fefto reached him in the country, to think he had been completely mifled by the previous information: that furprife encreased, on finding that the public prints had been more accurate in their reprefentation of facts than his majesty's declaration. Never had any paper been brought forward with the ftamp of official authority fo little connected with the documents on which it was profelfedly founded: it entirely concealed the most important facts of the negotiation, and stated the others fo loosely, as not to exhibit them in any precife or diftinct shape. The right honourable gentleman had ftated that disrespect had been fhown to a foreign court by the French directory, and an inference drawn of a difpofition thus manifefted to throw contempt on all eftablished ufages. It was afferted, as an apology for bringing forward the manifefto, previous to the publication of the papers, that much mechanical labour was neceffary for preparing them for the infpection of the house; but for his own part, he could not but fufpect, it was thought expedient to give a bias to their fentiments by the publication of the manifefto, before the facts were fubmitted to their cool, and fober investigation; and the delay which was imputed to mechanical labour was purposely designed to afford minifters an opportunity of revifing the papers, and of deciding what part of their contents it might be prudent to fupprefs, and what might be fubmitted to the public eye. Lord Malmesbury was fent to negotiate for peace, and furnished with full powers to conclude, but not to treat he had no inftructions with refpect to the terms he fhould propofe, and no direction upon which to act concerning the propofitions he might receive. When he was afked if he came to treat for the king of Great-Britain separately? he anfwered, No; but for the king of Great Britain, jointly with his allies. When he was atked if he was furnithed with any powers from those allies? he again repled, No. Had he any terms to propofe? He anfwered, he would fend for inftructions. Thus it appeared, that he was empowered to conclude for the king of Great Britain, but not qualified to treat; and that for the allies, for whom he came to treat, he had not power to conclude. Could there be a more palpable mockery of the forms of negotiation? We next come to the bafis: in the prefent inftance it was laid fo wide, as to comprehend no diftin&t object, and to be reducible to no precife meaning: the French flated, that they had agreed to your principle, and only difputed its application. The principle of mutual compenfations is fubftantially recognized in every negotiation, and did not require to be fpecified. The general objects of difpute have been, in fixing a bafis, whether it fhould be regulated by the ftatus quo ante bellum, or the uti poffidetis? The minifter had ftated, as a proof of reluctance on the part of the French, that they for fome time hefitated to admit our propofed bafis; but in fact they virtually recog nized the principle when they entered into the difcuffion of terms. He who aiks, what will you give, or ftates what he is willing to receive, at once admits the bafis of mutual compenfation. When the French alked lord Malmesbury what terms he was prepared to propofe, he was unprovided with any anfwer, and obliged to fend to this country for inftructions. What inference can be drawn from this conduct on the part of minifters, but that, by thus bringing F 2 forward forward a futile, illufory, and unmeaning bafis, they expected to difguft the French in the first inftance, and fo get rid of the negotiation; and if the French, who muft have felt themselves mocked by this treatment, and have been more and more allured of the infincerity of our minifters, had ftopped all further proceedings, would they not have been fully juftified? Undoubtedly minifters expected that they would have refented the insult, and have broken off the negotiation at the onfet. They thus hoped to have obtained an eafy credit for their pacific intentions, and to have thrown upon the enemy the odium of a determined purpofe of hoftility, and an unreasonable rejection of the preliminary bafis of negotiation. Unfortunately, however, for this project, the bafis was recognized. The difappointment of minifters was evident lord Malmesbury was unprepared how to act; and compelled to fend for farther inftructions. The queftion then became, "fince the French have to unexpectedly accepted the bafis we intended to be rejected, what can we find that they muft be indifpenfably called upon to refufe?" Lord Malmesbury, who had before no terms to propofe, was now inftructed to bring forward fuch as could not be fuppofed to undergo much difcuffion; fuch as could not readily fail to effect the purpose of being rejected. Mr. Fox then confidered what had been faid by the minifter refpecting the terms offered: it had been urged, by way of apology for thofe propofed by lord Malmetbury, that it was ufual to be fomewhat high in our demands in the first inftance; that any propofitions, in the beginning of negotiations, were never to be regarded as decifive; and that in the progrefs of treating we might relax as circumftances fhould render it expedient. But was the right honourable gentleman fo ill qualified to judge of the conduct proper for thefe times, as feriously to maintain this argument? He had defcribed it as a negotiation, the ill fuccefs of which must tend to divide France, and to unite Great Britain; which muft give indubitable confirmation to the justice of our caufe, and add double energy to our future efforts. Inftead of carrying his pretenfions higher than he might be difpofed to accept, he fhould have gone to the other extreme, and have ftated them at the lowest point of what he deemed to be fair and equitable; thus fecuring the end which he profelfed, to have had in view-to render apparent to all Europe the equity and moderation of his own fentiments, and the injuftice and ambition of the enemy. Mr. Fox next adverted to the two memorials, and confeffed he had never been more ftruck with the impoffibility, even for talents the moft fplendid, to cover the weaknefs of a caufe, and fupply the deficiency of real argument, than in the inftance of what the minifter had faid refpecting Holland. Even if Holland thould be reftored to its priftine fituation; if the Stadtholder thould be reinstated, and the alliance renewed with this country, he does not fay that he would restore to Holland her former poffeffions; No; he might then perhaps only relax in their favour part of the conditions on which the present ftate of things obliges him to intift! A right honourable gentleman (Mr. Dundas) fome time fince declared in the houfe, that as we had taken the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon, we meant to keep them for ever. This was reafoning very much à la Francaife. It was curious to remark that indeed; and if France complied with their demands, what would be her relative fituation amongst the powers of Europe? She would have given up Belgiam, Luxemburg, and Italy and farther, it was required, that fomething fhould be ceded to the Emperor, to render him fecure on the fide of the Auftrian Netherlands. The three great powers of Europe would all of them be left with confiderable acquifitions. The king of Pruffia had gained a third part of Poland; Ruffia had obtained a confiderable extent of territory from that unfortunate country; and, in addition to his thare in the divifion, it was propofed that the emperor of Germany fhould be put in poffeffion of Maeftricht, or fome other place. France was only to be left with Savoy, Nice, and Avignon. Was the state of the war fuch as would juftify this propofition? Was it equitable that all the other powers fhould gain more than France? When Great-Britain acted fo unreafonably, France naturally took a ftep calculated to give confidence to the people in thofe countries annexed to the Republic, by declaring, that on no account would the confent to give them up. that in the very moment when the minifter is at fuch pains to reprefent the demands of the French as in the higheft degree exorbitant, how much he countenances them by his own. He fays, "We have taken a great deal from Holland, they have taken nothing from us, therefore we are not bound in juftice to make them any reftitution: but if Maeftricht, or fome place, be ceded to the emperor for the fecurity of the Netherlands, we may perhaps be induced to make them fome reftitution; but on no account to restore Ceylon or the Cape of Good Hope." On the fame grounds might the French fay, "We have taken much from the emperor; he has gained nothing from us; therefore we are not bound to make him any reftitution. But what are the specific propofals to the French? to evacuate Italy, to give up the Milanefe, Belgium, and Luxemburg; to negotiate the arrangement of peace for Germany with his Imperial majefty, as conftitutional head of the empire; and though they are already at peace with the moft confiderable Germanic powers, with the king of Pruffia, with the electors of Saxony, Hanover, &c. they would thus be placed in a fituation in which they would have all their treaties to begin anew. In return for all thefe facrifices, he offers to reftore to them Martigique, St. Lucia, Tobago; referving however one of them as an equivalent, if they are to retain St. Domingo. The reftoration of Belgium was a fine qua non; and Mr. Fox avowed he fhould much regret to fee Belgium attached to the territories of the republic: but if minifiers were fincere in their wifhes for peace, if they confidered Belgium as an object of fo much importance, let them not offer brafs for gold. What they had offered was trifling As to the French minifter having afked lord Malmesbury to give in his ultimatum, it evidently meant no more, than that he fhould make a formal declaration of what he had faid refpecting Belgium; a demand which furely could not be deemed unreasonable. After having heard so much stated of the value of Belgium, and fuch reafons urged why it fhould be reftored to the Emperor, Mr. Fox could not help remarking that it was not very long fince the people of that country were in a ftate of rebellion; and it was furmifed at the time, that we were by no means F3 averfe averse to supporting them in their endeavours to fhake off the Austrian yoke. But however great its value might be, was it fufficient to juftify the continuance of a deftructive war? And if it were, there was another queftion to be confidered; if, in addition to the expence and carnage with which the war had already been attended, it were proper to facrifice a hundred millions more, and a hundred thousand men, for its attainment, it ought to be very clear, that our object was attainable by thefe means. It ought alfo to be recollected, that the emperor, who was a friend to-day, might be an enemy to-morrow. It was not eight months fince he was not fo much a favourite with minifters ; perhaps, indeed, they were cautious in expreffing their partiality, left it fhould be fufpected that money was then going to the court of Vienna. At that time the king of Sardinia was extolled as a pattern of fidelity to all princes: he did not mean to impute to the Sardinian monarch any breach of faith; neceffity compelled him to conclude a treaty with the republic; and we had not heard in what fituation he was now to be confidered, with respect to this country. Ministers had already fent large fums to his Imperial majefty, and were about to make farther adyances; and the alliance could not be maintained at an expence lefs to the country than a fum of two millions annually. If we fhould not be able to grant him the fame affiftance, he might be reduced to the fame neceflity as the king of Sardinin, and compelled to conclude a реасс. When all thefe circumftances were put together, the facrifices which must be incurred in attempting to wrest Belgium from the French, and the uncertainty of ob. taining the object, the minifter who on that account only fhould refufe to make peace had much to answer for on the fcore of policy and humanity. By the treaty concluded with the emperor, in 1793, we engaged not to lay down our arms without his confent: if we urge the ftipulations of a treaty as a reafon why we cannot conclude peace but on certain terms, we fanction the argument which is reprefented as fo unjuftifiable on the part of France. We had no more right to talk of our treaties, than they of the regulations concerning their boundaries. If an abfurd and impracticable condition he introduced into a treaty, is there not reafon to fufpect it is for the purpose of throwing difficulties in the way of peace To the French is imputed all the odium and blame of breaking off the negotiation. The minifter had afferted, that we were not bound by any thing as a fine qua non; for that is impoffible, in the nature of a negotiation, until it be concluded. But whatever affertions may be, the world at large will regard the memorial of lord Malmesbury as the fine qua non of the court of Great Britain refpecting Belgium. The right honourable gentleman fays it may be recovered by force of arms; but what fecurity is there that we fhall not fink in our prospects upon that event, and that they will not rife in proportion as we fink? Amuse not the people of this country (continued Mr. Fox) by a delufive pretence, as you did by an amendment to get rid of an honourable friend of mine, and in which you stated to Europe that you would negotiate with France when its government was capable of maintaining the re lations of peace and amity with other powers. Thefe little artifices had had their ends ends; but there were times that required openness and candour. The plain queftion was, peace or war? However the minifter might perfuade the majority of the house that his wishes and inclinations bend towards peace; it would not be believed by the people, that the fine qua non, with regard to Belgium, would overbalance the affertions of members of parliament. The houfe had not the credit with the publie nor did it deferve that credit, which former houfes of commons had. and who voluntarily adopt the step of uniting themselves with their neighbours. There was one thing very remarkable, that in all this negotiation, where almoft every poffeflion of all the parties had been taken notice of, the name of the valuable and important kingdom of Corfica had never appeared. Did minifters fay, when they took it," You may form a government of your own, and be a free people?" No; they fent a viceroy. Sir Gilbert Elliot went as reprefentative of his majefty; cooked them up a conftitution, half French, half English, and endeavoured to detach them entirely from any predilections in favour of French principles. He then proceeded to make fome remarks on the cause of breaking off the negotiation. Was the emperor (faid he) a party to it? No; it was a fine qua non, made in a matter intended folely for the benefit of the Emperor, to which, neverthelefs, he was not a party, and which we did not know whether he himfelf would infift upon! Surely this might have been known before the negotiation was entered upon; when we were fo often fending fuch immenfe fums to the emperor, fome perfons employed in thefe offices might have atked the questionHad any done fo?-No; and let any impartial man anfwer, if this was not a mockery of negotiation. But faid the right honourable gentleman-Why did not the directory prefent a contre-projet ?-To whom fhould they prefent it? Not to the emperor; for he was not a party, though every thing contained in our projet was for his benefit alone. The people, indeed, (faid Mr. Fox) who may come into the power of another people by chance of war, cannot, by the law of nations, be difpofed of lawfully, till the definitive treaty of peace is concluded: but this was very different from a people who are left at liberty to choofe a government for themselves, The French were and always have been reprefented by minifters as a horde of affaffins. Suppose the Corficans had chofen the king of Great Britain as their king, and entreated that they might not be given up to thefe affailins; would the right honourable gentleman have faid, in a negotiation for peace, that Corfica was an object of restoration ? Mr. Fox believed he would not; and may not the French ufe the fame arguments refpecting Belgium? On former occafions, when the conquefts in the Weft Indies were mentioned as means of negotiation, the idea of ftatus quo ante bellum was ridiculed. He particu larly alluded to Martinique, which was not to be confidered as a conqueft in former wars; it was taken at the request of the inhabitants in it, who all defired to be taken under the protection of his Britannic majesty. Martinique was, however, mentioned in this negotiation; and the minifter had gone off from his high language. Peace, Mr. Fox affirmed, could not be obtained by a perfeverance |