causes, be impossible for the Commander-in-Chief to make: therefore, it will only be requisite for me to state, in as few words as possible, the various modes in which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object, on which depends, not only the honour and glory of our Country, but possibly its safety, and with it that of all Europe, from French tyranny and oppression.

If the two Fleets are both willing to fight, but little manoeuvring is necessary; the less the better;—a day is soon lost in that business: therefore I will only suppose that the Enemy's Fleet being to leeward, standing close upon a wind on the starboard tack, and that I am nearly ahead of them, standing on the larboard tack, of course I should weather them. The weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale of wind, the manoeuvring of both Fleets is but of little avail, and probably no decisive Action would take place with the whole Fleet. Two modes present themselves: one to stand on, just out of gun-shot, until the Van-Ship of my Line would be about the centre Ship of the Enemy, then make the signal to wear together, then bear up, engage with all our force the six or five Van-Ships of the Enemy, passing, certainly, if opportunity offered, through their Line. This would prevent their bearing up, and the Action, from the known bravery and conduct of the Admirals and Captains, would certainly be decisive: the second or third Rear-Ships of the Enemy would act as they please, and our Ships would give a good account of them, should they persist in mixing with our Ships. The other mode would be, to stand under an easy but commanding sail, directly for their headmost Ship, so as to prevent the Enemy from knowing whether I should pass to leeward or windward of him. In that situation, I would make the signal to engage the Enemy to leeward, and to cut through their Fleet about the sixth Ship from the Van, passing very close; they being on a wind, and you going large, could cut their Line when you please. The Van-Ships of the Enemy would, by the time our Rear came abreast of the Van-Ship, be severely cut up, and our Van could not expect to escape damage. I would then have our Rear Ship, and every Ship in succession, wear, continue the Action with either the Van-Ship, or second Ship, as it might appear

most eligible from her crippled state; and this mode pursued, I see nothing to prevent the capture of the five or six Ships of the Enemy's Van. The two or three Ships of the Enemy's Rear must either bear up, or wear; and, in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably than our two Van-Ships (now the Rear) yet they would be separated, and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our Ships time to refit; and by that time, I believe, the Battle would, from the judgment of the Admiral and Captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from these moments are useless, when every man is disposed to do his duty. The great object is for us to support each other, and to keep close to the Enemy, and to leeward of him.

If the Enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be, to engage the Enemy as arriving up with them; and the other Ships to pass on for the second, third, &c. giving, if possible, a close fire into the Enemy in passing, taking care to give our Ships engaged, notice of your intention.

TO WILLIAM MARSDEN, ESQ., ADMIRALTY.

[Autograph, in the Admiralty. "June 3rd. A.M. At 8-20, Amphion spoke two English Merchant Ships, [from whom, according to Clarke and M'Arthur, Lord Nelson learnt that the French Fleet was in the West Indies.] June 4th. A.M. At G, saw the Island of Barbadoes, bearing West per compass, distance, six or seven leagues. At 9, H. M. Ship Northumberland, Rear Admiral Cochrane, at anchor in Carlisle Bay, who saluted with 13 guns, which was returned with 11. The Fort (Needham) saluted with 15 guns, which was returned with an equal number. P.M. At 4:50, anchored in Carlisle Bay, Barbadoes. H. M. Ship Spartiate joined."— Victory's Log.

Sir,

Victory, off Cadisle Bay, June 4th, 1805.

I arrived off here at noon this day, where I found RearAdmiral Cochrane in the Northumberland, and the Spartiate is just joining. I send you some letters of information, which the Rear-Admiral and Sir William Myers have received from Dominica and from St. Lucia. There is not a doubt in any of the Admirals' or General's minds, but that Tobago and Trinidada are the Enemy's objects; and, although I am anxious in the extreme to get at their eighteen Sail of the

HI SHE BIT Bees 11 June, 1805.

teras Lensins-General St Wan Myers, ComTher--Cd of the Facres & Bades and the Leeward

Gretel a report from the Windward side of Gros
Sul in all, passed there last night. Their

* Sink +ZƏ 2, 21 1st be elder Barbadoes or Trinidad.

2. Lord Nelson added this Note, in his own hand:

av Djur pers. Sir Tan Myers's Secretary, and extracted from and Maje Mrers has no doubt but that the intelligence may NELSON AND BRONTE.

Tiracy, Jane 4: Carlisle Bay."

Islands, has very handsomely offered to embark himself, with two thousand Troops, on board the Fleet under my command, for the purpose of frustrating the Enemy's intentions, who, it appears have determined on an immediate attack on some of the Leeward Islands; and, as our Troops have been very much harassed and fatigued in marching on so short notice from the different out-posts, for the purpose of embarking, consequently require every comfort which can be given them, and as any distinction in victualling them would, under the present circumstances, be, in my opinion, very improper, it is my intention, as we may soon be in Battle with the Enemy, and the stay of the Troops on board cannot be many days, that they shall be victualled the same as the respective Ships' Companies.

It is, therefore, my directions, that you cause the Troops who may be embarked from Barbadoes on board his Majesty's Ship, under your command, to be victualled at full allowance of all species of provisions, the same as your Ship's Company, during their continuance on board.

NELSON AND BRONTE. N.B.-A similar Order given to the Captains of H. M. Ships, Northumberland, Canopus, Superb, Spencer, Belleisle, Conqueror, Tigre, Leviathan, Donegal, Swiftsure, Spartiate. NELSON AND BRONTE.

A.M.

TO WILLIAM MARSDEN, ESQ., ADMIRALTY.

[Original in the Admiralty. "June 5th. A.M. At 9:30, weighed, and made sail to the Southward: Squadron in company. P.M. 2-15, made the general signal to Prepare for Battle. June 6th. P.M. At 5:30, Mud Fort, at Tobago, saluted with 19 guns, which was returned by an equal number. [At 6·10, a Schooner made the signal for the Enemy being at Trinidada.-Signal Log.] At 6-20, bore up. June 7th. At 5, made sail to the Westward, towards the Bocaz of Trinidada. [At 9, observed Fort Abercrombie on fire, and the Troops to abandon it.-Signal Log.] P.M. At 5:30, anchored in the Gulf of Paria, near the West entrance of the Bocaz of Trinidada: Squadron anchored as convenient. June 8th. A.M. At 7, weighed and made sail."-Victory's Log. Clarke and M'Arthur state that "On the 6th of June, the Fleet arrived off Great Courland Bay, Tobago; and Captain Henderson of the Pheasant Sloop, was directed to proceed with all expedition to Port Toko in Trinidad, to send a boat on shore with Sir W. Myers' letters, for information whether the Enemy were in the Gulf of Paria, and to communicate by signal with the Admiral in the morning. At Tobago all was bustle and apparent un

certainty, when, in addition, the following singular occurrence took place. A Merchant, particularly anxious to ascertain whether the Fleet was that of a Friend or Enemy, Lad prevailed on his Clerk, with whom he had also agreed respecting signals, to embark in a Schooner, and to stand towards it; and it unfortunately happened, that the very signal made by the Clerk, corresponded with the affirmative signal which had been agreed on by Colonel Shipley, of the Enemy being at Trinidad. It was the close of the day, and no opportunity occurred of discovering the mistake. An American Merchant-brig also had been spoken with, the same day, by the Curieux, probably sent to mislead, whose Master reported that, he had been boarded a few days before by the French Fleet off Grenada, standing towards the Bocaz of Trinidad. No doubts were any longer entertained, the news flew throughout the British Squadron, the Ships were ready for Action before daybreak, and Nelson anticipated a second Aboukir in the Bay of Paria. If further confirmation was necessary, it appeared in the seeming conflagration of one of our outposts at daylight, and the party retreating towards the citadel. The Admiral and Officers of his Squadron, after such corroboration, felt it difficult to believe the evidence of their senses, when, on entering the Gulf of Paris on the 7th, no Enemy was to be seen, nor had any been there."-Vol. ii. p. 409.]

Sir,

Victory, off Trinidad, 8th June, 1865.

I herewith transmit you a copy of a letter from Captain Maurice, dated the 6th instant, acquainting me with the surrender of the Diamond Rock, late under his command, on the 2nd of this month, to the French Squadron of Ships and Gun-Boats therein mentioned, together with a copy of the terms of Capitulation that accompanied his said letter, which I request you will be pleased to lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, for their information.

I also transmit you, for their Lordships' information, a copy of a letter from Captain Maurice, of the above date, informing me of his arrival at Barbadoes, and of the communication he received from the French Commodore, which I give but little credit to, as no Squadron or Ship, I understand, could arrive at Martinique but what must be seen from the Diamond Rock; and with respect to their future operations, they have only been mentioned, probably with a view to deceive. I am, &c. NELSON AND BRONTE.