may answer that he has been outvoted by his colleagues, or he may say that the opposition he experienced made his intended measures impracticable, that a bill he intended to bring in has been delayed for seven years because seven honest men could not agree on its text. Besides, in every board discussion the moment arrives at last when the decision has to be left to chance, to the toss of a coin.

He said in the Reichstag on December 1, 1874:

What guarantee of moral responsibility have you in the case of any institution unless responsibility is borne by a single person? Absolutely none. Who is responsible in a Cabinet, consisting of eight or ten independent Ministers, none of whom can take an important measure unless the majority of his colleagues support it? Who is responsible for the resolutions of a parliamentary majority? It is clear that it cannot be sought for in any individual, because in the case of a majority vote everybody is entitled to say that he was not in favour of the measure taken, but that others were opposed to him.

...

I believe that national affairs can be conducted in a spirit of unity only if the Government is presided over by a man who is able to give orders. I should, of course, raise difficulties to myself if I should frivolously or too easily make use of that power. On the other hand, the ability to give orders is a weapon, the possession of which is known to all, and therefore it becomes rarely necessary to use it.

He stated in the Reichstag on November 22, 1875:

The position of a Prime Minister of Prussia is ungrateful because of his powerlessness. One can be responsible only for that which one does with one's own free will. A board is irresponsible, for later on it is impossible to discover the men who formed the majority which passed this or that measure. Joint responsibility is a fiction. It may be very convenient to leave resolutions to a Cabinet and to say the Cabinet has resolved to do this or that. However, if you inquire how the resolution was arrived at, every Minister will shrug his shoulders and tell a different tale, for if there has been failure no one cares to assume responsibility.

In his posthumous memoirs, his political testament, we read:

Official decisions do not gain in honesty and moderation by being arrived at collectively, for, apart from the fact that, in the case of voting by majority, arithmetic and chance take the place of logical reasoning, that feeling of personal responsibility in which lies the essential guarantee for the conscientiousness of the decision is lost directly it comes about by means of anonymous majorities.

The board character of the Prussian Ministry, with its majority votes, daily compels Ministers to compromise and surrender to their colleagues. A real responsibility in high politics can only be undertaken by one single directing Minister, never by a numerous board with majority voting

Many similar pronouncements of his might easily be

given.

Bismarck was a keen student of history, and had learned its lessons. He was aware that divided counsels had been responsible for confusion in policy and administration and for the downfall of States since the earliest times; that divided councils had sapped the strength, and destroyed, kingdoms and oligarchies, aristocracies and democracies; that no organisation can be efficient which is nominally controlled by many heads-which has no real head but at best a figurehead; that a nation, like an army, or like a commercial undertaking, can be successfully and responsibly directed and controlled only by one man.

Richelieu and Bismarck were the greatest civilian statesmen of modern times, and Frederick the Great and Napoleon the First were the greatest military statesmen. They were certainly at least as eminent as organisers and administrators as they were as generals. Not unnaturally both were in favour of a single and undivided control of the national government and administration, and were absolutely opposed to divided control because the latter means no control, but drift, delay, inefficiency, intrigue, and disaster,

Frederick the Great stated in his Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement' of 1777 :

If a ruler abandons the helm of the ship of State and places it into the hands of paid men, of Ministers appointed by him, one will steer to the right and another to the left. A general plan is no longer followed. Every Minister disapproves of the actions of his predecessor, and makes changes even if they are quite unnecessary, wishing to originate a new policy which is often harmful. He is succeeded by Ministers who also hasten to overthrow the existing institutions in order to show their ability. In consequence of the numerous innovations made none can take root. Confusion, disorder, and all the other vices of a bad administration arise, and incapable or worthless officials blame the multitude of changes for their shortcomings.

Men are attached to their own. As the State does not belong to the Ministers in power they have no real interest in its welfare. Hence the Government is carried on with careless indifference, and the result is that the administration, the public finances, and the army deteriorate. Thus the monarchy becomes an oligarchy. Ministers and generals direct affairs in accordance with their fancy. Systematic administration disappears. Everyone follows his own notions. No link is left which connects the directing factors. As all the wheels and springs of the watch serve together the single object of measuring time, all the springs and wheels of a Government should be so arranged and coordinated that all the departments of the national administration work together with the single aim of promoting the greatest good of the State. That aim should not be lost sight of for a single moment. Besides, the individual interests of Ministers and generals usually cause them to oppose each other. Thus personal differences often prevent the carrying through of the most necessary measures.

National disasters of the greatest magnitude are obviously the most searching tests of the value of the national organisation. The Seven Years' War was fought chiefly on Prussian soil. The country had been overrun by hostile troops, had

Y

been utterly devastated, and had in part become abandoned by man. Yet, ten years after the war the population, the income and the wealth of Prussia were considerably greater than at its beginning, as I have shown very fully in another book which supplies a mass of documentary information on Frederick the Great as an organiser and administrator.1 In it will be found copious extracts from the King's writings, and especially from his two Political Testaments, which have not previously been published in English.

Now let us see what the administration of Napoleon the first can teach us.

Napoleon the First was an organising genius. His military triumphs proved ephemeral, but in the domain of national organisation and administration his work has endured. Professor Pariset wrote justly in the Cambridge Modern History':

Bonaparte directed the reorganisation of France, and never perhaps in history was a work. so formidable accomplished so quickly. Order and regularity were established in every branch of the administration. The greater part of the institutions founded during the Consulate have survived to the present day, and it is no exaggeration to state that it was Bonaparte who created contemporary France.

The French Revolution had destroyed the work of eight centuries and had left nothing but ruin and disorder. The Treasury was empty. The taxes failed to come in. The paper money was greatly depreciated. No loans could be raised. The nation had repeatedly become bankrupt. The consecutive revolutionary Governments were governments of many heads. Although the revolutionary leaders were men of the greatest ability, divided councils and the influence of popular passion had caused them to adopt the most insane measures. They had madly destroyed the national organisation and the national credit. In 1796 the louis d'or of twenty-four francs was worth from

1 The Foundations of Germany, Smith, Elder & Co., 1916.

6107 francs to 8137 francs in assignats. A pair of boots which cost thirty francs in gold cost about 10,000 francs in paper. In 1799, at the end of which Napoleon became First Consul, the 5 per cent. Rente reached the minimum price of seven, yielding thus 71 per cent. to the purchaser. Unrestricted self-government had produced administrative anarchy throughout the provinces. Edmond Blanc tells us in his Napoleon I, ses Institutions Civiles et Administratives':

For a long time no money had been available for constructing or repairing roads and bridges, and these had fallen into decay. Roads no longer existed. Where they had been, the ground was full of holes yards wide and deep, in which carts and carriages disappeared. Fourcroy reported that in travelling from Tours to Poitiers and to La Rochelle, and thence to Nantes, his carriage was broken six times, and that eleven times he was compelled to employ several teams of oxen for drawing it out of the mire. Carters would only proceed in numbers so as to be able to assist one another, and would frequently travel across the cultivated fields because passage through them was easier than along the so-called roads. At night the roads were unusable, and carters could often do no more than three or four miles per day.

This state of affairs had made transport by road very expensive. The internal trade of France came almost to an end. Wheat which fetched 18 francs in the market at Nantes cost 36 francs at Brest. Hence, scarcity prevailed in many departments. During the first years of the Directoire, out of 85,000 people in Rouen no less than 64,000 had to be supplied with bread by public distribution. During the Directoire and the first few years of the Consulate the problem how to feed the people was the principal preoccupation of the Government. France, like modern India, lived under the dread of impending famine.

The canals of France were as neglected as the roads. The harbours of Rochefort and Fréjus were filled with mud. The vast drainage works of the time of Louis the Fourteenth had fallen into ruin, and so had the dykes which protected the country against floods. The roads were infested with