence; and no doubt the conference of the physicians and the prince, at Carlton House, was better calculated to explain the nature of his majesty's malady, and the probability of his recovery, than their parlia mentary evidence; and the resolution taken by the prince immediately after this examination, showed that the result of this examination was a conviction in the mind of his royal highness that his majesty's recovery was more near, and proba ble, than was generally imagined.

Another point of view, upon which the prince took his resolution to retain his father's ministers, was that he might not disturb the present system of things, and particularly the war of Portugal, in its mid progress. The war, at least the shape and form of it, belonged to these ministers. If any other set of men were called in, they must continue the same course, or alter it and commence another. If they continued the same course, and succeeded, they would have been accused of taking the reputation from their predecessors; if they failed, they would have incurred a suspicion that they had not warmly embraced measures which they were conscious were not their own.

Their success would be without praise, and their failure would be put to the account of party feelings. On the other hand, if they departed from this usual policy, the departure would necessarily introduce an immense deal of confusion, and what they might have done from real principle and persuasion, would have been imputed to jealousy and counteraction. In this state of things, therefore, the prince doubtless concluded, that it would be the most pru dent, as well as the most moderate conduct, to leave every thing in the state in which he found it. Under these circumstances, the ministers continued responsible for their own measures; and whatever might occur, could be imputed only to them..

Such, therefore, were the circumstances and

he reasons upon which his royal highness took a resolution which at once gratified and surprized the public. 1st. He was unwilling to obtrude himself or testify any eagerness to assume the pomp and splendour belonging to his father, and therefore came forward merely to execute the duties of the crown, declining its lustre and power.

CHAP. IV.

2dly. He was unwilling to enter upon a new BOOK IX. plan of policy which he might not have time to finish; be was unwilling to interrupt the present course of things; he was unwilling, in a word, to act as owner, whilst, on account of the restrietions with which he was enthralled, he could. alone consider himself in an office of trust..

1811.

In order to show the position of the French troops at the commencement of this year, the following are extracts of official dispatches from Marshal-general Lord Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool.

"Cartaxo, Jan. 5, 1811. "My Lord,―The reinforcements to the enemy's army in this country, which were on the march in the valley of the Mondego, arrived upon the Alva at Murcella on the 24th, which river they crossed by a ford on the following day, and continued their march to join the army.

"Colonel Wilson, who had retired from Espinhal and crossed the Mondego upon hearing of the advance of these troops, lest he should be involved in an unequal contest in front and rear at the same time, repassed the Mondego on the 25th, and annoyed the enemy's rear on his march of the 25th and 26th, from the Alva towards Espinhal. He took some prisoners, and cut off some of their small detachments, which fell into the hands of the Ordenanza.

"The division which had marched to Pinhel, and the advanced-guard of which had been at Trancoso when I last addressed your lordship, was still at Pinhel on the 26th December, when I last heard from General Silveira, whose head-quarters were at Torrinha.

"I have letters from Cadiz to the 23d and 29th of December, stating that Marshal Soult had marched from the army engaged in the operations against that place, with 4,000 or 5,000 men, on the 20th and 21st of December..

"Generals Mendizabel and Ballasteros are still at Llerena and the neighbourhood of Monasterio, and Girard's division of Mortier's corps at Guadalcanal,

"No material alteration bas been made in the position of the enemy's army since I addressed your lordship last. The detachment which marched to Castello Branco returned immediately, and was sent either for the purpose of escorting a messenger, or to obtain intelligence. I have the honor to be, &c. (Signed) "WELLINGTON.""

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"Cartaxo, Jan. 12, 1811.. My Lord,-Since I addressed your lordship on the 5th inst. I have learnt that the detachment of the enemy's troops which joined the army in the end of last month, consisted of eleven battalions of the 9th corps, and a body of troops, which, under the command of General. Gardanne, had before attempted to penetrate through Beira Ваха. The whole are stated at 8,000 men, by some of the officers who saw them, but I should! think they must be more.

"The other division of the 9th corps had not passed the frontier when I last received accounts of them; but I learn from. an intercepted letter from General Drouet to General Claparede, that this division has been ordered to take a position at Guarda. Their advanced-guard broke up from the neighbourhood.of Trancoso in the night of the 3d inst.

"There has been no alteration in the position of the enemy's army since I last addressed you, excepting that General Drouet's head-quarters have been fixed at Leyria with the troops which joined with him..

"The enemy continue to construct boats in the Zezere; and have shewn much jealousy of the measures adopted by our troops on the left of the Tagus, to command by their fire the commu← nication between the Zezere and Tagus..

·BOOK IX.

CHAP. V.

*1811.

"I have now to inform you, that Marshal Mortier arrived at Ronquillo, with a division of the corps under his command, on the 3d instant. He has since continued to advance into Estremadura, having formed a junction with the division which had been at Guadalcanal, under the command of General Girard; and I am concerned to add, that I have just learnt that he obtained possession of Merida, and of the bridge over the Guadiana at that place, on the evening of the Sth inst. the Spanish troops having retired..

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They have left General Banastero's division on their left flank, between Xeres de los Cavalleros and Olivenza, with his communication open with Badajoz; and it is reported, that Mortier's corps is followed by other troops. I have the honour to be, &c.

It appeared evident, by the accounts which arrived from Spain, that Bonaparte meant to unite the entire peninsula to the French empire. No attention was paid to Joseph in any matter, and orders were transmitted directly to Soult, who appeared to hold a preference to Massena in the mind of Bonaparte, and to the military governors established in Spain.

But every doubt on the subject was removed by an intercepted letter published in the memorial Military Patriotico of the 25th December. It came from Azanza, Joseph's ambassador ex'traordinary at Paris, and was addressed to one of the ministers at Madrid. In it this courtier communicated, after many preambles, in which he discovered his previous fears and the bitterness of his heart, that he was invited to the house of Talleyrand, who observed to him that France had spent farge sums and wasted many armies in the peninsula, and that she must repay herself and be compensated for sacrifices so great; that the blood of Napoleon had been ungrateful to him, and had not taken due care of his interests; that the debaucheries of Joseph, and the ignorance and eaprice of his ministers, had prolonged a war which ought to have been terminated long ago; that Cabarras alone had done more nrischief to the French cause than the battles of Baylen, of Talavera, &c.; and that, in short, both the peninsula and Italy should be incorporated with the French empire. Azanza submitted to him, that to change the dynasty, and to destroy the independence of Spain and the Spanish name, were very different things: that the inhabitants of the provinces beyond the Ebro had submitted to the government of Joseph without much disturbance; but, that no sooner had Bonaparte decreed the formation of military governors in those provinces, than a great insurrection broke out; that in consequence of the war of the peninsula not being terminated, the French

generals had proceeded to treat the inhabitants in a cruel and despotic manner; that the best opportunities had been lost, from the plans of the campaign being ill combined and worse executed; that the insurgents had assembled the cortes, and were employed in forming an universal legislation for all parts of the monarchy; that in consequence of a novelty so pernicious, all parties would join that of the insurgents; that the latter would prefer death before slavery; that the war would become much more lasting; and that the English would not cease to assist them in such circumstances, &c. To all this, the exbishop of Autun replied, that he was not invited to throw doubts on a point that was already decided upon by the highest wisdom, and the most profound policy; and concluded with complimenting him on his henceforward belonging to thegreat family."

On the 9th of January, Coimbra was occupied by Drouet. Colonel Trant found the enemy too strong for him, and therefore evacuated and retreated across the Vonga towards Porto.

The reinforcements received by Massena at this time were 9,000 infantry and only 300 cavalry, a large quantity of stores and a small park of artillery.

Every effort was used to reinforce Lord Wellington, while his lordship's exertions were truly laudable, as appears from the following private letter:

"The activity and zeal displayed by Lord Wellington, is the theme of every loyal Portuguese and British soldier. His lordship takes his breakfast every morning at four o'clock, and is on horseback at five, reconnoitring his out-posts, as well as every position where his attendance may be necessary. He writes a great deal; and where secrecy is required, his lordship copies bis dispatches himself. He is at all times very abstemious, and uniformly sleeps in his clothes on a couch. You will have heard that the reinforcements received by the French are a part of the 9th corps, under General Drouet, consisting of 15,000 men, with provisions, &c. Hitherto their arrival has caused no movement in our army; many, however, talk of the probability of a battle very soon. The enemy have thrown three bridges over the Zezere, in their rear, near Punhete, and are busily employed there in constructing barks, rafts, &c. which are seen by that part of our army stationed at and near Chamusca, on the other side of the river, where Marshal Beresford now is with 30,000 men; hence it is presumed that Massena, if he finds himself obliged to retreat, will attempt to cross the Tagus, and retire through Alentejo. You have before been informed, that lines were forming on the other side of that, river, from Moiter to the south bank. One hundred pieces of cannon were sent over some time ago, and

that position is daily made more formidable. All the galegos here are now become subject to be impressed for the army of this country, and every man capable of bearing arms (if native) is laid hold of for the same service; so that in the country we see nothing but military. The marines from the men of war now garrison this city. We have no other troops here except the Corpo de Commercio: even the caçadores (sharpshooters), consisting of very respectable inhabitants, have been marched off to the army long since, and have behaved very well in several skirmishes. In short, the greatest part of the country is in arms; and from all we see and hear, it is not too much to expect, that the issue of the present struggle will be fortunate and glorious to the brave Portuguese troops, and add fresh laurels to the brows of our countrymen, serving in this just and meritorious cause.'

The siege of Tortosa was truly to the honor of the Spanish name. The Spaniards at this The Spaniards at this time had the elements of a great people, but were depressed by a bad government. The following is an extract from the French journal of this siege, which was very voluminous.

The engineers caused a road to be rapidly constructed over the mountains and rocks, which extend on the right bank of the Ebro, from Mequinenza to Xerta, in order that the 3d corps, charged with the siege of Tortosa, might be able to transport by land the field-artillery, the baggage, and every thing which could not come by the navigation of the Ebro.

"The general-in-chief, Count Suchet, for the purpose of completely insulating Catalonia from the rest of Spain, and of favoring the movements of the 7th corps, caused one of his divisions to advance in front of the tête-de-pont of Tortosa, with a corps upon Cenia, to observe the army of the Valencians; and constructed têtesde-pont on the Ebro, in front of Xerta and Mora, in order to remain master of the approaches of the left bank and of the navigation of the river. We awaited in this position, till the month of December, the assembling of the troops who were to protect the siege from the enterprises of the Catalonians. During this time the corps of the army had to sustain a number of encounters with the Valencians, the Catalonians, and the garrison of Tortosa, in which the enemy, constantly beaten, lost about 4,000 men."

After detailing other preliminary operations, the journal thus described the fortress.

"Tortosa, washed by the Ebro, and with a chain of mountains at its back, is surrounded by a wall with bastions, of which one part is in the plain, and the other is raised on heights of granite, almost every where destitute of soil, about 200 feet high. The fortress has for its citadel, an old castle upon an elevated rock. When, in 1708, the French made their attack by the bas

1811.

tion Saint Pierre, which is on a height, they BOOK IX. were obliged to form, almost throughout, their trenches with bags of earth, which they had CHAP. V. brought, and they were twenty days in constructing their batteries. The Spaniards since then have strengthened this bastion with a good entrenchment, and have constructed in advance of it the fort of Orleans; they have also crowned the other heights with horned-works.

"The siege commenced on the 20th December, and the general-in-chief determined that the attack should be conducted upon the demi-bastion Saint Pierre, which rests upon the lower Ebro. But it was necessary to direct a false attack against fort Orleans, which enfiladed the lower ground. The trenches were therefore opened against this fort on the evening of the 19th. At day-break we were not completely covered with the parapets, and the balls of the enemy carried off the bags of the earth and the gabions; but the trenches were mostly maintained throughout. Captain Sea, of the engineers, a young officer of great promise, was killed by a ball which struck his head.

"In the night of the 20th, favored by its darkness and a violent wind which prevented the enemy from seeing or hearing, the labours of the trenches were conducted with such energy, that at day-break every thing was under cover. The enemy at last perceiving our works, opened a violent fire with all the artillery that could bear upon them; but this hail of bombs, chain-shot, balls, grenades, and stones thrown from mortars, did little damage, and did not drive away the workmen. The Spaniards attempted without success a sally in the plain; as they were enfiladed by the fire of the parallel of Orleans, and taken in reverse by the fire of the right bank, their sallies could not be dangerous against the parallel of Saint Pierre.

"In the night of the 21st the works were continually improved. At day-break the enemy opened a brisk fire, and caused us the loss of some men by the shells which he threw into the trenches. His artillerymen took a very good aim. On the left of the centre parallel there was thrice formed a battlement with bags of earth, for the purpose of placing a sentinel there, and thrice it was carried away with the bead of the sentinel.

"In the night of the 22d, the enemy perceiving our labours by means of fire-balls which he threw into the air, kept up a constant fire from his covered-way, and overwhelmed us with a shower of chain-shot: it was necessary to remove the workmen four different times. We lost about twenty men. By day there was a brisk cannonade from the fortress: the works begun were completed.

"In the night of the 24th the firing was very violent: the enemy made sallies on almost all points, which dispersed the workmen employed in

1811.

BOOK IX. the attack of Fort Orleans. In the centre, the parallel was advanced within thirty toises of the CHAP. V. place of arins of the bastion St. Pierre. The enemy made a sally from his téte-de-pont, which was easily repulsed. During the day the cannonade was brisk: in general, the besieged fired more than 1,000 shot in the twenty-four hours, and our daily loss is from twenty to thirty men.

"At eleven in the night of the 25th, the enemy opened a terrible fire of musketry and artillery: at the close of which he made a desperate sally against the parallel of attack on fort St. Pierre. The guard of the 44th regiment repulsed them with the bayonet, and made some prisoners. He continued his fire of chain-shot, &c. till one in the morning; when he attempted a new sally, which was also repulsed. The parallels from this time confined him too much to permit him to deploy many troops. During the day, the fire of the enemy was less vigorous than usual. The second parallels had been lined with sharpshooters placed behind battlements formed of bags of earth, who annoyed the Spanish artillerymen, and forced them to shut their embrasures,

"In the night of the 26th, it was wished to continue, by sap, the approach to the place of arms of the bastion St. Pierre. The enemy, after having thrown hand-grenades from the salient angle of his place of arms, all at once leaped over the pallisades of the covered-way, burst upon the head of the sap, and threw the workmen into confusion. The brave Clause, serjeant of the sappers, remained firm at the head of his party. He drove back above sixty Spaniards with grenades, and at the point of the bayonet, until he fell severely wounded. Captain Fourcauld, of the artillery, with his usual energy, repulsed the Spaniards to their place of arms, and soon drove them even from that. He was struck by a musket-shot. Lieutenant Lemercier, of the engineers, whose behaviour was most gallant during the siege, had his arm broken; several sappers were wounded.

"In the day our working parties were so much annoyed by the enemy's artillery that they could not proceed. Such of the enemy as defended the covered-way, and the artillerymen through the embrasures, were equally annoyed by our sharpshooters from the second parallel.

"On the 27th, the enemy, by way of preparation for a general sally, before our batteries began to play, kept up an extraordinary fire. Captain Poussin, of the artillery, was killed by a grape shot in the forehead.

"At four in the afternoon, the enemy sallying forth by the gate del Rastro, advanced in force to take our parallels in reverse: but General Hubert, rushing at the head of the 6th light, and 116th, threw himself on the enemy at the point of the bayonet, with immense carnage. At the

same time they attacked our parallels in front; they were vigorously repulsed from the height of Orleans, but on the plain they succeeded in driv ing us from where we had crowned the place of arms of the bastion St. Pierre; Lieutenant Jacquand, of the artillery, in vain endeavoured to drive them back, at the head of some sappers. This brave young man died by the bayonet, without quitting the lodgement he had made. Some Spaniards penetrated to the second parallel, where they were killed. The lodgement of the covered-way was immediately retaken. The Spaniards, however, had time to set fire to the gabions, and destroy some of the works. This sally cost the Spaniards 400 men.

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During the 28th all the batteries played. The demi-bastion, St. Pierre, enveloped in a girdle of fire, was crushed and silenced. The fire of the half-moon was also extinguished. The bastion of St. John had only one serviceable gun on the flank. The advanced redoubt of Orleans had still some guns in play. The battery, No. 1, was a good deal annoyed. Our batteries on the right bank, although a vigorous fire was kept up on them from the castle, the tête-de-pont, and las Tenasas, kept up their fire. Five of the boats which supported the bridge were sunk; the plat form of the bridge, notwithstanding, did not separate; and it floated in such a manner as to afford a passage to a few stragglers.

"In the night of the 29th, the lodgement at the foot of the parapet of the covered-way belonging to the demi-bastion of St. Pierre was extended twenty toises. The counterscarp was crowned by a lodgement, which, commencing at the returning angle of the place of arms, was car ried thirty toises beyond the traverse. Beyond the traverse the counterscarp was not lined, which shortened the siege by twenty-four hours. Advantage was taken of this defect in the fortification to immediately commence the descent and passage of the ditch, for the purpose of mining the scarp of the bastion; but the work undertaken was too much. The enemy commenced a brisk fire from two guns, and after having driven our sappers from the ditch, with grenades and shells, which they rolled down from the ramparts, they also threw some burning faggots, which were pitched and tarred, that set fire to our gabions. From that time, we restricted ourselves to a lodgement on the counterscarp, and the descent of the ditch was begun.

"At day-light, we discovered that the enemy had abandoned their téte-de-pont, after having set fire to whatever was combustible. They left us three pieces of cannon.

"On the night of the 31st, the descent of the ditch having been completed, the passage thereof was easily effected to the mine. The only obstruction to this operation was the discharge of some grenades and a few musket-shot. The mi