Elliot to Naples to join me. I send I send you copies of my letters to Sir John Acton, the King and Queen, with their answers, Mr. Elliot's, and likewise those I have sent to Lord St. Vincent, for him to lay them before the Cabinet. Here it is necessary to observe to you, that a Sea-Officer cannot hold any official correspondence but with the Secretary of the Admiralty, without an order for that purpose, which is often given therefore, I have certainly irregularly sent them to Lord St. Vincent, as a Cabinet Minister-conceiving they are on subjects which the Board of Admiralty can have nothing to do with, much less the Clerks of that Office, through whose hands they must pass. When you, my dear Sir, take into your consideration all the letters sent me, with the liberal conduct towards my judgment, I trust that you will agree with me, that under all circumstances at this moment, I did right to give the opinion which I have done; but I stand open to the correction of the Cabinet. I felt that it was our wish to make Naples feel that we were her true friends, and sincerely wished to preserve as much as possible for her, and not to hasten the loss of any part of the Kingdom of Naples.

SARDINIA is declared Neutral, but that no Foreign Troops would be allowed to land. I wish they may keep off the French. We have no Troops to assist them, if they wanted our assistance. This reminds me of a word about more Troops for Naples: should the King of Naples, which is most probable, be obliged to quit his Capital and retire to Palermo, what General Acton suggests would be attended with the very happiest consequences, the possession of Gaëta, a very strong fortified Frontier Town, with a fine Bay and Port, the country people hostile to inveteracy against the French: 1500 British would secure this post, and always give us an entry into the country. I am not Military man sufficient to say how long our Troops could hold St. Elmo and the other Castles at Naples; but they would give that energy to the people, which might, and probably would be attended with the happiest effects. I regret the necessity of withdrawing the last part of that fine Egyptian Army, and am aware of the influence it will have on the timid Council of Naples.

ROME.-By a letter from Mr. Jackson, his Majesty's Minis

ter to the King of Sardinia, of June 17th, he says:-'I have seen the Secretary of State of this Government, and his Eminence told me there was no doubt that this State would be suffered to remain Neuter, and, consequently, that the Ships of the belligerent Powers will be received in the Ports of the Pope's States.' This may be the case for the moment; but if we were to receive the least advantage by it, I am sure we should be turned out as heretofore.

TUSCANY. It is difficult to know how to consider this State; they are not our friends, and it would, perhaps, be hard to consider them as enemies. Yet why should France use them against us, and we are to suffer Leghorn to enjoy its commerce for the advantage, ultimately, of the French? for it is they who receive the fruits of the Tuscan labour and commerce. And as the French have declared Leghorn in a state of siege, I can see no impropriety of considering it so likewise, and for our Government to place it in a state of blockade whilst the French remain in it. This is for the wise and grave consideration of our Government.

GENOA OR LIGURIA.-The same as the Italian Republic; it is France as much as Toulon; it has not even a name of independence. Therefore I shall, as far as I see at this present moment, have no hesitation in considering all Genoese Vessels as French. Everything at Genoa is French; therefore I hope that not a moment will be lost in declaring Genoa so considered. The blockade of Genoa ought to be declared instantly; if not, it will be what it always has been, the granary of the South of France, and the North part of Italy, which will be much distressed by such a measure, and I hope it will induce the Piedmontese, Genoese, &c., to rise against the French. Be that as it may, I do not think that we ought to allow the French Armies and friends to be maintained and enriched by our not blockading all the Genoese Ports. I therefore hope that this will instantly be done. The Imperial and Greek flag are filling it and Leghorn with corn.

MOREA. It is perfectly clear that the French are at work in that Country, either to prepare for their own reception, or to induce the Greeks to revolt against the Porte, and either way, it is a chain for their getting again to Egypt. If the French or their friends conquer the Morea, Egypt would be the

price of returning it, unless by an alliance with the Mamelukes they can possess both. This brings to my mind the Bey, who is going to England to solicit our justice against Turkish oppression. It appears very clear that the Territory assigned them in Upper Egypt, will not maintain them and their flocks. Government will know how to steer between the Turks and Mamelukes.

July 2nd. To this long letter, I shall only beg to call your attention, for what purpose the French are collecting such an Army in Italy, where at present there can be no prospect of an Army able to face them: 13,000 are in the Kingdom of Naples, 8000 are at this moment in Leghorn, 6000 marched in on the 28th June, the other parts of Italy are filling with Troops, even drawing them from Switzerland. The objects must be the conquest of Naples, (perhaps Sicily,) and certainly getting over to the Morea; therefore I regret the removal of our Egyptian Army, which in any of these enterprises, have kept the French in check: for I am sure they are afraid of that Army, and the Italians have the greatest confidence in it, and would make a struggle in their mountains; and time gained to us would be very desirable.

July 9th.—I joined our Fleet yesterday. With the casual absence of one or two Ships, we shall be always seven Sail of the Line; and as the French have at least seven-I believe nine-nearly ready, we are in hopes that Buonaparte may be angry, and order them out, which, I have no doubt, will put our Ships in high feather; for I never knew any wants after a Victory, although we are always full of them before. I will only [add,] that no endeavours of mine shall be wanted to gain one more, for I am worn up; and be assured that I am ever, my dear Sir, your most faithful and attached friend,

I have answered hastily your letters, and I think that you can work on General Acton's mind to call upon us secretly in

time to save Sicily. A reason is fully sufficient for all Europe, and the King of Naples, by his Protest, has paved the way for securing Sicily. He has the words put into his mouth. The English will hold Messina, whilst the French hold any part of the Kingdom of Naples; but I well know, and so do you, that the French would assuredly march to Naples. They have, unhappily, the upper hand for land forces. With respect to the Neapolitan Troops at Malta, General Villettes has orders to send them home, but I have requested him to keep the secret, and not to send them; for if they got into Messina, they would certainly not keep the French out one moment, and it would give a good excuse for not asking us to secure Messina. Indeed, I wish General Acton to tell us secretly— 'Secure Sicily for us.' The more he scolds us jointly with the French, the better. It is a nice point for him; for if he abuses us too much, the French will kindly offer him assistance. Further, with respect to the Neapolitan Troops at Malta, the General tells me, that with the absence of the 2000 Neapolitan Troops, and the 2000 British, that he will be hard pressed to do the duty of the Garrison. These are points for your consideration. If you talk on this subject with Sir John, and he makes a point of the Neapolitan Troops being taken from Malta, could it not be managed to have our Troops go to Messina with them? and then they would remain under the orders of General Oakes" who is the Officer destined to command at Messina-an excellent Soldier, and a good Man. I have done. Ever yours faithfully,

NELSON AND Bronte.

TO CAPTAIN THOMAS M. HARDY, H. M. SHIP AMPHION.

[Order-Book.]

Amphion, off Monte Christo, 1st July, 1803. Whereas the Government of the Republic of Genoa (or Ligurian Republic) has, by its conduct in adopting the wishes of the French Minister at that place as acts of their own Government, become hostile to Great Britain, you are there

Afterwards General Sir Hildebrand Oakes, Baronet, G.C.B., and LieutenantGeneral of the Ordnance: he died in September 1822.

fore hereby required and directed to seize and detain all Ships, Vessels, and property belonging to the Republic of Genoa (or Ligurian Republic), or to any of its Subjects, which you may fall in with, and send them into Port, there to remain (under the same particular instructions as the detained Ships or Vessels belonging to the Batavian Republic, mentioned in my order to you of the 30th May last)' until I shall receive directions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty respecting them.

NELSON AND BRONTE.

TO SIR EVAN NEPEAN, BART., ADMIRALTY,

[Original, in the Admiralty.]

Sir,

Amphion, off Monte Christo, 1st July, 1803.

From the following extract of a letter, dated June 14th, from Mr. Jackson, at Rome, his Majesty's Minister to the King of Sardinia, viz. :

"The Measures which have been adopted at Genoa against us, are the work of this Government, at the requisition of the French Minister, as well as the Italian Republic, which gives Letters of Marque against our Vessels. In Tuscany the Government has wisely refused to act. I just hear that at Genoa the French Minister required 5000 Troops of the Government, which replied that they had but 2000, which were at his service: it is supposed they will be sent out of the Republic, and Genoa be garrisoned with French Troops.'

In every point of view in which I have been able to see Genoa, I can only consider her as a part of France, and as such I have directed her Shipping to be seized and detained till I receive further orders from their Lordships; and, with due deference to the wisdom of Government, I would earnestly recommend that Genoa should be declared a Blockaded Port, and thus cut off all supplies for the Southern parts of France and the Northern parts of Italy; it will make the Inhabitants. severely feel the baneful effects of French fraternity, and in case of a co-operation with some of the Continental Powers, will make them ready to throw off the French yoke. Much