reau's defeat, and therefore, though his movement on Saint Dizier was out of the rules of ordinary war, and though it enabled the allies to conceive and execute the daring scheme which put an end to the campaign, yet it was by no means hopeless in its outset ; or, we would rather say, was one of the few

alternatives which the crisis of his affairs left to Buonaparte, and which, judging from the previous vacillation and cautious timidity displayed in the councils of the allies, he had no reason to apprehend would have given rise to the consequences that actually followed.

directed to retreat on the army of the south, which, numerous, victorious, and in triumphant possession of Lyons, was in full capacity to reinforce him, and protect the person of the emperor. This important arrangement being made, another was adopted equally necessary to deceive and observe Napoleon. Ten thousand cavalry were selected, under the enterprizing generals, Winzengerode and Czernicheff, who, with fifty pieces of cannon, were dispatched to hang on Buonaparte's march, to obstruct his communications with the country he had left, intercept couriers from Paris, or information respecting the motions of the allied armies, and to present on all occasions such a front as, if possible, might impress him with the belief that their corps formed the van-guard of the whole army of Schwartzenberg. The Russian and Prussian light troops meanwhile scoured the roads, and intercepted, near Sommepuix, a convoy of artillery and ammunition belonging to Napoleon's rear-guard, when 20 pieces of cannon, with a strong escort, fell into their hands. They also cut off several couriers, bringing important dispatches to Napoleon from Paris. One of these was loaded with as heavy tidings as ever were destined to afflict falling greatness. This packet informed Napoleon of the descent of the English in Italy; of the entry of the Austrians into Lyons, and the critical state of Augereau; of the declaration of Bourdeaux in favour of Louis; of the demonstrations of Wellington towards Toulouse; of the disaffected state of the public mind, and the exhausted condition of the nation al resources. Much of these tidings was new to the allied sovereigns and generals, but it was received by them with very different sensations from those which the intelligence was calculated to inflict upon him for whom it was intended. The information con

firmed them in the hardy resolution which they had at length adopted, and nothing remained necessary to its accomplishment but the junction of the two armies, and their maintaining a communication during the proposed advance.

Blucher, so soon as he felt the opposition to his movements diminished by the march of Buonaparte from Chalons to Arcis, had instantly resumed the offen- March 18. sive, and driven the corps of Mortier and Marmont, left to observe his motions, over the Marne. He passed the Aisne near Bery leBac, re-possessed himself of Rheims by blowing open the gates and storming the place, and, having gained these successes, moved toward Chalons and Vitry. His course had hitherto been south-eastward, in order to join with Schwartzenberg, but he now received from the King of Prussia the welcome order to turn his march westward, and move straight upon Paris. The grand army adopted the same direction, and thus they moved on in corresponding lines, and in communication with each other.

It was soon experienced, that, by the daring manoeuvre of throwing himself, with his principal forces, into the rear of the enemy, Buonaparte had necessarily exposed his own line of communication to be destroyed, his rear divisions to be cut off, and his supplies intercepted; and, in short, had subjected himself to the very evils which he proposed to inflict on the enemy. In his rapid march from Vitry to Saint Dizier, and by the closing and uniting of the enemy's armies be hind him, he subjected to the risk of being cut off and destroyed the corps of observation intrusted to Marmont and Mortier, who, retreating over the Marne, when Blucher put himself in motion as above-mentioned, entertained no doubt they would be able to

unite themselves with Napoleon about Vitry, where they conceived he was making a stand, upon his usual plan of interposing between the two invading armies. The presence of these troops was so necessary for the defence of the capital, that it is certainly the most extraordinary part of Buonaparte's conduct, that he had not warned them to retire upon Paris, since he did not unite them with his own army. The consequence was, that on the arrival of Mortier and Marmont in the vicinity of Vitry, where they expected to join Buonaparte, they found themselves unexpectedly in front of the grand army of the allies. The marshals, thus surprised, were compelled to a hasty and disorderly retreat as far as Sezanne, harassed on all sides by the numerous cavalry of the allies, and sustaining very great loss. Thirty pieces of cannon were lost in the retreat, much baggage cut off, and many prisoners taken. The cavalry repeatedly charged their rear-guard, and cut down or dispersed whole battalions. Without being actually in a general action, the corps sustained more loss than after many a wellfought day. Indeed, the unexpected and venturous movements on both sides in this part of the campaign, gave rise to events and concurrences which belong rather to the character of romantic narrative, than to the calculated chess-play of modern tactics. The next incident was one of this uncommon and interesting description.

The cavalry of the grand army being engaged in pursuit of the corps of Marmont and Mortier, the infantry defiled towards La Fere Champenoise, which the sovereigns had March 25. appointed for head-quarters. They had arrived near that place, when they heard a heavy firing, which seemed to approach directly to the town. In a

short time a large column of infantry was perceived marching in close order towards La Fere Champenoise, and defending themselves as they marched, by a fire with musketry and artillery upon several squadrons of cavalry, which hovered upon their rear and flanks, and charged them from time to time. The cavalry were soon recognized to belong to the army of Silesia, and the column of infantry to be French. The Emperor of Russia, who witnessed in person this unexpected scene, immediately ordered a train of artillery, then on the march, to get into line, and interrupt by their fire the farther progress and escape of the enemy.

The unfortunate division which thus fell upon Scylla, in endeavouring to avoid Charybdis, was a detached column of 5000 men, escorting from Paris a very large convoy of ammunition and provisions, and other supplies, for Buonaparte's army. The reinforcements, as well as the supplies, were of the utmost conquence to him. Their fate afforded another instance of the danger of the military policy of Napoleon, which, while he moved to the rear of the allies to annoy their line of communication, necessarily exposed his own to a similar risk. The column was commanded by Generals Amey and Pacthod, and they had proceeded without molestation beyond Montmirail, when their march was discovered by Captain Harris, aid-de-camp to Sir Charles Stewart, who chanced to be reconnoitring with a body of Cossacks, and instantly reported the incident to the general. The Prussian Field-Marshal immediately let loose upon them the cavalry of the corps of Kort and Basilischikoff. The French division finding themselves unexpectedly in front of a hostile army, halted, retreated, and by a counter-march threw themselves on the road of La Fere Champenoise, in the neighbour

hood of which they expected to find the rear-guard of Buonaparte, or the corps of Marmont and Mortier. Instead of this expectation being fulfilled, they fell into the very centre of the grand army, the artillery of which was immediately placed in position to oppose their farther progress, while large detachments of cavalry were dispatched to second those of the Silesian army, already engaged on their flanks. The natural military spirit of the French appeared to great advantage on this occasion. This column consisted entirely of young men, conscripts, or national guards, who had never before been in action; yet, neither the appalling preparations for their destruction, nor the inequality of the contest, nor the astounding surprise of encountering first one and then a second hostile army, where they expected to find friends, could induce them to surrender. They continued their march, firing even upon the officers, who, with flags of truce, advanced to beseech them to capitulate. One fell, who was worthy of a better fate than to die by the hands of his high-minded, though misguided countrymen, while imploring them to consider their own interest and safety. It was Colonel Rappatel, the friend, confidant, and aid-de-camp of Moreau, whom he had followed in exile, and from exile to the German campaigns. He now acted as aid-de-camp to the Emperor Alexander, by whose orders he galloped toward the French column: he was pierced with two balls while he was endeavouring to explain to them the desperate condition in which they stood, and the impossibility that their resistance could be usefuĺ or effectual. The artillery of the allies then opened on them, the cavalry charged their broken ranks, forced their way through them, and made great slaughter. The convoy fell into the power of the allies, and the whole

escort were killed or made prisoners. Amey and Pacthod, generals of division, five brigadier-generals, 12 guns, nearly 5,000 men, and immense stores of provision, ammunition, and artil lery, were the fruits of an affair more resembling, in all its circumstances, a theatrical denouement than an event of regular war.

The shattered divisions of Mortier and Marmont were in the meanwhile closely pursued, on the great road to Meaux and Paris, by the greater part of the allied cavalry of both armies. At Ferté Gauchere they were overtaken as they hastily marched through the village, charged in the flank and rear by the Prussian and Russian ca. valry, and so closely pressed that they found it impossible to extricate themselves by the sacrifice of a strong rearguard of fifteen hundred men, who were made prisoners. Their disastrous retreat was still harassed from Ferté Gauchere to Crecy, where, like a herd of deer, who endeavour, by separation, to divide the attention of the hounds, they parted into two bodies, one retreating upon Meaux, the other on Lagny; but both pursued, attacked, and losing at every mile's march, men, equipage, and cannon. The soldiers, desperate with such continued loss, could with difficulty be kept from disbanding; the artillery-men cut the traces of their guns, and mounted the draught-horses, in order to effect their escape from the clouds of Hussars, Hulans, Pandours, Cossacks, Tartars, and light horse of every denomination, that pounced upon them like hawks, when the slightest opportunity of attack presented itself. From La Fere Champenoise, where their unexpected rencountre with the grand army commenced, to the neighbourhood of Lagny and Meaux, these divisions were computed to have lost 8,000 men and 80 pieces of artillery, besides immense quantities of baggage and ammunition.