that head within the fum of 500,000l. and likewise so to arrange his payments as to put an end to the account; but that nevertheless the faid promises never were kept by him, and that the advances on treasury bills, on the 28th of February, 1797, aniounted to 1,619,0491.

11. That it appears to this houfe, that foreign remittances to a much larger amount than ever were known in the most expenfive wars in which this country has been involved, have taken place fince the year 1793.

12. That the extent of fuch remittances occafioned, at fo early a period as the end of the year 1794, and the beginning of the year 795, great alarm in the minds of the directors, which they at various periods communicated to the chancellor of the exchequer ; and that on the 3d of December, 1795, the court of directors, under the apprehenfion that it was intended to grant a farther loan to the emperor, came to a refolution, by which they declared their unanimous opinion, that fhould fuch a loan take place it would be most fatal in its confequences to the bank of Englani. "That they communicated fuch refolution to the chancellor of the exchequer, who affured them he fhould lay afide all thoughts of it, unless the fituation of things relative to the bank fhould fo alter as to render fuch a loan of no importance or inconvenience to them."

13. That on the 5th of February, 1796, the chancellor of the exchequer, after ftating, in converfation with the governor and deputations from the bank of England, his opinion of the neceffity of farther af fifting the emperor, promifed to take no step in that business with

out previously communicating to them his intention.

14. That on the 11th of Fe-. bruary, 1796, the directors of the bank paffed unanimously the following refolution :

"Refolved, That it is the opinion of this court, founded upon the experience of the effects of the late imperial loan, that if any farther loan, or advance of money, to the emperor, or to any other foreign ftate, fhould, in the prefent ftate of affairs, take place, it will in all probability prove fatal to the bank of England.

The court of directors, therefore, do moft earnestly deprecate the adoption of any fuch measure, and they folemnly proteft againft any refponfibility for the calamitous confequences that may follow thereupon."

To which refolution, when com municated to him, the chancellor of the exchequer returned for anfwer, "That after the repeated intimations which he had given to the governor, &c. of the bank, that no farther loan to the emperor would be refolved on without previous communication with the bank, he did not fee any reafon for thefe refolutions; that he did fuppofe they were adopted in a moment of alarm, and that he should confider them in that light."

15. That both from the gene ral tenor of the faid anfwer, and from its particular reference to the fubftance and matter of the refolu tion then communicated to him, he gave the governor, &c, of the bank to understand, that he was bound by promife to them, to negotiate no loan for the fervice of his imperial majefty, nor to make any remittance either to his faid imperial majefty, or any foreign prince, under any pretences whatever, with

out

out previonfly communicating fuch his intention to the bank of England: that the directors fo under. ftood him; and that, impressed with that belief, they abftained from making any further remonftrance on this fubject.

16. That neverthelefs, the chancellor of the exchequer, for fome time prior to February 11, 1796, clandeftinely remitted, and did for feveral months fubfequent, clandeftinely remit, to his faid imperial majefty, and other foreign princes, large fums of money, in defiance of his repeated promifes, and in violation of his folemn en gagement with the bank of England, and confequent upon their refolution of the 11th of Febru

ary.

17. That it appears, that if the faid advances of the bank to government had been paid off when required, or confiderably reduced, the bank would have been enabled to reduce, if expedient, the amount of its outstanding notes; and that fuch option would have been of effential fervice to its interests.

18. That it appears, from the evidence of the governor and deputy governor of the bank, that if the faid advances had been paid off when required, or confiderably reduced, the bank would have been enabled to give more extended aid to the mercantile intereft of Great Britain, in the way of *discount.

19. That it appears, that if the advances on the treafury bills had been paid off when required, and as the chancellor of the exchequer had promifed, and the foreign remittances abstained from, as the chancellor of the exchequer had likewife promifed, there would have exifted no neceflity for fuf

pending the due and ordinary courfe of the bank payments ia cafl.

20. That it appears to this houfe, upon an attentive examination of the evidence reported by the fecret committee, upon a minute perufal of the correfpondence between the governor and direc tors of the bank of England and the chancellor of the exchequer, during the years 1795, 1796, and 1797. and after a thorough review of the whole circumftances of the cafe, that the neglect of the chancellor of the exchequer in difcharg ing, or fufficiently diminishing, the amount of the fums advanced to government by the bank of England; his perfeverance in directing treafury bills of exchange to an amount unexampled to be paid at the bank; his frequent promifes, and conftant breach of thofe promifes, to reduce their amount within the fum of 500,000l.; and the enormous amount of his remittances to foreign princes in loans and fubfidies, were the principal and leading caufes which produced the neceflity for fufpending the due and ordinary course of the bank payments in cash."

Proteft entered on the Journals of the Houfe of Lords, in Confequence of the Refolution of the Houfe to rejec the Motier of the Duke of Bedford for the Difmifion of Minifiers.

DISSENTIENT.

ift. Becaufe, acting according to the ancient practice of the British conftitution, and in conformity with its true principles, we hold the advifers of the crown to be refponfible for the condition of the ftate; refponfible for its internal peace, and general good govern

ment;

ment; for the prefervation of all its ancient fundamental rights and liberties; for the protection of its commerce, of its credit, and the various fources of its profperity and wealth; for the obfervance of order, difcipline, and obedience in all the departments of the public force; for the honour and fuccefs of our arms (if unfortunately engaged in war); for the preponderance of the British power, and for the glory and fplendour of the Britiff name. Inftead of recognizing in his majefty's minifters that ability, forefight, and integrity, by which thefe, its dearest interefts, are preferved, we have feen throughout a courfe of years, the affairs of the nation conducted with that incapacity, perfidy, and corruption, by which all great empires, from the beginning of the world, have found their ruin; and which, in the particular ftate and fituation of Great Britain, have nearly exhaufted its refources and its credit, and annihilated its conftitution, which have brought fhame upon its character in the eyes of foreign nations, and diffufed largely among its fubjects miftruft in the intentions of their governors, hatred of their power, and contempt for their debility.

2. Because encouraged by the uniform, implicit, and fatal confidence of this houfe in the conduct of minifters, a fyftem of government has arifen, which, if it be fur ther perfevered n, will render the fortunes of these realms utterly irretrievable, even fhould wifdom and virtue fucceed in the minds of thofe minifters to ignorance and wickednefs. That fyftem is governed by Brinciples the very reverfe of thofe by which states and focieties have hitherto been kept together. It is grounded on the

doctrine that honour and reward is to attend on crime and folly; and that men are to be entrusted with power in proportion to their difpofition to abufe it. Such perverted maximas of policy take from government all the fupport it derives from opinion. The opinion of its confiftency is loft by minifters adopting and rej. Eting, as it fuits the purpose of their power, fyftems which they alternately recommend and revile.

The opinion of its

juftice is deftroyed from feeing that power depends on a principle which confounds the first distinc tions of right and wrong. All opinion of its vigour and efficiency is loft in the daily infults to its authority to which they are compelled to fubmit. Every fpecies of diforder is hence introduced. The example of thofe who govern is followed by thofe who obey. Nothing regular or orderly is found in the intercourfe between fubject and fovereign. State neceffity, inftead of being referved for occafions of the lift emergency, is re forted to as the conftant, and every day practice of executive adminiftation. In fuch a fyftem there is neither order nor freedom; and it is the energy of freedom alone that can refift with effect the zeal or fancied fuperiority of military means. Where no power is left to correct the vices of an ill-adıniniftered commonwealth, nothing, will remai to oppofe to the enterprifes of a foreign enemy.

3d. Becaufe to fuffer ourselves to be found by a foreign enemy in this diftracted condition, when we have the means of avoiding it, feems to us highly impolitic, and wantonly to call down deftruction upon the ftate. We fee nothing in the prefent minifters fo valuable as to induce us to rifque,

for

for their prefervation, any part of the common intereft. They have already kindled, by their odious perfecution of the catholics in Ireland, the flames of civil difcord in that country. We believe that an immediate change of men and of measures would yet preferve the common ties by which the two countries are united. If, unhappily, meafures of intolerance are to be fuftained by the fword, and if that oppreffed country be torn from the British crown, as America was fevered from our empire, rather than that these minifters fhould incur the lofs of their offices, we are urible to fee in what Great Britain would be the gainer. If an invasion of these realms fhould be the refult of delaying to open a fincere negotiation for peace, fully as we rely upon the zeal and bravery of our countrymen for the event, we do not conceive that the mifchief of fuch an attempt would in any degree be compenfated by finding, at the clofe of it, thofe minifters ftill in their offices. Above all things we deem it highly inexpedient that any numerous or important a clafs of the people fhould, in fo perilous a moment, conceive themselves to be placed in the alternative between foreign conqueft, and domestic ufurpation. We think that in this crifis no excufe is left for not calling forth the whole wisdom, and all that remains of the energy of the British nation; that it is among the crimes of thefe minifters that they have exhaufted in idle alarms for factious purposes, thefe refources which ought to have been preserved whole and unbroken, to meet the difafters which are impending over us; and for having fet up a cry of loyalty againft liberty, to the deftruction of that real frength by which alone

our fhores and our altars can, in the last extremity, be defended.

4th. Becaufe fuch a fyftem is dangerous to our prefent fafety and exiftence as an independent state, and the fupport uniformly given to it, tends to degrade and vilify this house in the opinion of the people. For the first time in our hiftory the continuance of a minifter in office feems to be made a condition of the conftitution. If that minitter, after having reduced his country to the loweft ebb of fhame and mifery, fhall continue to receive and no dispense all trufts, honours, and emoluments, and to be fupported in his abandoned courses, by this house, no motive will remain to love and reverence a conftitution exhibited in thefe colours to the people, through the medium of this houfe. Feeling no intereft in our proceedings, they will lofe all respect for our character and all belief in our honour.

5th. Because we believe the prefent minifters to be utterly incompetent to the cure of the evils they have produced. As the principles on which they made the war offer no profpect for its fuccefs, those on which they have hitherto negotiated for peace afford no hope for its attainment. As the improvidence and incapacity with which they have conducted the war have contributed fo largely to produce the calamitous fituation of Europe, and to build up the prodigious power of the French republic, we conceive that they poffefs not the means of obtaining fafe or honourable terms of peace for this coun try. We cannot expect that they will hereafter cherish or encourage tl at fpirit of liberty, under which, in former times, our greatness has grown and been matured. We are

rather

rather impreffed with the fear, that under the fame pretences which have caufed all our prefent difafters, large military establishments will continue to be kept up, with a view of crushing all its efforts, and rivetting ftill clofer the fetters of the people; that, releafed from the preffure of foreign hoftility, they will have recourse to coercive meafares in that unhappy country where their oppreffions have al ready provoked the people to refiftance. We can hope for no economy from men whofe extrava. gance and wafte exceeds whatever has been heard of the mad prodigality of former periods. We can expect no falutary reformations from those who have endeavoured to engraft upon and blend with the fubftance of the conftitution itself, thofe abuses by which their rapacity is fupported. Finally, we can expect, from fuch men and fuch a fyftem, no other iffue but the eftablishment of a dominion of minifterial terrorifm, fupported by parliamentary corruption, instead of the ancient conftitution of this country, conducted according to the principles of the revolution. (Signed)

BEDFORD. CHEDWORTH.

nefs which you have manifested in the new and difficult emergencies for which you have had to provide.

I must particularly exprefs the juft fenfe I entertain of the falutary and effectual provifions which you made for ftrengthening the means of national defence, and the meafures adopted for obviating the inconveniences which were to be apprehended to credit from the temporary fufpenfion of payments in cath by the bank; as well as of the promptitude, vigour, and effect, with which you afforded me your affiftance and fupport in fuppreffing the daring and treasonable mutiny which broke out in a part of my fleet, and in counteracting fo dangerous and pernicious au example.

I have the fatisfaction to acquaint you, that, fince the acceffion of the prefent emperor of Ruffia, the com mercial engagements between the two countries have been renewed in fuch a manner as will, I doubt not, materially conduce to their mutual interests.

Gentlemen of the house of

commons,

I must return you my particular thanks for the liberal and extenfive provifion which you have made for the various exigencies of the public fervice; and, while I lament the neceffity which increafed them. to fo large an amount, it is a con

folation to me to obferve the attention you employed in diftributing the heavy burdens which they occafioned in fuch a manner as to render their preffure as little fevere as poffible to my people.

My lords, and gentlemen,

The iffue of the important negotiation in which I am engaged is yet uncertain: but, whatever may be the event, nothing will have

been