the libel such words as judicial corruption, he | to charge either the one or the other with any says, that expression does not imply a ge- thing else. If that had been their object, neral charge of corruption in the jury, or a would they have addressed the learned judge general charge of the undue administration of by saying "Do not deceive yourself-do not Justice, but is applicable only to Mr. Deputy lay that flattering unction to your soul?” Loveland. He states that the only object was, This is language which can only be apto charge Mr. Deputy Loveland with corruption plied to men who are conscious of havthat is the way in which he wishes to get ing acted corruptly; to such men, you narid of the charge respecting judicial corruption. turally desire that they will not lay the flatter-If the facts on which he argues were true, ing unction to their souls, that their conduct perhaps there would be no difficulty in getting can escape or elude the inquiring gaze of rid of it; but unfortunately for the argument, public observation; but to those whom you Mr. Deputy Loveland is mentioned in the suppose misled by error, you state the facts libel of the 17th of January, and the expres- and point out your reasons for thinking sion "judicial corruption" is in another libel of they have erred. Here is not a word of the 24th of January. In the libel that speaks reasoning. All is invective and abuse. Mark of Mr. Deputy Loveland there is not a single how it proceeds, "No, my lord, our laws word that speaks of judicial corruption. and constitution, the tribunals and jurisprudence of England, have received a wound that threatens their destruction. The Magna Charta and Bill of Rights have been almost rendered useless and abolished. The lives and personal safety of individuals have been made the wanton sport of brutal malice: and the chief security and best blessing of our immortal Alfred, the Trial by Jury, has been perverted and destroyed." By whom and how perverted and destroyed? By the learned judge who presided, and the jury who acquitted under his direction. Now, I ask you, whether to state of the judge who presided at such a trial, and the jury who, after a patient attention to all the circumstances of the case, relieved their consciences, by acquitting the parties accused-I ask you, whether to state of them that they had perverted and destroyed the Trial by Jury was not one of the grossest libels that could have been uttered ? I ask you, whether it is not holding them up to the greatest detestation? I ask you, whether it is not saying to the one, that he has been guilty of an impeachable offence, and to the other that in the exercise of their duty in a Another observation occurs to me-it is said that every one of these libels is in the spirit of fair and free discussion. Now here is a very short passage, which I will state to you: "To the Editor of the Independent Whig; The professions you invariably make to the public, as editor of the Whig, as well as under the signature of Crito, will, I hope, animate your pen on the subject of the late trial for three murders at the Old Bailey!!! The former one for the cruel, systematic, gradual torturing to death a poor boy, was bad enough, God knows, but the last eclipses every thing before recorded. Henceforth, away with the hitherto popular foolish Erskinean boast of Trial by Jury;' for the sake of injured humanity, let us have no more of these boasts. It is reported that Mr. Deputy Thomas Loveland, of Aldersgatestreet, baker, has the merit upon this occasion of having chiefly contributed to prevail upon the rest of the jury to pronounce the verdict of acquittal, which has astonished every individual. Your language is mostly nervous, strong, and forcibly energetic. Pray, for the sake of injured justice, exert it on this occasion with full force, and the effect will be great." Now here is a general comprehensive abuse of the jury, without reference to any one of the facts, and yet you are told this is a publication in the spirit of free and fair inquiry, weighing the facts on one side against those on the other, and by comparing them, determining whether the verdict was well or ill founded. It is trifling with you either to state such arguments or to answer them. In the libel against sir Simon Le Blanc, he implores his lordship to revise the proceedings (there is nothing like a discussion of the facts); he says, "be not deceived, nor lay that flattering unction to your soul, that these horrible and atrocious acts will elude the inquiring gaze of public observation," &c. Is this the language of a man who was not wishing to impute any thing but error? I understood from the learned counsel for the defendants, that the object of the publication was only to impute false humanity and mistaken mercy to the judge and jury-not VOL. XXX. judicial proceeding, they have been so far culpable as to render themselves the objects of punishment, by the operation of a writ of attaint? I ask you, whether it is not imputing to both the greatest misconduct that men can be capable of committing? It costs these gentlemen nothing to utter these libels. If they be not convicted for publishing them as libels, they go unpunished-there will be nothing to restrain them, the public security will have no hold upon them except by the tie of their own consciences; but you, gentlemen will recollect, that the learned judge, whose conduct is arraigned, and the jury, whose conduct is arraigned, act under the solemn obligation of an oath, and it is imputed to them that they have acquitted persons accused of murder, conscious at the same time that they were guilty of that crime. I cannot conceive any thing more detestable and wicked than the conclusions of these libels; the one which suggests to sir Simon Le Blanc, that there may be something in mitigation of his conduct-that 4 G this writer is willing to believe his lordship' supposed the party innocent; and the other, in which the jury are called upon to state their reasons for the verdict they had pronounced. One of these libels contains a promise to do that which the learned counsel says every editor has a right to do. The writer promises to enter upon a fair, full, and free, discussion of the facts on which the ver. dict was decided ;-but he gives no such facts, he only states that he reserves them for a future discussion; but, such discussion never afterwards makes its appearance. He says that our brave soldiers and sailors are materially interested in the decision; and, lest it may be supposed possible, that, in the discussion which is promised, but which is not given, something should appear favourable to the prisoners, he says, he shall show their guilt by a brief analysis of facts, and a comparison of the law of evidence, as hitherto established in our public tribunals, with the doctrine recently asserted at the above trials. So, you see, gentlemen, that he states, that he shall hereafter discuss the facts, which, however, he never does discuss. He hopes to persuade his readers, that, by the discussion, all those conclusions will be justified which he previously draws without the discussion. He states, that the principle laid down by the judge, and adopted by the jury, will render it utterly impossible in future to produce legal and substantial proofs of guilt, or procure the conviction of a murderer or assassin. Thus imputing to the judge and jury, the establishment of principles, which hold out impunity to all who shall be guilty of murder and assassination. nity, the public indignation, though doubtless unavailing, cannot be altogether overwhelmed by the impetuous torrent of judicial corruption." Here is not a word of deputy Loveland, as was pretended by the counsel for the defendants; but the verdict which is arraigned is imputed generally to judicial corruption, and this is the libel upon which you are desired to put this construction, that it is a mere statement of the facts submitted to the jury, and of the conclusions which the writer draws from those facts. Now, in the first place, there is no statement of the facts; in the second place, there is no discussion even of the supposed facts; and, in the third place, so far from pointing out to the jury that they had proceeded on error of judg ment, their conduct is in express terms imputed to judicial corruption. I know not, gentlemen, whether it is necessary for me to add any thing to show the absurdity of this defence. It is said that nothing more is imputed to the jury than error. This is the language they hold by their counsel to you, and they say they only wish to correct that error. Now I will just read one passage more. Speaking of the alleged murder of the boy by Chapman, the libel says, "To you, gentlemen, with his last departed groan, he committed (while hope cast a momentary smile upon his visage) his individual cause and the cause of humanity. I appeal, then, to a discerning public, even to your own hearts will I appeal, whether you have done your duty as Englishmen, as jurymen. I here pause:-I fancy I see the blush of conscious error and unworthiness overspread your cheeks." These are the words of the libel. In express terms unworthiness is imputed to the jury as well as error; and, in the former part of the libel, the charge is judicial corruption. Under these circumstances, I feel that I have detained you too long. Is it not a waste of time to contend that it is a libel of the grossest nature, to say of a judge and jury that they have acted on principles which hold out impunity to crimes of that magnitude? Is this imputing error to them? Do the defendants mean to say, I think this case is of great importance: that this is imputing nothing but error? Do-it is of the last importance to the public, they mean to say, that they were giving them an opportunity of correcting that error, by submitting to them a discussion of the facts, and affording them the means and opportunity of answering the charge against them? but, after these two first libels, you see there is a third," When public indignation is excited at the conduct of an inhuman individual,-when the horrid acts of that individual are established by the clearest concurring testimony, the plain steps that a jury have to pursue, is, to follow the natural Instinct of their hearts and understanding; and, by deciding in conformity, they still keep elevated the opinion of the impartial and retributive mode, Trial by Jury." Not a word here of any doubts as to the guilt of the parties. it is taken for granted. He goes on, "but when, contrary to all expectation, their decisions give liberty to such inhuman monsters, when they seemingly set at defiance the clamorous calls of justice and huma that the administration of justice should be pure and uncorrupt-it never can be so unless the conduct of juries is left to the guidance of their own consciences to impute misconduct to them in their judicial character is to impute to them the greatest possible crime-it is a violation of their oaths, and of every duty which they owe to the public, to the individuals concerned, and to themselves.-If once an opinion prevails that they are to be attacked in this brutal way for the verdicts they may give--if they are to be held out to public abhorrence and detestation, because they have followed that which ought to be their only guide-the light of their own consciences-it is not to be expected that they will not be swayed in the judgments they may give, and deterred from doing their duty, lest they should afterwards be exposed and held up as objects of public detestation by the editor of some newspaper.-But shall these persons; in truth there is an act of parliament which has been referred to, and which directs the mode of proof; and the provisions of that act having been complied with in this case, it seems to me that the publication has been proved against both the defendants; however, it is for you to judge of that fact, as it is of every other fact in proof before you; but in their defence nothing is said to show that these defendants are not guilty of the publication. we suffer them to be so exposed?--Shall we suffer an individual to inveigh against the judge who presides and the jury who decide on the lives of their fellow-subjects?--Shall we suffer any man to impute to the judge and jury the most unjustifiable and criminal conduct, and allow him to tell you, in his defence, when he is judicially called upon to answer, that he only meant to impute error, and that his object was, to discuss the case fairly, deliberately, and coolly, on a full view of the facts?-You have it, on the admission of the defendants own counsel, that the acquittal, in the first instance, depended upon the effect of the evidence; and, in the second, that it depended upon the credit which was due to the witnesses; and no where have you, in these libels, the facts which were proved in the one case, or the evidence which induced the jury in the other to disbelieve the witnesscs. Under these circumstances, you will arrive at that conclusion at which every man in court has arrived. You will find that the object of these publications was, in the language of the record, to bring into contempt and to disgrace the administration of justice and the trial by jury; and that, having been published with the intention charged in the information, they are gross and scandalous libels. SUMMING UP. The great and main point of the defence is with respect to the publications themselves, and the motives and intentions by which the defendants were actuated; for, it is said, and very truly, that, by a recent act of parliament, the whole matter in issue in a case of libel is to be left to your consideration. Gentlemen, that is so: the act of parliament recites," that doubts have arisen, whether, on the trial of an indictment or information for the making or publishing any libel where an issue or issues are joined between the king and the defendant, or defendants, on the ples of not guilty pleaded, it be competent to the jury, impanelled to try the same, to give their verdict upon the whole matter in issue." The act of parliament then directs," that on every such trial, the jury sworn to try the issue, may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue upon such indictment or information, and shall not be required or directed by the Court or judge, before whom such indictment or information shall be tried, to find the defendant or defendants guilty, merely on the proof of the publication by such defendant or defendants, of the paper charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same, in such indictment or information; provided always that on every such trial, the Court or judge, before whom such indictment or information shall be tried shall, according to their his discretion, give their or his opinion and directions to the jury on the matter in issue between the king and the defendant or defendants, in like manner as in other criminal cases.' Then, gentlemen, it being indisputably one of the provisions of this act, and it being required that the Court should give you, in its directions, its opinion, whether the matter be libellous or not, I have no difficulty in stating, that, looking at these papers published by the defendants-if you find them to have been so published with the intention of imputing to the judge who presided, and the jury who gave their verdict, what is therein stated-I have no hesitation in saying they are very gross libels; and I think you will have no doubt of that yourselves, when you come to consider what are the charges contained in them. Mr. Justice Grose.-Gentlemen of the jury; --This is an information filed by his majesty's attorney-general, charging the two defendants with having printed and published the libels you have heard read, for the purpose of bringing into contempt the administration of justice and the trial by jury, as established by law in this country; and they are charged to be libels as well upon the judge as upon the jury; for, there can be no doubt, that in these libels which have been read to you, there are parts which reflect on the adminis-or tration of justice by the judge as well as by the jury. The two questions you have to try are these-first, whether these publications have been issued, whether they have been made public by the defendants or either of them; and in the next place which seems to be the main ground on which the defence is rested-whe ther, when published, they were published innocently or with a libellous intention; whether for the purpose of discussing fairly and candidly the circumstances of the cases of Bennett and the other man, or whether for the purpose of libelling the administration of justice in the country, and of bringing into contempt the trial by jury. With respect to the first point, i. e. the publication, I do not know that I need read to you the evidence, for, no comment or observation has been made by the gentleman at the bar that goes to deny that there has been fair evidence of the fact of publication, and I think there is fair evidence for you to say there has been in this case a publication by One of these letters is addressed to the editor of the Independent Whig. It states, that the professions he had invariably made to the public, as editor of the Whig, as well as under the signature of Crito, would, the writer hoped, animate his pen on the subject of the tention, without discussing those grounds, to malign and vilify the administration of justice in this country, and in reality to cast upon it the severest stigma which could be affixed to it.-You have heard a great deal said with respect to this on the one side, and on the other, and it seems to me, that when you consider the observations that have been made on this subject on the part of the prosecution, they must appear to you as they do to me, altogether unanswerable.-There does not appear to be any attempt to discuss the facts, as they came out in evidence on the trial-on the contrary, here is nothing put forth but wholesale abuse of the administration of the justice of the country both with reference to the judge who presided, and the jury, who, under his directions, found the verdict. If, therefore, viewing the whole of the libels, you are satisfied they proceeded from an intention to slander the administration of justice, and not from that of arguing the merits of the case, and discussing whether, upon the evidence, the two persons who had been acquitted, were properly so acquitted; then I think these two defendants are guilty of the offence imputed to them on this record.-It should seem, the fact of publication has been clearly made out-it has not been denied:-if, however, you are of a contrary opinion, and should think the fact of publication has not been clearly proved, then you will say that the defendants are both not guilty;-if you are of opinion, that what has been published is not a libel, you will then also find them not guilty;-but if you should be of opinion, that the publication has been proved, and that it is libellous, you will then have to determine that which is the great question in this case, namely, whether the publication was with the intention to defame, traduce, vilify, and subvert the administration of justice in the way it has been administered on the occasions to which the libels refer,—I mean the trials of Chapman and Bennett;-if, from what you have heard, you are satisfied, that such in reality was the intention of the defendants; if you are convinced, that their object was, to destroy the trial by jury, and to defame and disgrace the administration of justice, you will of course say they are guilty.-If you can find any fair reasonable ground, that these papers were intended merely as a public discussion whether Now, gentlemen, upon looking farther into these men, who had been tried at the Old these papers, it does, I own, seem to me, Bailey and acquitted, were properly acquitted that a more severe or a more deliberate libel or not, then you will say, they are not guilty; on the laws of the country, and administra--but you will consider, that if such was tion of them, can not exist; but you their intention the fair and proper mode are told, that, in reality, it was not the would have been to have taken all the circumintention of these defendants to libel either stances of the case, on the one side as well as the judge or the jury-that certainly is the on the other, into consideration, and to have question for you to try-you are undoubtedly, drawn the conclusion from the evidence on to consider, whether it was the intention of both sides.—This has not been done-it is not the two defendants to discuss fairly and can attempted, neither is it affected to be done; didly the grounds of the acquittals to which but the defendants, without discussing or enthey referred, or whether it was not their intering into the merits of the question, have Now surely, gentlemen, a grosser libel upon the trial by jury cannot be published; and when such language as this is made use of, it in reality reflects, and is intended to reflect, not only on the judge who presided at the trial, but on the jury, who, under his direction, gave their verdict.-The libel consists in this;-that the laws and the tribunals of the land are represented as having, by the couduct of the judge and the jury in the administration of the laws, received a wound which threatens their destruction-Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights are represented as almost abolished, or rendered useless, and the trial by jury is represented as having been perverted and destroyed;-and all this is described as the fruit and effect of judicial corruption. Then, gentlemen, when you find such reflections as these in a publication, I think it can require but very little argument, to convince you, it is a libel on the judge and jury. The libel alleges, that the corruption must have originated with the judge, and was afterwards adopted by the jury. contented themselves with assuming certain facts, and then introducing one general sweep ing libel, by way of commentary on the facts falsely assumed by themselves. If, therefore, you believe, in reality, that it was the intention of these defendants to libel the learned judge, you will say they are guilty--if you are of opinion that it was their intention to libel the jury, you will say they are guilty. If you believe it was their intention to libel the administration of the justice of the country, and not to discuss the propriety of the verdicts which have been given, you will also in that case find them guilty. If you think the papers were published with no other view than that of discussing the propriety of these verdicts, you will of course find them not guilty; yet one cannot conceive how such could have been their intention; for you find that all the facts were not clearly brought before the public by those who pretended to discuss the question. It is for you, however, to determine on the whole of the matter-if you think it probable that these papers were published by the defendants for a fair and proper purpose, you will say they are not guilty. If, on the contrary, you think it was only their intention to throw a stigma on the administration of justice, as it was administered by the jury under the direction of the judge, in that case you will say they are guilty. You will consult together, and consider of your verdicts. Foreman of the Jury.-May we have a copy of these papers-May we be allowed to take them out of Court with us? Mr. Justice Grose.-Certainly, gentle men. You may take with you whatever will assist you in returning your verdict. The Jury retired, and were absent about twenty minutes; upon their return into court, Mr. Lowten addressing them said, "How say you, gentlemen, are John Harriott Hart and Henry White, Guilty or Not Guilty ?" Foreman of the Jury." GUILTY." 680. Proceedings on the Trial of an Information filed by his IN THE KING'S-BENCH. The KING JOHN HARRIOTT HART and HENRY WHITE, John Parker, Broad-street, merchant. Thomas Ruff, Two-Swan-yard, coach-master. Court of King's-Bench, Guildhall, Saturday, ardson; it was as follows: June 25th, 1808. THE JURY. Tadley, Swithin's-lane, merchant, Mark-lane, merchant. e the preceding Case. Of HILARY TERM 48th Geo. 3 1808. London BE it remembered that sir to wit. Vicary Gibbs knight attorneygeneral of our present sovereign lord the king who for our said lord the king in this behalf prosecutes in his own proper person comes here into the court of our said lord the king before the king himself at Westminster on Thursday next after the Octave of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary in this same term and for our said lord the king giveth the |