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obtain it, would comprehend the honour and fecurity of our allies, and applauded that prince to whom, under the direction of his gallant brother, we were indebted for a feries of military exploits, which in themselves were likely to expedite the negotiation.

Earl Fitzwilliam addreffed the houfe in rather an eccentric harangue. Their lordships, he faid, would recollect that he had been an advocate for the war at its commencement, from an opinion of its neceffity; and he was now the more confirmed in it, from the experience of a long train of events. When the war began, it was asked whether it would be prudent to draw the fword, not only in the defence of an ally, but for the preservation of the civil happiness of Europe: it was generally admitted not only to be prudent but indifpenfable: the defigns of the enemy tended to the deftruction of every established government, and the total fubverfion of order in fociety; nor had those defigns been abandoned. He had trufted, that he fhould not have heard a word of negotiation like that which had been mentioned, and was surprised to find fuch expreffions ufed as were common at the end of an ordinary war. When he found the address re-echoed to the crown vague expreffions concerning negotiation, without the leaft attention to the grand principle on which the war commenced, he was conftrained to declare he fhould ftand in oppofition to it.

To reftore order; to defend the ftates of Europe against the dangers which threatened thein; to protect perfons and property from a fatal devaftation, and fupprefs the tendency of innovating and pernicious doctrines, were the oftenfible objects of the war. What then was the

purport of the proposed address! Why, it was neither more nor lefs than a recommendation to his majefty to acknowledge and approve that fyftem he had formerly reprobated and oppofed. If there were any wifdom in negotiation now, the fame wifdom should have been manifested four years ago; for the fame causes existed then, and prov ed the neceffity of war, which exift at the prefent moment.

Was the fyftem which had rouzed our attention, and demanded our exertions, now extinct? Their lordhips ought to compare the views of France at that period, with the plans they had profecuted now. The great and powerful govern ments of Europe were not the first who were attacked by the spirit of aggreffion; but the inferior and feeble ftates had felt their overbearing influence, and their fubverfive authority.

Such inftances announced their intention, and fuccefs was to afford the means of extending their principles. He inftanced Sardinia. No fooner was the king compelled to fubmit to a peace with France, than it was fucceeded by their interference in the internal adminiftration of his government; they infifted on his reftoring to their liberty, and to their effects, all the perfons who had been condemned to imprisonment or penalties for the propagation of anarchical doctrines. At Rome they fignalised their triumphs by impofing the fame degrading conditions. In Berlin the ftandard of infurrection was reared; the national cockade was worn to attract partifans, and propagate the principles of which it was the emblem.

Were their lordships prepared to fubmit to fuch indignities, to allow the national cockade to be worn in this country by every man whom

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the French directory might choose to confider as a Frenchman? By arms alone these attempts and thefe difgraces were to be refifted; and to the fe evils we expofe ourselves if we conclude any peace with the enemies of established government, and of the moral and religious or der of fociety. Whatever confidence might be placed in the loyalty of the people at home, what could be faid of our diftant polleffions? Were our colonies fafe? Were the Weft India iflands in a fituation in which we could rely on their tranquillity? What had been the effect of French principles in their own fettlements? What ravage had they not extended to our own iflands of St. Vincent's and Grenada ?

. The effect of their fyftem was to overthrow all the barriers by which property was protected, and the tendency was realifed by the practice. Even in glancing over the proceedings of their legislative bodies, he had found that one of their reporters states, that the fale of the national property (that is, what was the property of individu als) is the pivot of the revolution. Were their lordfhips prepared to fubmit to the mandates of the directory? At their command were they ready to let loofe all who had been doomed to punishment for fedition, and attacks upon the conItitution of this country? to fet at liberty Mr. Yorke to recal from Botany Bay the Jacobins who had been tranfported thither? When they had confented to difband our troops and difmantle our fleet, now in the height of its power, did they imagine we fhould be able to cope with the forces of the directory, wielding the combined ftrength of the navies of Spain and Holland? If they did

not wish to expofe the country tó these difafters, they would not con cur in giving his majesty an advice which would ftrike at the interest of the ftate, and weaken the fecurity of his government.

From an obfervation of the no ble lord who feconded the address, it appeared, that it was not merely for ourselves but for our allies that this negotiation was to be inftituted. He doubted how far minifters were authorised to include them in the measures they were about to adopt: if we could gather the fentiments of the emperor from his conduct in circumstances apparent、 ly the most desperate, he would not condefcend to treat with the enemy of established order and government. There was a fubject on which he propofed a question to minifters: Did they mean to recog nife France, circumfcribed within her ancient boundaries, or the republic of France bounded by the Rhine and the Alps? For a feries of years our ancestors had struggled to límit the territories of France, and to maintain the balance of Europe; and it was no trivial confideration whether this aggrandifement was to be acknowledged, and thefe acquifitions fanctioned. This, however, was a fecondary confideration with him; for his prime objection was to treat with France, conftituted as that government was. But the effects which our commerce would fuftain by its aggrandifement were not indifferent: it was no light re flection that Holland was under the controul of the enemy; that Leghorn, once fo important in war from the fupplies which it furnish ed, and, in peace, as the great mart of our commodities and manufac tures, was now taken from us. All the coafts of Europe were now fhus against our commerce. In Italy

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the establishment of a republic un der France would exclude our trade in that country; and unless the king of Naples came boldly forward to refift the enemy, the whole of the north of Italy would be inacceffible to our manufactures. By commerce our nation had flourished; what then was to be our fituation when every port into which our commodities had flowed, was to be fhut against us? We might treat with the French directory; but what traffic could our merchants maintain with individuals deftitute of property, or poffeffing it without fecurity? The lofs of Spain too was now certain; by whatever name it was diftinguished (whether a monarchy or a republic, was now of little confequence) it was the tributary of France. Having thus reminded them of the principles on which the war was undertaken, his lordship moved, as an amendment, "that the house, impreffed with the justice and neceffity of the prefent war, would continue to give his majesty a vigorous fupport in afferting the general caufe of his majesty and his allies, and in preferving the dignity of the crown." The earl of Guildford expreffed much fatisfaction that a meafure which might lead to the restoration of general tranquillity, had been confidered as the leading feature of the addrefs.

It was the fame in his eftimation, and, he believed, in that of every well-wisher to his country in this kingdom.

If the achievements of the archduke fhould operate, as he hoped they would, as means of rational negotiation, they ought to be regarded as omens of happiness to us and our ally; if, on the contrary, they should revive hopes formerly entertained, and caufe the parties to

rife in their demands, and prolong this miferable and unavailing conteft, they should be confidered as evils of the firft magnitude; they would be felt as fuch, not only by the people of the prefent day, but by their pofterity for a length of time to come. There was one part of the addrefs, which he could not pafs without a comment; that the tranquility of the kingdom had remained undisturbed, and anarchy had been repreffed by the wisdom and energy of the laws. It was with pleafure, his lordship faid, that he could bear his teftimony to this truth, that the tranquillity of the kingdom had remained undisturbed; he believed it was owing to the love the people bore to the laws of their country; but if, by the wifdom and energy of the laws, an allusion was intend ed to be made to the two extraordinary bills paffed in the laft parliament, it would be indeed unfounded. Thofe bills were held in abhorrence by the people, who at the fame time held in the highest refpect the known conftitutional common law of the land. The noble earl concluded with his fupport of the prefent addrefs, conceiving, he faid, peace to be the greateft bleffing the country could wifh; but he did not mean, by fo doing, to preclude himself from his right to enquire at any future period into the causes of the prefent calamitous conteft, and the conduct of those who had plunged us into

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Lord Grenville, after compli menting his noble friend who mov ed the addrefs, totally differed from lord Guildford, who had afferted, this was a miferable and unavailing ftruggle; it was a struggle, he would maintain, that had already availed us; and though profpects of peace

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might be cut off, it would fill be of the utmost avail to this country. With regard to the bills, he differed from him alfo entirely, and was convinced, they had contributed very greatly to preferve our internal tranquillity. Another noble earl had stated it as inconfiftent with our principles to treat with any government in France but that of a monarchy. That the existence of a republic was an infuperable bar to negotiation, and that nonarchy was indifpenfable, was a calumny which minifters had every feffion found it neceffary to contradict. They had believed indeed that the best illue to the conteft would be the re-establishment of monarchy in France; but they had never pledged themselves to an opinion fo extravagant, that with out this object no peace could be obtained. It was ftrange the noble earl fhould infer from the opening of the negotiation that the worft terms would be concluded; they certainly were not prepared to admit in the enemy any power to dictate to our internal regulations, or the overthrow of the conftitution; neither furely was it a confequence that our allies were to be abandoned; it certainly would be unbecoming in him to answer the questions that had been propofed. But what fecurity could we have against an interference fimilar to that which had been practifed in Sardinia?

The king of Sardinia was compelled to accept unworthy terms of peace; the difference of our fituation, by exempting us from the neceffity of the one, fecured us from the ignominy of the other. If juft and honourable terms were refused by the enemy, we were preparing to repel any other; and the power

of maintaining this determination was the best pledge for our obtaining honourable conditions.

The earl of Abington spoke against the addrefs, and alfo against the bills paffed in the last feffion of parliament. There were rights of the people which neither came from kings, lords, nor commons; and they could not take them away.

The motion paffed in the affirmative; but a moft fingular protest was entered on the journals by earl Fitzwilliam, the fubftance of which was as follows

Difentient. Firft. Becaufe, by this addrefs, unamended as it ftands, the fanction of the lords is given to meafures as ill-judged with regard to their object, as they are derogatory from the dignity of the crown. Solicitations for peace muf encrease the arrogance and ferocity of the enemy of all nations; they muft fortify and fix the authority of an odious government over an enflaved people; they muft impair the confidence of other powers in the magnanimity of the British councils, and inevitably tend to break the fpring of that energy which in former times has characterifed this high-minded nation.

Second. Becaufe no peace can be had with the ufurped power now exercising authority in France: the methods by which they obtained it, the policy by which they hold it, and the maxims they have adopted, openly profefled, and uniformly acted on, towards the deftruction of all governments not formed on their model, and fubfervient to their domination.

Third. Becaufe the idea that this kingdom is competent to defend itfelf, after the fubjugation of all Europe, is prefumptuous in the extreme, and contrary to the

policy both of state and commerce by which Great Britain hitherto has flourished.

Fourth. Because while the common enemy exercises his power over the several states in the manner we have feen, it is impoffible long to preferve our trade, or our naval power; this hoftile fyftem feizes on the keys of the dominions of thefe powers, forces them, without any particular quarrel, into di rect hoftility with this kingdom, infomuch that there is no harbour which we can enter without his permiffion, either in a commercial or naval character.

Fifth. Because no fecurity can, be hoped for in our colonies and plantations whilft this ufurped power fhall continue thus difpofed and thus conftituted. The new fyftem leaves our colonies equally endangered in peace as in war; it is therefore that all ancient establishments are effentially at war for the fake of felf-preservation.

Sixth. Because it has been declared from the throne, and adopted by parliament, that there was no way to obtain peace but through the ancient government long eftablished in France. That govern'ment has been folemnly recognised, and affiftance and protection as folemnly promifed to thofe Frenchmen who fhould exert themselves in its restoration.

Seventh. Because the example of the great change in the moral' and political world, made by the ufurpation, is, by the prefent pro-cedure, confirmed in all its force. It is the firft fuccefsful example in history of the fubverfion of the government of a great country, by the corruption of mercenary armies, to the deftruction of the whole proprietory body of the na

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Eighth. Because our eagerness in fuing for peace may induce the enemy to believe we are unable to continue the war; which, in the event of an actual peace, will tempt them to renew that conduct which brought on the prefent war; neither hall we have the ufual fecurities for peace: they do not acknowledge the obligation of law; they have not the fame interest or fentiment in the confervation of peace which have hitherto influenced other governments; nor fhall we be better able to refift their hoftile attempts after a peace than at the present hour. If we remain armed, we cannot reap the ordinary advantages of it in economy; if we difarm, we fhall be fubject to be driven into new wars, under every circumftance of disadvan tage.

Ninth. Because they frankly tell us, that it is not our interest to make peace, for they regard it only as an opportunity of preparing fresh means for the annihilation of our naval power. They do not conceal that it will be their object to wreft from us our maritime preponderancy, to re-establish what they call the freedom of the feas, and to carry to the Eighest degree of profperity those nations which they ftate to be our rivals, which they charge us with unjustly attacking when we can no longer dupe, and which they contemplate as furnishing refources for our future humiliation and deftruction: they falfely affert, that the English nationi fupports with impatience the continuance of the war, and has extorted his majefty's overtures for peace by complaints and reproaches: they ftudioully disjoin the English nation from its fovereign.

Tenth. Because, having acted throughout the course of this mo

mentous

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