the following circumftance, that charity in fentiment, or charity in general, (except when it is taken in a limited fenfe, as fignifying bounty to the poor is always applied to thofe who differ from us, and never to those who agree with us; and indeed it is about the difference that it is fuppofed to be exercised.

I. Now, the first thing I obferve upon this is, that if the above be the fcripture meaning of charity, then certainly fome bounds must be set to it; and it must be praise or blame worthy according to the cafes in which it is exercised. I make this fuppofition, because though it is proposed, in the courfe of these remarks, to fhow, that the above is not the feripture-meaning of the word; yet there is really, within certain limits, a duty of this kind prescribed to us in fcripture, but never called charity. The duty I mean is mutual forbearance, and guarding against rafh judgement but it is remarkable, that neither in the defcription of this duty, nor in the arguments urging to the practice of it, is the word charity, or the neceffity of charity, ever once introduced *. The proper objects of forbear

ance

• I do not know whether I fhould call it an exception from this, that in one paffage, when the Apostle Paul is speaking of the opposite fins, of judging others on the one hand, or defpifing them on the other, he introduces walking charitably. But it is in a fenfe quite oppofite to what it would have been used in by one pleading for the modern charity. It is not the man who judges rashly that he charges with uncharitable nefs, but him whe defpifeth

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ance are matters of indifference, or rather matters of comparatively fmall moment; and the fin of rafh judging confifts in believing things to be of more moment than they are, and attributing outward actions or expreffions to bad motives or principles, without neceffity. I fay, without neceffity; because it is allowed, by every judicious. and accurate writer upon rash judging, that a perfon cannot be chargeable with this fin, merely for thinking ill of another's temper or practice, upon clear and irrefiftible evidence. To do otherwife, in many cafes, is either wholly impoffible, or argues a weakness of understanding; which cannot be the object of approbation, nor confequently of imitation.

Let us therefore suppose, that this duty of forbearance, which indeed I take to be wholly diftinct in its nature, is the charity fo ftrongly recommended, and so highly applauded, in scripture, and that it is-to be exercised with regard to the opinions of others. In that cafe it must have certain bounds, for the following reafons.. 1. If it were otherwife, we fhould then either want a meaning for many declarations and precepts in fcripture; or, which is worse, fhould perceive them to be evidently abfurd and illfounded. That I may not tire the reader, I

defpifeth his weak brother, and is at no pains to avoid giving offence: Rom. xiv. 15. "But if thy brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkest thou not charitably. "Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Chrift died.".

fhall

fhall not adduce the tenth part of what is faid on this fubject in fcripture; but muft beg of him to weigh the following paffages, and to make fome reflections on their manifeft purpose: Jude y 3. 4. "Beloved, when I gave all dili gence to write unto you of the common fal"vation, it was needful for me to write unto 66 you, and exhort you,

The one

that ye should earnestly contend for the faith which was once deli"vered unto the faints. For there are certain (6 men crept in unawares, who were before of old "ordained to this condemnation, ungodly mén, "turning the grace of our God into lafciviouf "nefs, and denying the only Lord God, and our Lord Jefus Chrift." Here I think is plain- . ly a duty with regard to opinions, altogether different from that of forbearance. requires us not fo much as to judge our brethren; the other requires us to contend earneftly with them. The one fuppofes the trifling difference to be wholly buried; the other implies, that it fhould be kept clearly in view, and all poffible pains taken to fupport the truth, and to refute the error. The one fuppofes entire peace and union; the other implies a firm and refolute oppofition, so as to come to no terms which imply confent or approbation. The phrafeology through the whole paffage teaches us to interpret it as I have done : "certain men," fays he, "crept in unawares;" plainly fignifying, that if they had not crept in fecretly,

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"There are

fecretly, they would not, or ought not to have been fuffered to come in openly. Now, if charity and forbearance be the fame thing, here are fome perfons deferibed whom we are not to forbear, and confequently for whom we are to have no charity: therefore it must have some limitation. Let it be as extenfive as you will, it is not boundless.

Titus i. 10. 11. 13. "For there are many "unruly and vain talkers and deeeivers, efpe"cially they of the circumcifion: Whose mouths "must be stopped, who fubvert whole houses, "teaching things which they ought not, for fil"thy lucre's fake.Wherefore rebuke them fharply, that they may be found in the faith." Now, let me afk any unprejudiced reader, whether sharp rebuke be not a very different thing from forbearance? How can you rebuke those whom you may not fo much as judge? or why fhould you attempt to make them found in the faith, if they are already received of God? as it is expreffed, Rom. xiv. 3. Befides, what is the meaning of fubverting whole houfes? and of stopping the mouths of the falfe teachers, to prevent or remedy this fubverfion? In the fame epiftle, ch. iii. 10. the apoftle fays, "A man "that is an heretic after the first and second "admonition, reject." Does not this fuppofe, that it is poffible for a man to be a heretic ? Does not the apoftle here ordain a sentence of expulfion to be paffed against him, after the pains

taken

taken to reclaim him appear to be fruitless? It is plain, therefore, that if charity be the fame with forbearance, it must have limits; for if every body must be forborn, then certainly no body can be expelled.

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I must not here pafs by an aftonishing interpretation put by fome, and men of learning too, upon the following verfe of the fame chapter: "Knowing that he that is fuch, is fubverted, and finneth, being condemned of himself;" that is, fay fome, no man is an heretic in the fenfe of this paffage, but who is felf-condemned, or acting contrary to his own conviction; fo that he must be rejected, not for the error of his judgement, but for the obftinacy and depravation of his heart. I do not remember to have seen any ftronger inftance of the power of prejudice, than giving fuch a sense to the word felf-condemned. If any man can really conceive a cafe in his own mind of a heretic obstinately perfifting in his error, and fuffering for it, in oppofition to his own inward conviction, and at the fame time this circumftance clearly afcertained as the foundation of his fentence, I with he would teach me how to conceive it : at present it seems to me utterly impoffible. If any person thus fpeaks lies in hypocrify, is it to be fuppofed that he will confefs it? and if he do not confefs, how is it poffible to prove it ? The plain meaning of being condemned of himself, in this paffage, is, that his errors