infringed, in direct opposition to existing engagements, and in defiance to those very powers which had guarantied the execution of the treaty of Luneville. The faith of nations, and the laws of hospitality, were also most cruelly and shamefully violated in the detention of our unsuspicious countrymen; who, upon the repeated assurances of personal liberty and security, reposed a misplaced confidence in the false honour of the French government. These unprecedented occurrences gave but little reason to expect, that the ordinary modes of warfare, mitigated by the refinement of civilization, would be resorted to by a rancorous and implacable enemy. But we are confident, whatever success may attend the barbarous prosecution of war by the arms of France, the generous and humanely-tempered courage of the British nation will reject, with disdain, every form of hostility which is not strictly consonant to the established system of European warfare. The only fairly hostile proceedings of France, at the commencement of the contest, were directed against our commerce. The extensive commercial relations of this country made it impossible to adopt, within a very limited period of time, the maritime regulations best calculated to defeat the first operations of an enterprising foe. Our losses were, therefore, somewhat considerable, and it was not possible to prevent them. Situated as this country and France were at the beginning of the war, our merchant vessels being dispersed over every part of the ocean, no measures, however judicious, could well prevent our losses from bearing almost a necessary proportion to the prosperity of the country, and the

means of annoyance which the enemy had at their disposal.

In this view of the chief occurrences of the last year, it is entirely unnecessary to mention the frantic conspiracy of colonel Despard, and the rebellious insurrection in Ireland, in any other terms than those of retrospective allusion. It will be sufficient to remark, however we despise the former, or lament the consequences which attended the latter, that both of them led to the discovery of a fact, which places in the strongest light the loyalty of the people of this country, and even proves, that, in Ireland, disaffection and treason were, neither widely diffused, nor assumed the character of a dangerously organized rebellion. The conspiracy of colonel Despard, wildly planned, and in every respect inexecutable, was abetted only by a few miserable and deluded confederates. The rebellion in Ireland, though attended with ferocious and sanguinary excesses, was by no means formidable, with respect to the condition, resources, and numbers of the insur gents. The most active and vigorous exertions were employed with immediate effect to quell the insurrection. But impartiality requires that we should state, that some doubt has been entertained, whether or not the Irish government exerted a due degree of vigilance, in order to detect the conspiracy, and to provide against its explosion.

Such disastrous events as conspiracy, rebellion, and war, produced no material impression on the general prosperity of the country. The prodigious augmentation of the national debt in the course of a long period of hostility, the immense arrears funded in the first year of peace, and the injurious ef

fects on commerce which naturally resulted from the revival of the contest with France, might justly be supposed to present many serious obstacles to any extensive system of financial supply. On the contrary, they appeared to oppose nomaterial check to financial operations, on a scale which in magnitude far surpassed any system that had ever been adopted. The gigantic project of raising the greater part of the supplies within the year, at a time when the enemy had conceived the most sanguine hopes that the resources of the state were in a great measure exhausted, could not fail to convince the French government of the folly of - waging against this country a war of finance. It must, however, be confessed, that this system of raising supplies was extended beyond its natural limit. The circumstances which we have described, as calculated to affect the prosperity of the empire, were certainly entitled to serious consideration. Had a system of finance been adopted with due reference to such circumstances, the impolicy of so great a departure from the ordinary mode of raising supplies, would at once have suggested the necessary limitation. But still, though the war taxes have been less productive in consequence of the disproportionately extensive scale upon which they were imposed, yet the possibility of having recourse to so vast a system of supply, must always be considered as an infallible criterion of public prosperity.

The financial plans of Mr. Addington met with comparatively little opposition. The parties which, previously to the war, had been formed against his administra. tion, and which, after that event,

became more firmly consolidated, in order to effect a change in the ministry, chose rather for the objects of their severest animadversion, the measures taken for the defence of the country, and the prosecution of hostilities. It will be proper to notice, in the sequel, the means by which they ultimately accomplished a change in his majesty's councils. The change which they produced no way corresponded to the object which they had united to attain. Nothing less than a radically new administration, formed of individuals more distinguished for great talents than for political unanimity, could satis fy the expectation of those who were now drawn up in hostile array against the ministers of the crown. Even before the commencement of the war, the spirit of party had manifested a considerable degree of asperity. Several parties, indeed, appeared in the British senate. Their views and sentiments were extremely different. One party represented the pacific conduct of ministers as tame, abject, and submissive. The honour of the British name, they asserted, had been prostituted to the extravagantly ambitious views of a military tyrant, who insulted our moderation, and treated with contempt the disposition we had shown for the preservation of peace. Another party, apprehensive of numberless evils that might inseparably attend the renewal of hostilities, insisted on the necessity of maintaining a pacific system. They exhausted every argument which the ground of expediency could supply, in order to demonstrate theimpolicy, underthe existing relations of the continentai states, of engaging in a war, without a prospect of co-operation on the part of any of the European powers,

and consequently without a chance of making on France any material impression. A third party took a middle course. They justified the forbearance of ministers, and regarded it as a pledge of their pacific intentions. They acknow ledged that Great Britain could never submit to a series of insults and aggressions; but conceived that government, under the peculiar circumstances of this country and France, had acted a wise and honourable part in endeavouring to avoid, as far as they were justified by temperate and dignified policy, the renewal of the horrors and calamities of war. Such was nearly the state of parties at the beginning of the rupture. Those who were the advocates of peace, engaged in opposition to ministers immediately upon its termination. This party gradually coalesced with those who had stigmatized the peace of Amiens as a hollow truce, and were how dissatisfied with every measure of government. The difference of former opinions was forgotten; and however desirous the one party might be for the return of peace, and the other for the vigorous prosecution of the war,they cordially united their most strenuous efforts, with a view to produce a radical change in the administration.

As the gradual secession of Mr. Pitt from Mr. Addington's administration very materially contributed to accelerate that event, which had long been the object of the most active exertions of the opposition, it may be proper to inquire upon what grounds Mr. Pitt's promise of constant, active, and zealous support was given and withdrawn. It has been stated, that when Mr. Pitt retired from office, he felt convinced that, under the peculiar circumstances of the

period, his majesty had selected for his ministers persons by whom, it was probable, the government of the country would be wisely and safely administered. Upon this conviction, he and lord Grenville gave them an assurance of their support. The new administration, it was said, had publicly and pri vately professed their intention of continuing to act upon the same general system which had been adopted by their predecessors. It was, therefore, in consequence of an essential departure from that system, that Mr. Pitt found it expedient to withdraw his support from Mr. Addington; nor, to use the language expressed by the partisans of the former, would it have been consistent with public duty, or common sense, to have given unqualified support to any line of conduct which ministers might be disposed to adopt. It has also been declared, that Mr. Pitt never gave, and that Mr. Addington never understood he had received, such a promise.

On the other hand, it was alleged that the country had been involved in a state of inextricable embarrassment, by the measures which the preceding administration had pursued. It was, therefore, of the first national importance, since peace was unanimously desired, and, indeed, was an event upon which the happiness and prosperity of the country most intimately depended, that a ministry should be formed possessing both the dispo sition and the talents requisite for the accomplishment of this great object. Mr. Addington and his colleagues were the persons selected to promote the ardent wishes of the nation, and remove the difficulties which would have obstructed the success of any pacific over

tures from the ministers whom they succeeded. It has been represented that, in these arrangements, the establishment of a temporary mi nistry was the object Mr. Pitt had in view. The popularity of the early part of Mr. Addington's administration began, however, to awaken political jealousies; and the authority which was intended to be provisional, appeared to as sume a character of permanent stability. The friends of the minister did not hesitate to declare, that the disapprobation which Mr. Pitt had expressed on various measures of his government, arose, not so much from political dissonance of opinion, as from motives of personal jealousy, united with an unextinguishable ambition, which disdained every gratification but a complete resumption of power. Whether Mr. Pitt's secret opposition was dictated by public or private feelings; whether he felt a conviction that ministers were unequal to the arduous task of a judicious management of public affairs, and conceived it his duty to engage in arrangements, for his return to of fice, in order to devote his talents and his influence to the service of his country, at a moment of extra ordinary difficulty and danger; or whether he acted from individual considerations alone, are questions to which the partisans of Mr. Pitt and Mr.Addington will be disposed to reply in very different terms. It seems, however, in opposition to any unfavourable conclusion, that, without any previous step taken on his part, Mr. Pitt, on the eve of the war, was invited to a negotiation, the object of which was to place him at the head of the government, and that, instead of impatiently grasping at office, he declined the proposal, because it was

coupled with conditions (the exclusion of lord Grenville) inconsis tent with what he felt due to his public situation, and with his views of the public service.

The failure of these arrangements naturally increased the dis union which prevailed. The exclusion of lord Grenville exasperated the parties embarked, with various views, in opposition to the ministry. However discordant the elements of which these parties were composed, they appeared to have blended them into an apparent political unison of sentiment. To deprive ministers of office, and to substitute an able, firm, and vigorous administration in their place, was the sole object to which their efforts were directed. Although the exertions made by government to meet every public exigeney were great beyond all precedent, yet the extraordinary talents of those by whom they were opposed, deprived them, in a great degree, of the just approbation of the country; and, in time, attached such unpopularity to many parts of their conduct as to rob them of the confidence which they had inspired. The natural consequence of the success which accompanied the efforts of the opposition, was that change in his majesty's councils which took place in the course of the succeeding session of parliament.

The meeting of parliament took place on the 22d of November 1803. In the speech from the throne, his majesty stated, that since the last meeting of parlia ment, it had been his chief object to carry into effect the measures which had been adopted for the defence of the united kingdom, and for the vigorous prosecution of the war. In these preparations ho acknowledged that he had been

seconded