Then the bill reverses the constitutional precept, because, by it, representatives are not apportioned among the several States, according to their respective numbers. It will be said that, though, for taxes, there may always be found a divisor which will apportion them among the States according to numbers exactly, without leaving any remainder, yet, for representatives, there can be no such common ratio, or divisor, which, applied to the several numbers, will divide them exactly, without a remainder or fraction. I answer, then, that taxes must be divided eractly, and representatives as nearly as the nearest ratio will admit; and the fractions must be neglected, because the Constitution calls absolutely that there be an apportionment or common ratio, and if any fractions result from the operation, it has left them unprovided for. In fact it could not but foresee that such fractions would result, and it meant to submit to them. It knew they would be in favor of one part of the Union at one time, and of another at another, so as, in the end, to balance occasional irregularities. But instead of such a single common ratio, or uniform divisor, as prescribed by the Constitution, the bill has applied two ratios, at least, to the different States, to wit, that of 30.026 to the seven following: Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky and Georgia; and that of 27,770 to the eight others, namely: Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, and South Carolina, as follows: 66 11 9 66 66 66 2 . 5 16 6 2 12 7 Rhode Island 68,444 divided by 30,026 gives 2 New York 352,915 Pennsylvania 432,880 Maryland 278,513 Virginia . 630,558 Kentucky 58,705 Georgia 70,843 85,532 divided by 27,770 gives 3 475,327 235,941 New Jersey 179,556 Delaware 55,538 North Carolina 353,521 South Carolina 206,236 And if two ratios be applied, then fifteen may, and the distribution become arbitrary, instead of being apportioned to numbers. Another member of the clause of the Constitution which has been cited, says “the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000, but each State shall have at least one representative.” This last phrase proves that it had no contemplation that all fractions, or numbers below the common ratio were to be unrepresented ; and it provides especially that in the case of a State whose whole number shall be below the common ratio, one representative shall be given to it. This is the single instance where it allows representation to any smaller number than the common ratio, and by providing especially for it in this, shews it was understood that, without special provision, the smaller number would in this case, be involved in the general principle. The first phrase of the above citations, that "the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000, is violated by this bill which has given to eight States a number exceeding one for every 30,000, to wit, one for every 27,770. In answer to this, it is said that this phrase may mean either the 30,000 in each State, or the 30,000 in the whole Union, and that in the latter case it serves only to find the amount of the whole representation ; which, in the present state of population, is 120 members. Suppose the phrase might bear both meanings, which will common sense apply to it? Which did the universal understanding of our country apply to it? Which did the Senate and Representatives apply to it during the pendency of the first bill, and even till an advanced stage of this second bill, when an ingenious gentleman found out the doctrine of fractions, a doctrine so difficult and inobvious, as to be rejected at first sight by the very persons who afterwards became its most zealous advocates ? The phrase stands in the midst of a number of others, every one of which relates to States in their separate capacity. Will not plain common sense then, understand it, like the rest of its context, to relate to States in their separate capacities? But if the phrase of one for 30,000 is only meant to give the aggregate of representatives, and not at all to influence their apportionment among the States, then the 120 being once found, in order to apportion them, we must recur to the former rule which does it according to the numbers of the respective States ; and we must take the nearest common divisor, as the ratio of distribution, that is to say, that divisor which, applied to every State, gives to them such numbers as, added together, come nearest to 120. This nearest common ratio will be found to be 28,658, and will distribute 119 of the 120 members, leaving only a single residuary one. It will be found too to place 96,648 fractional numbers in the eight northernmost States, and 106,582 in the seven southernmost. The following table shows it : Ratio, 29,658 85,832 27,816 New Hampshire 141,823 26,391 13,599 68,444 10,728 5,077 6,619 6,408 10 96,648 55,538 26,680 18,191 24,540 68,705 10,989 7,225 4,230 70,843 23,137 105,582 3,636,312 202,230 202,230 Whatever may have been the intention, the effect of neglecting the nearest divisor, (which leaves but one residuary member,) and adopting a distant one (which leaves eight), is merely to take a member from New York and Pennsylvania, each, and Fraction. 4 16 2 8 12 6 15 1 9 21 2 12 7 2 119 give them to Vermont and New Hampshire. But it will be said, this is giving more than one for 30,000. True, but has it not been just said that the one for 30,000 is prescribed only to fix the aggregate number, and that we are not to mind it when we come to apportion them among the States ? That for this we must recur to the former rule which distributes them according to the numbers in each State ? Besides does not the bill itself arportion among seven of the States by the ratio of 27,770 ? which is much more than one for 30,000. Where a phrase is susceptible of two meanings, we ought certainly to adopt that which will bring upon us the fewest inconveniences. Let us weigh those resulting from both constructions. From that giving to each State a member for every 30,000 in that State results the single inconvenience that there may be large portions unrepresented, but it being a mere hazard on which State this will fall, hazard will equalize it in the long run. From the others result exactly the same inconvenience. A thousand cases may be imagined to prove it. Take one. Suppose eight of the States had 45,000 inhabitants each, and the other seren 44,999 each, that is to say each one less than each of the others. The aggregate would be 674,993, and the number of representatives at one for 30,000 of the aggregate, would be 22. Then, after giving one member to each State, distribute the seven residuary members among the seven highest fractions, and though the difference of population be only an unit, the representation would be the double. Fractions. 1st.. 45,000 15,000 2d. 45,000 15,000 3d. 45,000 15,000 4th. 45,000 15,000 5th. 45,000 15,000 6th. 45,000 15,000 7th. 45,000 15,000 th. 45,000 15,000 th. 44.999 14,999 10th.. 41,999 14,999 11th. 44,999 14,999 12th. 44,999 14,999 13th. 44,999 11,999 14th. 44,999 14,999 15th. 14,999 674,993 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 Here a single inhabitant the more would count as 30,000. Nor is this case imaginable, only it will resemble the real one whenever the fractions happen to be pretty equal through the whole States. The numbers of our census happen by accident to give the fractions all very small, or very great, so as to produce the strongest case of inequality that could possibly have occurred, and which may never occur again. The probability is that the fractions will generally descend gradually from 29,999 to 1. The inconvenience then of large unrepresented fractions attends both constructions; and while the most obvious construction is liable to no other, that of the bill incurs many and grievous ones. 1. If you permit the large fraction in one State to choose a representative for one of the small fractions in another State, you take from the latter its election, which constitutes real representation, and substitute a virtual representation of the disfranchised fractions, and the tendency of the doctrine of virtual representation has been too well discussed and appreciated by reasoning and resistance on a former great occasion to need development now. 2. The bill does not say that it has given the residuary representatives to the greatest fraction ; though in fact it has done so. It seems to have avoided establishing that into a rule, lest it might not suit on another occasion. Perhaps it may be found the next time more convenient to distribute them among the smaller States ; at another time among the larger States ; at other times according to any other crotchet which ingenuity may invent, and the combinations of the day give strength to carry; or they may do it arbitrarily by open bargains and cabal. In short this construction introduces into Congress a scramble, or a vendue for the surplus members. It generates waste of time, hot blood, and may at some time, when the passions are high, extend a disagreement between the two Houses, to the perpetual loss of the thing, as happens now in the Pennsylvania assembly; whereas the other construction reduces the apportionment always to an arithmetical operation, about which no two men can ever possibly disser. 3. It leaves in full force the violation of the precept which |