fully pay that passing tribute of applause to which the patriotism of their motives and the promptness of their measures so well entitle them.

The proclamation is examined very ably in the 7th No. and clearly proved to be inconsistent with the principles of neutrality. It was not less erroneous in us to retaliate upon the British nation for the misconduct of one of its inferior officers than it was in those officers to violate the dignity of our flag to punish the misconduct of one of our inferior officers. Το each case we may apply the law maxim, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.

The 8th and last letter contains an able exposition of the act of congress of 3d March, 1808, investing the president with power to interdict foreign vessels from entering our ports in certain circumstances.

" This law professes only to give powers to the president to enable him "to prevent insults to the authority of the laws, whereby the peace of the United States with foreign nations might be endangered." This law, in the words of it, has no immediate relation to a state of war between other nations, and of neutrality in our government. It is true it refers to armed vessels, but we well know that many nations in times of profound peace, keep up an armed naval force; and that these armed vessels are frequently employed by the nation to which they belong in voyages to, and from their remote colonies, and have frequently occasion to enter the ports and harbours of other nations, and there procure such supplies as may be wanted.

"Considering then this power to the president, as acted upon by him in a time of peace, could he with propriety, under the pretence that he was apprehensive that the authority of the laws would be insulted, and thereby the peace of the United States with foreign nations would be endangered-Could I say, the president of the United States (for the act gives preventive authority,) with propriety issue a proclamation, that no armed vessel of any nation should enter our ports, or even any waters within our jurisdiction? such an act, according to the law of nations, as long received and acted upon in Europe, would, if it did not justify hostility, cause us at least to be considered a country of barbarians and savages, for none but such do absolutely exclude the entrance of the armed vessels of any action with whom they are at peace.

"But could Mr. Jefferson under this law, at a time when there was a general peace, with propriety exclude all the armed vessels of one particular nation, leaving full privilege to the armed vessels of other nations to enter our ports or waters? In so doing he would give just cause to the nation so treated to declare war against us. So much for what he properly might do preventively, in time of general peace. Let us examine what he might do punitively.

" I will now suppose, that in time of general peace, certain armed vessels of a foreign nation, having entered our ports, or waters within the jurisdiction, have there violated our laws. In this case I admit the full authority and right of our government to punish those who have thus acted; it might punish them by commanding, and enforcing, if in its power, their departure. It might forbid their entrance into any other ports or waters within our jurisdiction. It might prohibit our fellow citizens from giving them aid or furnishing them with supplies; that is, provided the offence committed would, in sound discretion, justify such a punishment. But, I deny, that in the case I have last stated, our government would have for that cause, any right to deny the duties of hospitality, to any other armed vessels, than those, who had violated our laws, either by prohibiting them from entering our ports or waters, or by prohibiting our citizens from giving them such aid or assistance as they might need. Still less, if possible, could our government justify preventing, for that cause, or refusing permission to any vessel belonging to the same nation, or to its citizens or subjects, to make entry, and unlade, so long as the said armed vessels should remain in the harbours or waters of the United States, in defiance of the public authority. A nation in time of peace declaring itself to be in a state of peace, has no more right to punish the innocent for the crimes of those who are guilty, than a private individual in society has, because he has received an injury from B, to make a victim of some one of the family, or his connexions, who was not privy to, nor concerned in the crime. No casuistry, no sophistry can darken this truth.

"A government which in time of peace receives an injury from the citizens of another nation may, if in its power, punish the citizens according to the nature of their offence, and if the offenders oscape and thereby avoid punishment, the government injured may apply to the sovereigns or supreme authority of the nation, whose subjects had committed the injury, and demand redress; if this redress is granted, there terminates the dispute; but if the persons complained of are justified, if redress is refused, then that government, which received the injury, hath a right, as prudence or policy may dictate to declare war, or as a milder remedy to grant letters of marque or reprisal. And until war is declared, or at least until letters of marque or reprisal are granted, which is, an hostile measure, no government has a right, in any manner, to visit, upon the innocent the sins of another, nor can the sins of a portion of its citizens, be visited upon its government, until a fair candid application has been made, and the conduct of the offender is justified or redress refused.

"I have thus far considered this subject, to wit, the act of congress and the president's authority under it, upon the supposition the whole world, or what is the same thing, all nations, with whom we have any connexion, to be at peace.

"I will now consider the act of congress as an act having passed during the war, that subsists between the powers of Europe, and at a time when we professed ourselves a neutral nation. In this situation, as we were at peace with all the belligerents, and were neutral in their disputes, we not only owed to each of them every thing due to them as being at peace with us, as far as consistent with a state of neutrality; but we were also bound to perform to each all the duties of neutrality in the most honourable and impartial

manner.

"The duties of neutrality depend solely upon the laws of nations (except so far as they may be regulated by treaties) they cannot be regulated by the municipal laws of any country; the American government cannot by any of its acts either increase, diminish or alter the duties which it owes as a neutral nation to either of the belligerents; such an act, if passed, would be in violation of the constitution; it would be a nullity.

"I have already shown, that if all nations were at peace, the proclamation of the president could not be justified as a peace measure but would be an act of hostility. Yet less can it be supported as the act of a government professing itself to be neutral between the belligerent powers, and sacredly bound to act to each with equal impartiality, and to do no act, which in its own nature should benefit the one of the belligerents, as such, to the injury of the other. I have in my last number shown how inconsistent the conduct which our government hath adopted is with the duties of neutrality, and how immediately it operates in favour of France and to the injury of Great Britain, as it immediately relates to the war subsisting between them. I have shown that the proclamation could not be justified by the laws of nations nor by the laws of neutrality. And I have shown that it cannot be justified by the acts of congress, because an act of congress cannot change or alter the duties, which a neutral owes to belligerents, as those duties in no degree depend upon the municipal laws of any country.

"If then the conduct which our executive has adopted in publishing and enforcing the proclamation is not on our part consistent with a state of general peace, nor with the state of neutrality towards the belligerent powers, it can only be considered as an hostile act, and such it notoriously must be allowed: I have already proved that a nation cannot visit the sins of the guilty upon those who are personally unoffending, except when the nation acts hostilely: in that case having a right to punish the government against which hostilities are commenced, as a corporate or political body, so as it has a right to inflict punishment upon every of the members, of which that corporeal or political body is composed; just as when an individual, in his private character, beats another, although the blow was given with the fist, the person injured has a right to retaliate on the ribs, the legs, even the toes of the aggressor.

"But here the effect of the proclamation is not merely to injure the innocent crews of the British ships, thus occluded; which would of itself be bad enough; but the principal injury is done and was intended to be done to the British nation, as a nation. Hence then it is manifest that our executive has acted in violation of the pacific duties; he has acted inconsistent with neutral duties; he has acted in a hostile manner towards Great Britain; he has pursued measures of hostility towards that nation!

"But by what right has the president done this? Is he authorized so to do by the constitution? No, by the constitution congress alone have the power of declaring war. If congress alone can declare war, can the president before congress have made that declaration, himself act hostilely towards, or in other words commit acts of hostility against any nation? The question is almost an insult to common sense; as well might the constitution have authorized the president to declare war; if under its authority and consistent therewith, he

may commit acts of hostility against a nation, by which that nation would be justified in retaliating, and thus engage his country in a

solemn war.

" Is he justifiable under the law of congress, on which I have observed, to do acts hostile to a foreign nation? No, an act of congress, under the pretext of preventing the violation of our laws, or under any other pretext, cannot infringe the laws of nations, the laws of neutrality, nor justify the president in committing any act of hostility. The law question is therefore, as far as it may have such effect a mere nullity, a direct violation of the constitution. But it may be asked, how comes it that such an act ever disgraced our national code? I will, my fellow citizens, give you its history: an advantage was taken at a period when the "sensibilities" of the citizens of the United States were all alive, and that too the effect of art and cunning, and when their prudence and good sense were as fast asleep as if they had been under the influence of some one of the ancient necromancers. The members of your national legislature passively passed it, just as they, at the last session, passed the embargo law, because the president willed it."

The style of the pamphlet is rugged and unpolished, but the importance of the subject and the solidity of the reasoning entitle it to a careful consideration.

T

THE ADVERSARIA.

No. I.

"He hath been at a feast (of books] and stolen away scraps." Shakspeare. HE witty Balsac informs his readers, that in a valley near the Pyreneans, two leagues broad and five long, the inhabitants had lived, from time immemorial, in the most cordial friendship, when their ill fortune brought an attorney to live among them. These people who had never known what a lawsuit meant, before this unlucky arrival, immediately fell together by the ears; nothing was heard of but processes and appeals to the parliament of Thoulouse.